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ABSTRACT
Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty Reduction Outcomes: Theory and Evidence
By
Guevera Assamoi Yao
December 2006
Committee Chair:

Dr. Jorge Luis Martinez-Vazquez

Major Department:

Economics

This dissertation examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty
reduction and explores potential transmission channels through pro-poor sectoral
outcomes such as basic education, basic healthcare and agricultural productivity. We first
develop a theoretical model to explain the interaction between decentralization and
poverty reduction outcomes. In particular, we show that the marginal effect of fiscal
decentralization on pro-poor sectors depends largely on the outcome of the trade-off
between potential benefits derived from better matching of local preference due to local
proximity, and the lack of technical capacity at the local level. This finding provides, in a
way, a theoretical explanation of the different outcomes observed in fiscal
decentralization programs around the world.
This inconclusive theoretical result motivates an empirical analysis to assess
whether there is any statistical significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and
poverty. We implement this estimation using the Generalized Method of Moment
Instrumental Variable (GMM-IV) methodology on 97 countries spanned over the period
1975-2000. Our estimation results reveal a statistically significant, but non-linear
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relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty. In addition, we empirically
explore potential transmission mechanism of the effect of fiscal decentralization on
poverty through three sectors (basic education, basic healthcare and agricultural
extension) that have been shown in the literature on basic needs and also by development
practitioners to have significant bearing on the well-being of the poor.
Finally, given the relatively high level of poverty in addition to the fact that most
African countries are far behind in attaining their Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) targets, we investigate whether the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty
will be greater in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to other regions.

xiv

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation develops both a theoretical and an empirical framework to
examine the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction. We first develop a
simple theoretical model to explore potential interaction between decentralization and
poverty reduction outcomes. Building on models developed by Kanbur and Feroni
(1991), Besley and Coate (2003) and Faguet (2004), we postulate that the marginal effect
of fiscal decentralization on pro-poor sectors may largely depend on the net effect of the
trade-off between benefits derived from better matching of local preference resulting
from local proximity, and the lack of technical capacity at the local level. In particular,
we show that an optimal mix of pro-poor goods and services is obtainable under an
economic structure that is neither highly centralized, nor fully decentralized. Indeed, this
particular form of decentralization is more and more advocated by practitioners and
development institutions, which recommend stressing on local capacity building, while
maintaining a sound coordination by central government agencies.
Furthermore, we conduct an empirical analysis to not only assess the overall
impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty, but also to explore potential transmission
channels—basic education, basic healthcare and agricultural productivity—through
which fiscal decentralization may improve poverty reduction outcomes. We conduct this
empirical study using the Generalized Method of Moment Instrumental Variable (GMMIV) methodology on 97 countries spanned over the period 1975-2000.
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We also investigate whether the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
poverty reduction outcomes is non-linear, in an attempt to verify our theoretical postulate
relative to the fact that full decentralization may not guaranty the optimal mix of pro-poor
goods and services necessary to reduce poverty. We employ a quadratic model
specification to derive the optimal level of fiscal decentralization needed to achieve
poverty reduction outcome in developing countries.
Finally, given the relatively high level of poverty in addition to the fact that most
African countries are far behind in attaining their Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) targets, we investigate whether the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty
reduction outcome will be greater in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to other regions.

Motivation
Poverty reduction has been for decades at the center of important debates in the
international community. Historically, poverty reduction strategies have relied on the
indirect effect of growth-led policy in a manner consistent with macro-economic stability.
Proponents of this view mainly advocated a central government-led effort that could
initiate a national plan for investing in key economic sectors which may have a
sufficiently positive impact on the wellbeing of the poor. However, this approach proved
to be somewhat successful in most developing economies. In general, these countries
were unable to sustain growth and presented some common “symptoms,” such as lack of
civil liberties, environmental deterioration, corruption, and a very poor record of
delivering local public goods and services; that is, poor performances in providing basic
public services such as clean water, sanitation, primary education, basic health care and
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shelter. Most of these failures occurred in an era when the scope of central government
was expanding enormously (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002).
However, in September 2000, the world leaders adopted at a Summit initiated by
the United Nations, new resolutions and strategies about poverty reduction, with a set
targeted quantifiable measures referred to as Millennium Development Goals.1 Thus,
recent issues of the World Bank’s development report (World Bank 2001) have focused
on poverty. Even few years earlier, the United Nation Development Program’s Human
Development Report started to publish an index on human poverty.2 Also, in September
1999, the notion of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) was introduced as an
integrated part of a national plan of action to reduce poverty, which later becomes the
main approach adopted by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to provide
development assistance.
It is worthwhile noting, however, that the origins of the PRSP process also relies
on the search for solutions to a series of problems confronting the World Bank, IMF and
many bilateral donors during the 1990s, when their mandates were being challenged
(Driscoll and Christiansen 2004). For instance, the IMF was blamed for contributing to
the Asian economic crisis and that led to internal and external reviews of their main
lending instrument, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). On the other
hand, the World Bank was under pressure over deteriorating economic growth in Sub1

The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are an ambitious agenda for reducing poverty and
improving lives that world’s leaders and experts from the United Nations Secretariat and IMF, OECD and
the World Bank agreed on at the Millennium Summit in September 2000. For each goal one or more
targets have been set, most for 2015, using 1990 as a benchmark (See Table A2).
2

The human poverty index (HPI) was created in 1997 and measures deprivation in basic human
development in the same dimensions as the Human Development Index (HDI). The variables used are the
percentage of people expected to die before age 40, the percentage of adults who are illiterate, and overall
economic provisioning in terms of the percentage of people without access to health services and safe water
and the percentage of under-weight children under five (see UNDP 1997).
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Saharan Africa. Indeed, there was a general perception of a lack of trust and poor
coordination between the World Bank and IMF in this region.
In March 2002, the World Bank and the IMF completed an extensive review of
the PRSP process, consulting with governments, in-country stakeholders, international
NGOs, other aid donors, and a specific review of civil society participation. Although,
this internal review concluded that it was too early to know if the process was having an
impact on poverty, there were some critiques who argued that PRSP’s principles that the
program is nationally owned and based on broad participatory processes, were marred by
important flaws in practice. In particular, the World Bank and the IMF are still charged
with endorsing the poverty reduction strategies, which in turn become a condition for
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) eligibility and further concessional lending. As
a result, the PRSP is still viewed by many outsiders as donor conditionality to developing
countries (Trocaire 2004). Thus, an overarching recommendation from outsiders has been
the adoption of the development forum as the structure within which to take key
decisions on the PRSP framework. This would facilitate broader stakeholder
participation, including government, parliament, civil society, donors and the IFIs.3
From the perspective of this dissertation, an important point to note with the
PRSP process is the little attention that has been given to the decentralization processes
currently ongoing in most of the countries covered in the PRSP initiative. Despite the fact
that PRSP process prescribes decentralization and participation as an integrated part of
“bottom-up” approaches in a framework for action that links local governance to poverty
3

See, for example, CISDSE/CI (2005). Generally speaking, NGO reviews reveal a sense of frustration that
their input is not having the impact that the World Bank and IMF seemed to have promised. While some
NGO reviews remark that the PRSP approach has given civil society more participatory power than old
processes (2001), others conclude that the PRSP approach is essentially a fraud (Guttal et al. 2001). For
other PRSP reviews see CIDSE/CI (2004a and 2004b), Trocaire (2004) and Panos (2002).
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reduction, only few country PRSPs so far have discussed the PRSP process in the context
of decentralization.4 In fact, internal reviews have been greatly criticized for choosing to
ignore the PRSP process in the context of decentralization (IMF 2003).
Meanwhile, in the economics literature, greater attention is being paid to
decentralization as an instrument in development policy. Thus, local governments have
emerged as central players. Typically, there is some form of transfer of political and
fiscal authority from central to local governments. At least in theory, decentralization
makes it possible for people to have greater influence on government’s decisions that
affect their lives (Martinez -Vasquez, Charles McLure, and Wallace 1999). In principle,
decision-making at the local level gives more responsibility, ownership, and thus
incentives to local agents; and local information can often identify cheaper and more
appropriate ways of providing pubic services (Bardhan 1997). While different goals are
pursued with decentralization reforms in different countries, decentralization reforms
commonly aim to improve the delivery of key public services, such as education and
health care; to democratically empower local communities through their local
governments; and to increase the transparency and equity with which public resources are
allocated across the national territory.
Despite the obvious importance of understanding the exact impact and interaction
of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction, relatively little is known about the
intersection of these two topics. Although a few empirical studies have analyzed the
impact of decentralized financing on poverty reduction efforts in developed countries, the
traditional public finance literature dealing with fiscal decentralization has not dedicated

4

Some of the PRSPs that discuss the process in the context of decentralization are Republic of Guinea,
Uganda, Philippines, Indonesia, Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua.
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much attention to studying the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty in developing
economies. In fact, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty is not
straightforward and not always well understood. For instance, the traditional literature on
local public finance has long viewed poverty reduction policy as mainly a redistributive
matter that needed to be exclusively addressed by central government on the justification
of mobility and adverse externality issues. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization was
associated with the concept of efficiency and was largely ignored in poverty reduction
strategies (Tiebout 1956; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972). However, the recent trend in
donor-supported development activities and poverty reduction programs have now
embraced the view that poverty is first a local phenomenon and that poverty reduction
policies require involvement at the local level, including adopting sound fiscal
decentralization program (World Bank 2000). Thus, fiscal decentralization is seen as a
policy with the greatest potential for improving public service delivery and contributing
to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of reducing poverty.
To date, however, there have been only a few serious attempts to systematically
consider the impact of the different dimensions of fiscal decentralization on poverty
reduction. A number of cross-disciplinary studies that span economics, political science,
public administration and sociology attempted to evaluate the impact of decentralization
policy on poverty reduction strategy. Unfortunately, much of these findings fail to be
grounded either on theoretical models or on sound empirical methodology. These studies
often fall into anecdote and description from selected case studies. Hence, there is a need
for both theoretical and empirical studies to address this issue in a more systematic way.
Thus, the overarching goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the relatively little work
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that has been done in form of literature to date by analyzing, both theoretically and
empirically, the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes. As
mentioned above, this study also looks at a possible transmission mechanism of the effect
of fiscal decentralization on poverty through three pro-poor sectors; that is, basic
education, basic healthcare and agricultural productivity.
Although, the substance of this study is in the realm of academic research, we
hope to obtain conclusions and policy implications that will provide a better
understanding of the interaction between fiscal decentralization and poverty reduction. In
particular, we hope to inform or help policy makers in their design and implementation of
more pro-poor fiscal decentralization reforms.

The Need for Theoretical Analysis
The theoretical literature explaining the interaction between decentralization and
poverty are quite recent and few in numbers. In the current literature, there has been some
attempt to examine some aspects of decentralization, mainly political decentralization, on
specific anti-poor programs. Although, these studies have provided valuable insights on
the hypothesized relationship between decentralization and specific anti-poor programs,
more need to be done to explain the interaction between fiscal decentralization and
poverty reduction outcomes. For example, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) proposed a
theoretical model to examine the consequence of elite capture from a decentralized versus
a centralized administration of potential anti-poor programs. They found that centralized
delivery system is more prone to captured due to lack of monitoring of bureaucratic
performance. Moreover, they found that decentralizing the delivery system promotes
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cost-effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales. In the
same line, Galasso and Ravallion (2000) proposed a model of decentralized targeting of
an anti-poverty program with application to the Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education
Program. They also found that within village targeting improved with program size,
lower land inequality, less remoteness, fewer shocks, and less private redistribution.
Other studies have focus on the role of local government in the provision of local public
goods, without any particular attention on the pro-poor nature of these goods. For
instance, Besley and Coate (2003) and Faguet (2004) developed models of
responsiveness of local government to the provision of public goods. In particular, Besley
and Coate (2003) found decentralization to be welfare enhancing in the absence of
spillover effect, while Faguet (2004) showed that the tradeoff between central and local
government provision depend on the relative advantage over information and technical
capacity of each level of government. Thus, there is an apparent need to develop a simple
theoretical framework that can explain the potential outcome of (fiscal) decentralization
on poverty reduction in a more systematic way.
Hence, our model attempts to contribute to the literature in this direction. It seeks
to explain the interaction between decentralization and the delivery of pro-poor social
services at the local government level. We explicitly introduce a generic class of poverty
indicators to assess the marginal effect of decentralization on pro-poor services delivery.

9
The Need for Empirical Analysis
Although there is a large number of studies and research papers that have
considered the impact of specific aspects of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction,
surprisingly there have been very few attempts to bring the two sets of issues together in
a comprehensive manner. The current literature has approached the interaction between
decentralization and poverty from a number of different angles, each of which has its
particular strengths and weaknesses. There are a relatively limited number of empirical
studies that explore the direct relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty
reduction using country-level data sets. In general terms, the approach of these studies
has been to use regression analysis to estimate the impact of different measures of (fiscal)
decentralization on some national poverty indicator.5 Shortcomings of this approach
include limitations caused by the incomplete nature of the measures used for both poverty
and decentralization; the challenges of constructing a data set which is comparable across
countries; as well as the difficulty of dealing adequately with endogeneity and other
econometric issues. These weaknesses limit somewhat the validity of the findings. In
addition the results have not always been clear cut. For instance, Von Braun and Grote
(2002) conclude that decentralization does indeed serve the poor, although the impact
depends on the interaction of political, administrative and fiscal decentralization systems.
Other empirical studies have considered the impact of regional poverty rates on
regional expenditure patterns, while simultaneously considering the impact of
government expenditures on regional poverty rates. For instance, two comparable studies
for China and India find that subnational spending has a significant impact on poverty
rates, although their results suggest that the pro-poor nature of sectoral spending is quite
5

For example, see Von Braun and Grote (2002).
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country specific (Fan, Hazell and Thorat 1999; Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2000; Fan, Nyange
and Rao 2005). While these studies are noteworthy, they do not necessarily examine the
impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes in a direct or
comprehensive manner.
Our analysis improves on the existing literature in at least four ways: first it uses a
comprehensive panel data setting of 97 countries, spanned over the period 1975 to 2000
(five years average), to provide a comparative study that takes into account countries’
specific effects. Second, we address some empirical issues that were not considered in
previous studies such as endogeneity issues, serial correlation, and heteroskedasticity of
unknown among others, using the Generalized Method of Moment Instrumental Variable
(GMM-IV) approach. Third, we empirically investigate potential transmission
mechanism of the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty through pro-poor sectoral
outcomes. Finally, we provide specific results for Sub-Saharan Africa due to the fact that
it is far away from meeting its Millennium Development Goals’ (MGDs) targets.

Overview of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: In chapter II, we first present
the conceptual framework by providing working definitions of poverty and fiscal
decentralization, and then we provide a brief review of the existing literature on the
intersection of these two themes. Chapter III develops a simple theoretical model
explaining the interaction between decentralization and poverty reduction. In chapter IV,
we describe the empirical methodology and the data; while chapter V presents the
discussion of our empirical results. Finally, chapter VI offers the concluding remarks.

CHAPTER II
DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND EXISTING LITERATURE
In this chapter we first define poverty and decentralization in some depth,
consider the shortcomings of the various measures used in the literature and suggest
possible refinements. Next, we provide a parallel review for the concept of
decentralization. Then we show how the evolution of thinking about poverty has affected
the policy environment for poverty reduction. Next, we develop a conceptual framework
that allows us to examine the different links between fiscal decentralization and poverty
reduction. The section ends with a survey of evidence, both empirical and theoretical, that
is now available on the link between decentralization and poverty reduction.

Defining and Measuring Poverty

Evolution of the Concept of Well-being and Poverty
Current thinking on what constitutes poverty and wellbeing has come a long way
since the 1970s, when poverty was simply understood as low income and failure to
satisfy basic needs.6 Since then, the concept of poverty has expanded to include other
aspects of human wellbeing. The meaning of poverty has widened progressively in the
debates of the 1980s and 1990s. During that period, the concept of poverty gradually
evolved from the notion of “minimum level of subsistence” to the notion of “relative

6

The main focus of poverty in the 1960s was on the level of income such as Gross National Product per
head, reflected in macro-economic indicators. In the 1970s, poverty became prominent, notably as a result
of Robert MacNamara's celebrated speech to the World Bank Board of Governors in Nairobi in 1973.
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deprivation,” which defines poverty as the failure to maintain the standards prevailing in
a given society. Accordingly, poverty measure has been broadened to include, in addition
to income, a broad set of non-income basic needs, like primary education, basic health,
and access to basic social services. More recently, other elements have been added to the
poverty measure, including intangibles such as “capabilities,” dignity, autonomy,
vulnerability, voice, empowerment and participation.
The evolution process can be described in terms of a pyramid of poverty concepts
(see Figure 1). Each concept represents a dimension of wellbeing; and each
conceptualization, a different combination of dimensions, with the combination getting
even broader and more complex over time. Sen (1999), among others pioneered this
approach with his suggestion to include basic capability in the definition of poverty.

Figure 1: Evolution of the Poverty Concept
PC
PC + CPR
PC + CPR + SPC
PC + CPR + SPC + As.
PC + CPR + SPC + As. + Dignity
PC + CPR + SPC + As. + Dignity + Auto.
PC + CPR + SPC + As. + Dignity. + Auto. + Pol. Inst
Note: PC = Private Consumption;
CPR =Common Property Resource;
SPC = State Provided Commodities. As = Assets;
Auto = Autonomy; Pol. Inst = Political Institution.

Source: Adapted from McGee and Brock,

Given the proliferation of definitions, it is helpful to group them by school of
thought. The first class of definitions belongs to the “utilitarian” approach, which is based
on a ranking of preferences defined in terms of commodities (goods and services). More
precisely, this approach stipulates that all poverty comparisons should be made with
reference to the satisfaction of the individuals under consideration, or using the
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economics jargon, according to their “utility” levels. The theoretical basis for the
utilitarian approach is thus closely related to modern microeconomic theory. This
explains why a fundamental feature of this school of thought is the need to avoid
conclusions that contradict individual behavior. This school of thought is challenged by
those who believe that poverty should be a function of an “elementary” bundle of goods.
These goods may be seen as the minimum requirements in terms of food, shelter, or even
social rights. The “non-utilitarian” approach, as this approach can be called, provides for
a flexible identification of the poor by allowing greater variety in the goods admitted to
the basic consumption bundle.7
It is also important to note that the concept of poverty is very likely to be
multidimensional, encompassing both monetary and non-monetary aspects. An important
implication is that any attempt to define poverty by focusing only on one aspect of this
concept runs the risk of underestimating its richness and complexity.

A Multi-dimensional Definition of Poverty
Poverty is a multidimensional concept and as such it can be defined in many
ways: Poverty is lack of income, food, shelter, job opportunities, or physical asset bases
such as livestock and land. Poverty is also not having access to safe drinking water,
health facilities when needed or not being able to read and write. Poverty is also about
being at risk, uncertainty about the future, vulnerability, powerlessness, lack of voice,
representation or freedom (World Bank 1990 and 2001).
Thus, alternative definitions of poverty focus on various aspects of deprivation in
wellbeing, both income and non income. The definition of poverty may also vary with
7

A caveat to bear in mind about this school of thought on poverty is that it ignores any notion of utility
(Ravallion 1996).
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values and attitudes of the society under consideration and with its characteristics and
choices as a whole. Therefore, poverty can be seen partly as a value judgment, based on
criteria that differ from society to society. In this sense, conditions that define poverty can
differ quite significantly across countries and cultures. Nevertheless, the analysis of the
causes of poverty and the design of poverty reduction policies require some level of
standardization.

Absolute versus Relative Poverty and the Use of Poverty Lines
Poverty can be viewed in absolute and relative terms. Absolute poverty refers to
subsistence below some absolute standard of socially acceptable minimum standard,
usually based on basic needs or nutritional requirement. Relative poverty compares the
bottom strata of a population to the upper strata, usually divided in fifths (quintiles) or
tenths (deciles). Therefore, in terms of income, a person is absolutely poor if her income
is less than the defined income poverty line, while she is relatively poor if she belongs to
a bottom income group (for example, the poorest 10 percent of the population).8
The simplest measure of poverty in a country or region is the share of the
population that falls below a certain income-poverty threshold. The computation of the
poverty rate, as well as the computation of more complex measures of poverty and
income inequality is discussed in Appendix B.
A poverty line set at $1 (1985 PPP$) a day per person has been used by the World
Bank for international comparison purposes.9 However, other poverty lines have been

8

A drawback of relative measures of poverty is that there will always be (relatively) poor people no matter
how well off this group may be in an absolute sense (Ravallion 1994).
9
Note that this measure of poverty is based on consumption ability. The “one-dollar-a-day at purchasing
power parity at 1985 ($1 a day-1985 PPP) was developed by World Bank analysts in an attempt to link
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used in practice by the World Bank and the United Nation Development Program, to
differentiate between poverty levels in developing and transition countries. For example,
poverty lines of $2 (PPP$) a day has been suggested for Latin America and the Caribbean
which have a higher per capita income than countries in Asia and Africa; and $4 (1990
PPP$) for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries (World Bank
1990; UNDP 2000). On the other hand, for comparison among industrial countries, a
poverty line corresponding to the US poverty line of $14.40 (1985 PPP$) a day per
person has been used in the literature (UNDP 2000; Eurostat 2000).
Many developing countries that have set national poverty lines have generally
used the food poverty method. This method relies on some notion of the insufficiency of
economic resources to meet basic minimum needs in food. There are two approaches to
measuring food poverty: the cost of basic needs approach (CBN) and the Food Energy
Intake approach (FEI) (Ravallion 1994; Wodon 1997).
Both approaches are sensitive to the price level used to determine the cost of the
bundle of goods and concentrate mainly on calories or dietary energy counts. In industrial
countries, national poverty lines are also being used to measure relative poverty. For
example, the European Commission has suggested a poverty line for these countries of
half the median adjusted disposable personal income (Eurostat 2000; UNDP 2000).
The Cost of Basic Needs (CBN) approach sets the poverty line at the cost of a
basic diet for the main age, gender and activity groups, plus a few essential non-food
items. Survey data then establishes the proportion of people living in households with
consumption (or sometimes income) below this line. The basic diet may consist of the

poverty line and poverty measures across countries. It was first used in the 1990 World development
Report.
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least expensive foods needed to meet basic nutritional requirements, the typical adult diet
in the lowest consumption quintile or the investigator’s notion of a minimal but decent
diet (Ravallion 1994). The choice of both the food and the non-food components included
is necessarily arbitrary.
The Food Energy Intake (FEI) method focuses on the consumption expenditure at
which a person’s typical food energy intake is just sufficient to meet a predetermined
food energy requirement. Dietary energy intake, as the dependent variable, is regressed
against household consumption per adult equivalent. The poverty line is then set at the
level of total consumption per person at which the statistical expectation of dietary
energy intake exactly meets average dietary energy requirements (Ravallion 1994;
Wodon 1997).

Other Concepts of Poverty
Transient poverty, chronic poverty and the poverty trap
Transient poverty refers to short-term poverty status due to temporary or seasonal
causes, while chronic poverty is caused by long-term or structural causes (Cruses and
Wodon 2003). The conventional rule of thumb is that poverty is chronic if the average
consumption of household over time falls below the poverty line; otherwise, poverty is
referred to as transient.
The notion of poverty trap is associated with the idea of persistence in poverty in
a dynamic or temporal context. Indeed, in many cases poverty has a tendency to persist
and this has given rise to the idea of poverty as a stable low-income equilibrium; even if
there are episodes away from poverty, there are forces at work to bring individuals back
to this point (Chen and Ravallion 2001; Bowles et al. 2004).
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Human development and poverty: functioning and capability.10
The human development approach to poverty tries to assess poverty in terms of
achievement or outcomes. This approach perceives poverty as deficiency in human
capability to function at a minimum acceptable standard in a given community. The
concept of human development stems from Amartya Sen’s notion of “functionings” and
“capability.” The functionings of a person refer to the valuable things the person can do
or be (such as opportunity to enjoy long, healthy lives, to be literate and able to freely
take part in the life of a community). The capability of a person stands for the different
combinations of functionings the person can achieve; it reflects the freedom to achieve
functionings.

Vulnerability, empowerment and participation
The concept of vulnerability is often associated with poverty. Vulnerability has
two facets. The first relates to external exposure to shocks, stress and risk, while the
second relates to internal defenselessness and the lack of means to cope without suffering
damaging loss (Streeten 1994). Given the high degree of correlation between
vulnerability and poverty, the former has been used as proxy for poverty by development
practitioners. The notion of empowerment is often identified as the recourse to
vulnerability as it refers to the expansion of poor people’s capabilities and choices by
increasing their ability to exercise those choices free of hunger, want and deprivation. It
also increases their opportunity to participate in, or endorse, decision-making affecting
their lives. Thus, through participation, all layers of the population would have a voice in
decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that
10

For more discussion, refer to Sen (1984; 1993; and 1999).
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represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and
speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively (World Bank 2002). 11

Causes of Poverty
The previous paragraphs illustrate how both the perception and definition of
poverty may vary according to the perspective taken of the issue. Likewise, the causes of
poverty may be attributed to different processes and social factors. In what follows we
review some of the most commonly suggested determinants of poverty in the literature,
which include regional, demographic and cultural factors, as well as institutional and
socio-economic factors.12

Regional, Demographic and Cultural Factors
The root of poverty appears to be often region specific. Developing countries
often suffer more extensively from acute environmental degradation and natural disasters,
with which they are inadequately equipped to cope. These are important contributing
factors for many households, in particular the most disadvantaged stratum of the
population, to be trapped in harsh poverty.
In general, poor people rely on basic agricultural products and natural resources,
such as public water and firewood for cooking, to meet and maintain their daily
household needs. Thus, the depletion of forests and the contamination of water due to
environmental degradation pose an immediate and disproportionate threat to the

11
12

See World Bank (2002) for further discussion.
For further readings, refer to Forsyth et al. (1998).
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livelihood of the poor who are more exposed to hazardous sites and live mostly in
countries with lack of environmental regulation (Forsyth et al. 1998).
Another important source of poverty is the occurrence of natural disasters. For
example, the recent Indian Ocean tsunami devastated many areas of South-East Asia and
took the lives of around 300,000 people. Millions of individuals, especially the poor in
those areas, were deprived from access to food, water and shelter. Houses, school and
transportation system were destroyed. Due to lack of access to information to pre-and
post-disaster protection resources, the most vulnerable groups of the population, which in
developing countries tend to be women and children, are also likely to be the most
affected. These conditions tend to deepen the impact of natural disasters by
disproportionately harming the most vital population groups that are likely to contribute
to long-term development. Moreover, the added menace of malaria infestation, intestinal
parasites, and other diseases in the aftermath of disasters also contribute to worsen the
overall condition of the poor. Indeed, according to the World Health Organization
(WHO), over one-third of Africa's malaria deaths are due to natural disasters and
conflicts (Greenwood 1999).
The high prevalence of poverty in developing countries is attributable in part to
the demographic trap. Impoverished families with many children often cannot afford to
invest consistently in the care of each child in terms of nutrition, health and education.
They may only be able to afford to send one child, usually one son in school. As result,
girls stay at home or work in the fields and are thus denied access to education, even
when these services are available. Cultural values about the relative worth of females and
males lead families to invest the scarce resources available on males rather than females.
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For instance, in societies where sons bring their new spouses to live with the family after
marriage, and daughters move away to live with their husbands, sons often receive a
disproportionate amount of the family resources, reflecting the fact that sons will
contribute more to the preservation of the family tradition than daughters. Therefore, as is
often the case, measurements based on the assumption that family members have equal
access to resources, including income, can be misleading.
Recently, in order to address the gender inequality issue, the UNDP has created
two measures that focus specifically on how poverty may affect women and men
differently within countries: The Gender-Related Development Index (GDI), which
compares women's and men's well-being, and the Gender Empowerment Measure
(GEM), which measures women's participation in each country's political and economic
systems (UNDP 1997).13

Institutional and Socio-economic Factors
Poor governance practices as manifested by the presence of corruption and the
lack of rule of law and government accountability tend to be detrimental to the material
and social conditions of the poor because of their lack of private alternatives and their
vulnerability to abusive power. Indirectly, corruption inhibits development because
leaders misuse the limited available resources that could otherwise be used for
development projects to reduce poverty. As part of corrupt systems lacking
accountability, leaders may provide services and reward exclusively their political
supporters, which in turn may lead to social instability due to rebellion and internal

13

These two measures, GDI and GEM are discussed in Appendix B.
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conflicts. The material and human destruction caused by warfare is a major source of
poverty (Treisman 2000a; UNDP 2005).
Finally, lack of employment opportunities is generally identified as a major
source of poverty, and the long term poor tend to be unskilled and vulnerable to any
small shock to the market economy (World Bank 2001). More recently, the phenomenon
of jobless economic growth that increases income inequalities and generates too few jobs
for low income groups poses a new serious threat to addressing the issue of poverty in
many countries (UNDP 1990 and 1997).14

Definitions and Measures of Decentralization

Defining Decentralization
According to Litvack and Seddon (1999), fiscal decentralization is the transfer of
authority and responsibility for public functions to subordinate or quasi-independent
organization or the private sector. More recently, Bahl (2006, forthcoming) defined
decentralization as the empowerment of people by the empowerment of their local
governments. Three dimensions of decentralization are commonly used in the literature,
political decentralization, administrative decentralization and fiscal decentralization.
Political decentralization seeks to provide political power to subnational
governments that are politically accountable to their local constituents. However, subnational governments are expected to act within the legal and administrative framework
set by higher level government, usually the central government. To a great extent,

14

For the United States, empirical evidence suggests that although the relationship between labor market
opportunities and poverty rates has weakened since 1980, changes in unemployment rates, median wages,
and inequality predict changes in poverty rates rather well (Hoynes et al. 2005).
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political decentralization requires a combination of statutory reforms, development of
pluralistic political parties, strengthening of legislatures and encouragement of effective
public interest group (Litvack and Seddon 1999).
Administrative decentralization is the transfer of authority or control over local
civil service, local regulatory framework and subnational financial management of
certain public functions to lower levels of governments or semi-autonomous public
authorities. Essentially, this dimension of decentralization seeks to assess the autonomy
of lower levels governments in managing local affairs (for example, their ability to hire
and fire staffs working for local governments).
Fiscal decentralization is the empowerment of people through the fiscal
empowerment of their governments. It is mainly the transfer of fiscal decision-making
power and management to lower levels of governments (Bahl 2006, forthcoming).
A successful fiscal decentralization program should encompass four building blocks
commonly referred to as the four pillars of fiscal decentralization: the assignment of
expenditures responsibilities, the assignment of revenues sources, the allocation of
intergovernmental fiscal transfers or grants and subnational borrowing.
The first pillar of fiscal decentralization, Expenditures Responsibilities is
concerned about assessing the functions and expenditures responsibilities of each level of
government. It recommended that the assignment of expenditures responsibilities be
guided by the subsidiary principle, which suggests that government good and service
should be provided at the lowest level of government with capacity to efficiently
providing this good or service (Martinez-Vazquez 1998).
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The second pillar of fiscal decentralization, Revenue Assignment deals with the
question of which revenue sources local government should receive. That is, which taxes
and non-taxes revenues should be made available to local government? The main idea of
the assignment of revenues, in the context of fiscal decentralization, is to give some
revenue discretion to local governments to implement some social programs relevant for
their constituents. To achieve the revenue assignment process, some taxes are assigned to
local governments. The general principle is that local government revenue sources need
to be as stable as possible. In addition, local taxes should be easy to administer and
related to the benefit received by local residents.
The third pillar of fiscal decentralization, Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers is
necessary to ensure that local governments have sufficient revenue to fund their
expenditure responsibilities. These transfers are usually in form of grants from higher
level of government to fund activities of subnational governments. There are different
forms of grants or transfers used for a wide variety of purposes from vertical to horizontal
fiscal imbalance. Vertical imbalance occurs when there is a gap between the fiscal need
and the resources available to different level of government; whereas horizontal
imbalance refers to a situation where the resources allocation between government units
at the same level is not equal. Moreover, transfer can be unconditional or conditional,
made in a form of a block grant or matching grant.
The fourth pillar of fiscal decentralization is Subnational Borrowing is the last
pillar of fiscal decentralization. This pillar is important in the sense that often subnational governments do not succeed in balancing their budget with their own revenues
sources and transfers received from higher level of government; this is a situation of
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fiscal deficit, which calls for the incurrence of subnational debt or borrowing. In
principle however, efficient fiscal decentralization policy requires subnational to act
responsibly by adopting a hard budget constraint.
There are also three alternative forms of decentralization are commonly
mentioned in literature: deconcentration, delegation and devolution.
Deconcentration is considered the weakest form of decentralization in the sense
that central government body grants only a relative autonomy to its appointed field
offices that ultimately report to him. Delegation is one of most observed form of
decentralization around the world. In this setting, local government officials have some
discretion over responsibilities but are subject to strict control of higher-level
government. Devolution represents the most complete form of decentralization, since a
great deal of autonomy is given to locally elected government bodies to manage
programs and adopt policy of relevance to their constituents.15

Measures of Fiscal Decentralization
The two measures of decentralizations most commonly used in the literature are
decentralization ratios calculated for government revenues and expenditures respectively.
Thus, on the expenditure side, decentralization is measured as a ratio of local government
spending to general government spending (Oates 1972; Zhang and Zou 1998; Davoodi
and Zou 1998). Essentially such a ratio measures the relative responsibility of local
governments for administration and delivery of public services. It represents the share of
public expenditures in a particular sector that falls under the authority of local

15

See Bird (1993); Bird and Vaillancourt (1998); Litvack and Seddon (1999); and Martinez-Vazquez and
McNab (2003).
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governments, and is therefore subject to the merits and dangers of decentralized decisionmaking.
However, local expenditures result from an interaction of the scope of
responsibilities devolved to local governments, on the one hand, and local demand for
these services and efficiency of their provision, on the other hand. A ratio of local/central
expenditures can be misleading if local governments simply act as spending agents of the
upper-level governments and are constrained by conditionalities attached to
intergovernmental revenue.
As an alternative, decentralization can be measured as a ratio of local government
revenues to the general government revenue (Oates 1985; Woller and Phillips 1998; and
Akai and Sakata 2002). This second measure of fiscal decentralization complements the
first in a sense that it shows whether taxation powers allow local governments to
discharge their functions independently. Essentially it measures relative power of local
governments to finance their services. However, this measure can overstate the role of the
central government if a large portion of its revenue is transferred to fund administration
and delivery of public services by subnational governments.
Hunter (1977) recognized the important role of the transfer system in determining
the level of fiscal dependence or autonomy of subnational government, as the design of
transfer system determines the degree to which subnational governments have control
over the resources at their disposal. Although transfer schemes are generally designed to
address vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances,16 different transfer types gives central
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Vertical fiscal balance is said to exist when there is a broad correspondence between the expenditure
responsibilities assigned to each level of government and the fiscal resources available to them to carry out
these responsibilities. Horizontal imbalances arise because of differences in fiscal capacity and/or
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government officials varying degrees of control over local resources. Based on the
presumption that conditional transfers, unconditional transfers (including
intergovernmental borrowing) and shared revenues provide local governments with
increasing levels of fiscal control, Hunter defined a set of three coefficients of vertical
fiscal imbalance (VFI).17 The coefficient is calculated as the share of subnational
expenditures that are financed from sources not controlled by subnational governments.
The difference between the three coefficients is that they apply incrementally narrow
definitions of what resources are under the control of subnational governments18 so that:

VFI 1 =

Conditiona l Transfers
Subnationa l Expenditur es

VFI 2 =

Conditiona l Transfers + Unconditio nal Transfers
Subnationa l Expenditures

VFI 3 =

Conditiona l Transfers + Unconditional Transfers + Re venue Sharing
Subnationa l Expenditures

By construction, the coefficient takes on a value between zero and one, with values closer
to one indicating larger fiscal imbalance and values closer to zero indicating greater fiscal
balance. Of course, the narrower the definition of local control that is applied, the greater
the resulting fiscal imbalance, so that we generally expect VFI 3 > VFI 2 > VFI 1. While
Hunter’s judgments as how to assess budgetary control could be questioned, variants of
this approach are still used despite the inherent subjectivity (e.g., Stein 1999).
expenditure needs across jurisdictions, which may lead to the implementation of equalization schemes. For
a more comprehensive discussion of fiscal imbalances, see Bird and Tarasov (2004).
17
There are slightly different applications of Hunter’s original formulation. For instance, see MartinezVazquez and Boex (2001) and Bird and Tarasov (2004).
18
As specified here, VFI 1 supposes that local governments have no budgetary control over conditional
transfers, but are able to exert budgetary control over all remaining local fiscal resources; VFI 2 supposes
that local governments have no budgetary control over either conditional or unconditional transfers, while
VFI 3 presumes local governments essentially only have control over own locally generated revenue
sources.
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Besides the shares of different levels of government in total public revenues and
expenditures, empirical studies also measure the number and average size of jurisdictions
at each level. All other things being equal, a larger number of smaller local governments
would imply higher fiscal decentralization. This can have several interpretations: degrees
of freedom for tailoring public goods to heterogeneous preferences; intensity of
competition among jurisdictions; concentration of bargaining power, and so on. But, the
issue of the number of local government units is also connected to economies of scale,
inter-jurisdictional disparities and volatility of local revenues. This aspect of an
intergovernmental finance system has been measured as the absolute number of local
jurisdictions, which can be normalized by population or land area.19 Thus, while the share
of state governments in India’s total revenue and expenditures is significant, the number
of states relative to the national population is not large, suggesting a high degree of
centralization.

Issues in Measuring Fiscal Decentralization
As we remarked above, a single decentralization ratio cannot capture the entirety
of powers assigned to the subnational level. This is because different aspects of
government activities (regulation, financing, administration, and delivery) cannot be
captured with the same indicator. In fact, regulation, while being the most common form
of government intervention, cannot be measured by any indicators constructed from fiscal
data.20 Setting aside the regulation aspect, we can use fiscal data to separately
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See, for example, Oates (1985), Nelson (1986) and Eberts and Gronberg (1990).
Among other things, delineation of the power of regulation also includes what is referred to by some
scholars as administrative decentralization (Litvack and Seddon 1999).
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approximate other aspects of fiscal decentralization by properly modifying the
decentralization ratio technique.
A number of decentralization practitioners (for example Prud’homme 1995 and
Tanzi 1996) have pointed out several other institutional factors that may affect the
outcome of fiscal decentralization:
The accountability of subnational governments to constituents: In many countries,
local officials are not elected by popular vote, but are appointed. In this case, voters may
not express their preferences through elections, and may not replace those who do not
represent their views. The impact of this factor is often referred to as “political
decentralization.”
The possibility for people to choose where to reside: This enables people to “vote
with their feet,” but requires developed housing and labor markets.
Social capital: If local social customs entrench economic backwardness of some
groups (e.g., women), decentralization might make things worse. Also, transitional
countries have extremely atomized societies after decades of citizens’ passivity prevailing
under the communist regime. It will take some time and experience of civic participation
for local residents to build social capital, including positive beliefs about their neighbors
and local community, and willingness to cooperate in order to improve the community.
A certain degree of independence of the subnational governments from the
national government: Local governments should have some freedom to choose how they
will allocate their revenue resources among competing expenditure demands. This is not
always the case. Compensation rates for public employees are often fixed and beyond the
control of local governments. In some countries, local governments must seek approval
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of their budgets from higher level governments. All this is related to the central
government’s regulatory powers over local affairs (or “administrative centralization” as
often referred to in policy literature).
The availability of qualified and integral staff at the local level: It is argued that
skilled fiscal managers are too scarce in developing countries to be shared between the
central and local governments.
A minimum of fiscal management and budgeting institutions: Clear rules of
financial accounting and budgeting at all levels of government ensure some transparency
of public finances and thus accountability to constituents.
The preceding discussion has several practical implications for assessing the
impact of decentralization. First, fiscal decentralization unfolds along several dimensions
at different paces and thus the progress should be measured separately for each of them.
Second, when trying to explain the variation in the outcome of interest (e.g., poverty), we
need to include the measures of all aspects of decentralization as explanatory variables.
Finally, in addition to the attributes for regulation, financing, and administration of public
goods, we also need to control for other institutional arrangements such as: vertical
structure of subnational jurisdictions, political arrangements including legal status of
local authorities, clarity in the delineation of powers among levels of government, or
subnational borrowing powers and financial infrastructure.
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Reducing Poverty under Fiscal Decentralization
Although several past studies have attempted to link poverty and decentralization,
most of these studies have relied on individual country cases and anecdotal evidence. In
addition, these studies often lack clear definitions for the variables being used on the
poverty and decentralization sides. In the previous sections of this study we have
attempted to provide clear definitions for the various dimensions of poverty and
decentralization. In this section we will attempt to develop a conceptual framework to
guide our thinking on how these two variables interact.

Conceptual Linkages: The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Poverty Reduction
Because poverty is best defined as deprivation of various aspects of well-being, it
is logical to seek conceptual linkages via the direct and indirect impacts that
decentralization may have on these well-being components: private income, basic needs,
and security. In the subsequent chapters, detailed discussion of separate elements of
decentralization suggests that satisfaction of the basic needs of the population is the area
of poverty reduction where most benefits of decentralization are likely to occur.
However, in an indirect way, decentralization also affects generation and redistribution of
income and vulnerability of the poor to economic downturns.
There are several potentials ways in which decentralization may affect basic
needs of the population through the provision of services in areas such as primary
education, basic health and social services. Essentially, these impacts can take place at
the various stages of government action aimed toward satisfaction of these basic needs.
Clearly, decentralization policies can affect the level of public resources that are allocated
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to these expenditure areas; it can affect the way these expenditures translate into
government programs and the manner in which these programs are implemented; finally
decentralization can also affect whether these program actually reach the targeted
population groups.
More generally, decentralization can bring an improvement at each of these stages
by promoting good governance. Good governance has been found to improve a variety of
outcomes, such as school achievement, quality of life indicators, or even GDP growth
(Kaufmann et al. 2000). Decentralization and good governance are in many ways
symbiotic and reinforcing processes, especially when political decentralization (with
local elections and participation) is present (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2005; Blair
2000; and Manor 1999). To the extent that decentralization and better governance
improve local services and outcomes that are related to the wellbeing of the poor,
reductions in absolute poverty should follow. Relative poverty may also be reduced if the
improvements in the quality of services are in those areas that are more than
proportionally consumed by the poor.21
Decentralization can also improve the prioritization of budget allocations (leading
to the more effective allocation of programs favoring the poor) through better access to
information about needs and costs. Thus, it seems to be the case that the composition of
budgets tends to be different in decentralized versus centralized systems, with
decentralized systems spending relatively more on social services, which have the
potential of benefiting the poor (Arze et al. 2005).
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Note that even Pareto-improving growth can increase inequality and thus measures of relative poverty,
despite the fact that income for the poor has increased (see Ravallion 2004).
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Other stages of the budgeting process may be positively impacted by
decentralization. Decentralization may also make a difference in the implementation of
budgeted priorities by ensuring that resources budgeted for the poor reach their intended
destination. More effective implementation of the programs may be the result of local
input and participation, improved quality of the information used for implementing
programs, and by enhance accountability of local officials to their constituencies. Better
accountability and improved flows of information may also create incentive for service
providers (public entities or private contractors alike) to deliver services effectively and
efficiently.
Enhanced efficiency in service delivery can directly improve access by the poor to
basic services, such as education, health, water, sewage and electricity. For example,
under the EDUCO program in El Salvador, empowering community associations to hire
and fire teachers in community-managed schools resulted in increased net enrollments
and significantly improved standardized test scores, while teacher absenteeism fell. These
improvements in service delivery performance have been attributed to the fact that local
communities have more information and a greater stake in monitoring service delivery.
Similarly, parent-teacher associations, water user associations, community health groups,
and so on can play an effective role in encouraging suppliers, tailoring services to needs
identified by communities, and holding providers accountable for service delivery.22
However, as suggested by Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998), these benefits of
decentralized service delivery can depend critically on the level of capture by local elites
and on the level and nature of local inequality. If there is local capture and the interests of
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The World Bank’s (2004) World Development Report provides many examples and substantial evidence
on how these mechanisms actually work.
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the local political elites are not aligned with those of the local poor, decentralization may
work against the wellbeing of the poor.23 Similarly, in situations with pronounced
inequality in local relations of power and authority, decentralization, and in particular the
decentralization of poverty programs in such contexts can worsen local inequality and
reproduce or entrench local power relations (Conning and Kevane 2002; and Galasso and
Ravallion 2005).24
Besides non-income basic needs, decentralization can also enhance economic
opportunities for the poor. There are four ways in which decentralization may affect
private income. First, decentralization may facilitate economic growth through its impact
on macroeconomic stability (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2005; and Agenor 2004).
Macroeconomic recessions decrease the probability of finding new employment and the
level of earnings for those already employed. Second, decentralization can enhance
economic growth through the level and quality of economic infrastructure (roads, ports,
and so on) as we explained earlier. Third, decentralization can promote the inclusion of
poor people in the growth process by removing constraints and empowering them to take
control of their own development (through better education and health) and to take
advantage of existing economic opportunities (Stern et al. 2005). Finally, private income
can be affected through redistributive policies both via taxation and allocation of public
resources. We further develop these themes in subsequent sections chapters of this study.

23

Inherited social institutions might conflict with the participation of excluded groups. The literature shows
that pro-poor decentralization programmers in some countries (e.g. Malawi, Sri Lanka) have been
compromised by the existence of traditional power structures and the presence of local patron-client
relationships that have been perpetuated after the implementation of reform programs.
24
Note that democratic governance does not guarantee by itself the implementation of pro-poor policies at
the local level. This would require the majority of local population to favor pro-poor expenditures and to
participate in the political process at least by voting. However, the poor are less educated and have a lower
propensity to vote or to register to vote, and generally to participate in political process.
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The third aspect of poverty that can potentially be affected by decentralization
relates to vulnerability. Economic instability tends to affect the poor more directly
because of their higher vulnerability to economic turmoil due to the lack financial
cushions and personal assets, diminished access to safety nets, and so on (Skoufias 2003).
Because poor households mostly rely on informal insurance arrangements through their
extended family and community, they are insecure in the face of an economic crisis
affecting the entire community. Moreover, the kind of coping strategies they have to rely
on in those circumstances can entrench poverty and transmit it to other generations
(selling productive assets, reducing healthcare and nutrition for their children,
reallocating their time from schooling to earning income, etc). Depreciation of currency
associated with an economic crisis can increase the relative price of staple foods, which
usually account for a large share of poor household budget. Moreover, fiscal
retrenchment pursued by the government during an economic crisis usually involves cuts
in social programs, which are critically important for the poor. Also there are theoretical
arguments and empirical support to the notion that inflation hurts the poor relatively more
than the rich (Easterly and Fischer 2001).
Also civil conflicts are associated with a rise in poverty due to population
displacement and destruction of infrastructure. Potentially, decentralization can reduce
vulnerability of the poor to such external shocks (Spoor 2004). Improved representation
and organization of formerly excluded groups through decentralized governance can
enable the poor to have better access to safety nets and social security schemes, reducing
their vulnerability and insecurity (Jutting et al. 2004). Also, by establishing grounds for
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political consensus in ethnically divided societies, decentralization can reduce instability,
to which the poor are most vulnerable (Bird et al. forthcoming).

The Risks of Fiscal Decentralization for Poverty Reduction
Decentralization, as we have seen above can be quite instrumental in the fights
against poverty. However, if decentralization is not done right, there is the risk that those
potential benefits not only will not materialize but also that it will tend to aggravate the
poverty problem. On the macroeconomic side, a “botched up” decentralization process
can easily lead to economic macroeconomic instability, an inefficient allocation of
resources, and slower economic growth. On the microeconomic service-delivery side,
there are three specific ways in which decentralization can fail to translate into better
services for poor people (see Keefer and Khemani 2003):
First, governments may misallocate budgets by spending resources on the wrong
groups of people. Second, even when resources are allocated correctly, they may not
reach their intended destinations if organizational and incentive problems in public
agencies lead to misappropriation or theft. Third, even when resources reach a school or
health clinic, providers may have weak incentives, motivations, or capacities to deliver
services effectively.
These risks become more eminent, of course, as the particular decentralization
design deviates from the maxims of local discretion, voice, and accountability. On the
other hand, the risks are minimized when certain institutional conditions, such as political
freedoms, adequate human and physical capital bases, or free information flows are
present.
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Many empirical studies, some of which are surveyed immediately below, show
that practically all countries in which decentralization has had a positive impact on
poverty can be categorized as “free,” following the Freedom House index.25 Also
countries in which decentralization has had a positive impact on poverty have a literacy
rate of over 70 percent, in sharp contrast with the bad performers, where the rate lies
below 50 percent (Jutting et al. 2004).
To be effective, political accountability requires public access to information.
Besley and Burgess (2001) find that in India, states that are more responsive to food
shortages tend to also be those with higher levels of newspaper circulation, electoral
turnout, and literacy. In contrast, these authors also find that richer states do not tend to
be more responsive than poorer states. In Uganda, when evidence of leakage of public
school resources emerged following the implementation of “expenditure tracking”
exercises, the central government launched an information campaign. It began publishing
monthly transfers to school districts in newspapers, broadcasting them on radio, and
requiring primary schools to post the information. As a result the information on leakage
became a powerful driver of public action, and the level of leakage fell significantly
(Reinikka and Svensson 2004).
Other preconditions for a successful impact of decentralization on poverty are in
the realm of fiscal institutions. For example, local governments might be unable to act on
their superior knowledge of local needs and costs if they are bound by financial
regulations imposed by the central government. Moreover, citizens may be more
reluctant to engage in local budget issues if local governments are not delegated enough

25

An exception may be China, where decentralization may also have had a somewhat positive impact on
poverty despite being “not free.” See Jutting et al. (2004).
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fiscal autonomy. We provide further discussion of these risks and conditions necessary to
mitigate them in subsequent sections.

Existing Literature on the Study of Decentralization and Poverty
In this subsection we will first review the recent trends in poverty and
decentralization in different regions of the world and whether these trends have been
moving together or apart. Next, we review the literature, both theoretical and empirical to
see what has been found in previous studies on the relationship between decentralization
and poverty.

Global Trends in Poverty and Decentralization
Figure 2 illustrates current poverty trends around the world. An important
observation is that, on average, poverty, as measured by the headcount ratio has
decreased dramatically over the last two decades.26 Most of this reduction occurred in the
early eighties with some further improvement in the mid-nineties. The most remarkable
change was experienced by East Asian countries, which moved from the largest poverty
headcount (63 percent) in 1981 to one of the smallest in 2001 (20 percent). South Asian
countries also show a similar reduction in poverty headcount (from 58 percent in 1981 to
31 percent in 2001). At the same time the poverty headcount in Sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America mostly remained flat at 50 percent and 40 percent, respectively. On the
other hand, Eastern European and Central Asian countries experienced a dramatic

26

Recall that the headcount ratio is defined as the share of the population with below $1 per day.
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increase in poverty headcount to 22 percent in 1993 from around 7 percent in the
previous decade.

Figure 2: Trend in Poverty in the World
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As the year 1990 constitutes the beginning of intensive poverty reduction policy
reforms, it has been identified as the benchmark-year for the monitoring of the
millennium development goals. Overall, since 1990 poverty reduction has been less
dramatic than in the 1980s. Again, we observe significant improvements in East and
South Asia. A slight improvement is also registered in Latin America. However, SubSahara African countries have experienced a slight increase in the level of poverty. In
Eastern Europe and Central Asia the poverty hike associated with collapse of the
communist regime was followed by further deterioration until 1999 when the trend
appears to have turned around.
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Using a non-income poverty approach as measure by Human Development Index
(HDI), the story is slightly different. While, it is recognized that there is a link between
income and other potential measures of the quality of life, it is also easy to show that
across countries or regions at a single time, that link is far from linear and universal.

Figure 3: Expenditure Decentralization Ratio
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The Indian state of Kerala is perhaps the best-known example. This state has an
income per capita below $300 yet a life expectancy of 72, an infant mortality rate of 13
per 1,000 and only a 9 percent illiteracy rate—far better than a number of other wealthier
states in India and countries around the world. Preston (1975), estimated that between the
1930s and the 1960s income could only account for around 10–25 percent of the
improvement in life expectancy in the world as a whole. Similar to poverty,
decentralization is also a world phenomenon. A recent World Bank study notes that out
of 75 developing and transitional countries with populations greater than 5 million, all but
12 claim to be embarked on some form of transfer of political power to local units of
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government (Dillinger 1994).These decentralization processes have been motivated by
diverse reasons spanning from democratization to economic reforms to preventing
growing ethnic conflicts (Zeikate 2004).
As illustrated in Figure 3, since 1990 the expenditure decentralization ratio
increased throughout the world.27 However, this follows a period of centralization in the
eighties. Despite the recent trend, the geographical differences in the role of local
government remain virtually unchanged. Thus, the decentralization ratios in developing
and transitional countries throughout the world are below the level observed in OECD
countries. The only exception is India, where states—which are larger than most OECD
countries—have significant expenditure responsibilities with little decentralization below
the state level. Recently the decentralization of expenditures in Latin American and
Caribbean countries approached the OECD level. At the same time, the share of
government expenditures accounted for by local governments in the Middle East and East
Asia is still only one third of the OECD level.
According to the “integral decentralization ratio” depicted in Figure 4, the role of
subnational governments is smaller than what would be suggested by the share of public
expenditures they formally undertake (again with the exception of India’s states).28
Thus, the process of decentralization is not that pronounced outside the expenditure side
of the budget. Despite its small magnitude, a recent increase in integral decentralization
ratios is evident for all geographic regions. Again we see that Latin American and

27

The expenditure decentralization ratio is defined as public expenditures at the subnational level divided
by total government expenditures.
28
The integral indicator of the extent of decentralization is defined as a ratio of completely decentralized
expenditures to completely centralized expenditures.
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Caribbean countries have achieved most progress and approached the OECD level of
decentralization by the late nineties.

Figure 4: Integral Decentralization Ratio
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Without any pretension at this stage of implying statistical causation, it is quite
interesting to investigate the simple correlation between fiscal decentralization (measured
as the ratio of sub-national expenditures to total government expenditures) and poverty
reduction outcomes (as captured by HDI) measured in 1975-2000 country average figures
(see Figure 5). In this sample of countries, a number of developing countries, such as
Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and South Africa appear to present the best scenarios for a
positive association between the process of fiscal decentralization and poverty reduction
outcomes. This is in contrast to what took place in a number of other developing
countries, such as Kenya, Gambia, Malawi and Ethiopia, where high poverty is
associated with little decentralization.
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Graphical illustration of the link between Decentralization and Poverty, 1975-2000
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The negative relationship between decentralization and poverty is captured by the
fitted line on the left panel of Figure 5, having a downward slope for low to moderate
levels of decentralization. The reverse of the relationship at the high level of
decentralization is due to a special case of India, where high degree of decentralization
was not associated with substantial improvement in human development over the sample
period. However, as discussed below, Indian states have undergone diverse form of
decentralization method and the evidence within states is mixed.29 Thus, although it
appears that there may be a positive relationship between the level of decentralization and
poverty reduction outcomes, the transmission mechanism and the exact magnitude can

29

A basic failure of India decentralization has been that most decentralization has taken place at the
federal-state level with little decentralization taking place at the state-local level, at the same time many
states in India are larger than most countries in the world (Bahl et al. 2005).

43
only be determined by a sound empirical analysis. The next subsections focus on these
particular issues.

Theoretical Literature on the Study of Decentralization and Poverty
There are a number of theoretical models that have indirectly attempted to study
the interaction between decentralization and poverty. In fact, it is fair to say that the
theoretical literature on the direct link between decentralization and poverty reduction is
still at its infancy. The majority of these researches approach the issue on the political or
institutional angle, without any particular attention to the fiscal aspect of decentralization.
Moreover, the focus of these papers is often on some country specific anti-poor
programs. Although, these studies have provided valuable insights on the hypothesized
relationship between decentralization and anti-poor programs, more researches need to be
done to examine the direct interaction between the fiscal dimension of decentralization
and indicator of poverty at the subnational level. Among the few studies, we note the
very insightful piece by Bardhan and Mookerjee (2005), who proposed a theoretical
model to examine the consequence of elite capture from a decentralized versus a
centralized administration of potential anti-poor programs. They found that centralized
delivery system is more prone to captured due to lack of monitoring of bureaucratic
performance. They also note that decentralizing the delivery system promotes costeffectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales. In the same
line, Galasso and Ravallion (2000) proposed a model of decentralized targeting of an
anti-poverty program with application to the Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education Program.
The conclusion of their findings is that within village targeting improved with program
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size, and also with lower land inequality, less remoteness, fewer shocks, and less private
redistribution.
Another strand of the theoretical literature has been geared toward the role of
local government in the provision of local public goods, with this time minor emphasize
on the pro-poor nature of the public goods. For instance, Besley and Coate (2003) and
Faguet (2002) developed a model of responsiveness of local government to the provision
of public goods. One the one hand, Besley and Coate (2003) found that decentralization
enhances welfare in the absence of spillover effect, while on the other hand, Faguet
(2002) showed that the tradeoff between central and local government provision depends
on the relative advantage over information and technical capacity of each level of
government.
The theoretical model proposed in this dissertation seek to contribute to the
existing literature by bringing together these two strands of literature in order to develop
a simple theoretical framework that can explain the direct interaction between
decentralization and the delivery of pro-poor social services at the local government
level.

Cross-country Empirical Studies on the Study of Decentralization and Poverty
Only quite recently, a number of cross-disciplinary studies that span economics,
political science, public administration and sociology have attempted to evaluate the
impact of decentralization policy on poverty reduction outcomes. A main difficulty all
these studies have faced is that both decentralization and poverty are complex and multifaceted; this has required the consideration of a variety of explanatory variables and
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measurements of dependent variables in order to fully assess the potential linkages
between these two processes.
Several studies have attempted to examine poverty reduction and decentralization
through the efficient provision of basic needs programs, accountability and
responsiveness of lower level of government. However, most of these works are
anecdotal or descriptive, while the findings are not very precise and diverse. For example,
Rao (2002) examines a set of conditions for general and specific purpose transfer to
effectively influence poverty outcomes. Crook and Manor (1998) and Crook and
Sverrison (2001) use case studies for some selected developing countries to investigate
the impact of political and administrative decentralization on poverty reduction
outcomes.30
Other recent studies have used a more systematic approach to estimate the
potential effect of decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes. The few studies that
have followed this approach show somewhat mixed results. For convenience we have
grouped these studies in two categories: those that have found a “positive impact” and
those that have found a “negative impact” of decentralization policies on poverty
reduction outcomes.

The positive impact
Von Braun and Grote (2000) performed a cross-country analysis with a sample of
50 countries and concluded that decentralization (defined as a combination of political,
30

In their study, decentralization is taken to mean a transfer of power away from a central authority to a
lower level in a territorial authority. It can take the form of deconcentration and devolution, defined earlier.
Poverty reduction outcome, on the other hand, defined in terms of participation as citizens’ active
engagement with public institutions also defined over three modes: voting, election campaigning and
individual or group ability to pressure government authority.
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administrative and fiscal decentralization), serves the need of the poor, as captured by the
composite index of human development (HDI). These authors emphasize the need to
consider simultaneously political, administrative and fiscal aspect of decentralization
process in order to truly assess the impact on the poor. Along this line, Lindaman and
Thurmaier (2002) also use a cross-section analysis to examine the impact of
decentralization on HDI and find evidence of positive and significant relationship
between different measures of fiscal decentralization and basic needs in education and
health. Galasso and Ravallion (2005) use the Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education program
dataset and find that pro-poor program benefits increased with decentralization. In a
similar study, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2004) find that decentralized management
advanced poverty alleviation goals in West Bengal, India.

The negative impact
Several other studies have concluded that decentralization can negatively impact
poverty and pro-poor service delivery. Using cross-section and time series data for the
period 1975–2000, on a large number of countries, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003)
find that political decentralization, captured by whether or not state executive officials are
elected, worsen public goods provision (immunization and under-five mortality rate) in the
long run in developing countries. These authors also find that the presence of municipal
elections significantly hurts the results of decentralization for the long run provision of some
public goods. West and Wong (1995) find that in rural China, decentralization resulted in

lower level of public services in poorer regions and, Jalan and Ravallion (1999) find that
decentralization generated substantial inequality in public spending in poor areas in
Argentina. Similarly, Azfar and Livingston (2002) find no evidence of improved
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efficiency and equity of local public service provision from decentralization in Uganda.
Khaleghian (2003) uses a broader dataset for 140 countries and finds mixed result. He
concludes that decentralization appears to improve the coverage of immunization in lowincome countries but that the opposite holds for middle-income countries.
Some of the differences in results and conclusions can be explained by the different
empirical models used as well the cross-country data and the time periods studied. In
addition, we would not expect that the results for particular countries and times period
need to hold true for other countries and time periods where decentralization may have
taken very different shape. Undoubtedly this form of empirical analysis is still in its
infancy and significant progress needs to be made with data and the measurement of
decentralization in order to clearly establish the causal link, if any, between
decentralization and poverty outcomes.

CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL MODEL

Introduction
This chapter develops a theoretical framework for assessing poverty reduction
outcome outcomes in a decentralized provision of pro-poor public good and services,
accounting for different institutional settings. Our model built on Kanbur and Feroni
(1991), Faguet (2004) and Besley and Coate (2003), but explicitly introduces the poverty
dimension. Kanbur and Feroni (1991) uses a basic need approach to analyze povertyconscious restructuring of public expenditure, but not in the context of fiscal
decentralization. On the other hand, Faguet (2004) and Besley and Coate (2003), analyze
decentralization provision of public goods, without introducing poverty reduction
aspects. The model below provides a generic theoretical framework to understand the
interaction between decentralization and poverty reduction outcomes. In what follows,
we present the basic framework of the model and proceed to the analysis of the potential
effect of decentralization policy on the provision of the optimal mix of pro-poor service
and productive investment.

The Basic Framework
Consider two types of economies, k = (c, d), a centralized country (c) and a
decentralized economy (d). Type (d) economy is composed of (J) local jurisdictions or
regions of equal size, denoted by j = (1, 2,…, J) and are each administered by a local
government (LG). For analytical simplicity, we assume that there is odd number of
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jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction has (mj) members, consisting of poor and non-poor
households, uniformly distributed. There is no mobility in the sense that individuals are
assumed to have already been stratified and sorted according to their preference and/or
their social affinity and norms.31
In type (c) economy, there is only one government, the central government (CG),
which provides pro-poor goods and services financed by general taxation. Centralized
decision making generates outcome, which does not necessarily reflect local population’s
needs because of potential lack of information on local need preference by central
officials. However, central government is assumed to have a cost advantage in the
production of the public good. This benefit is drawn from its ability to access superior
technology and skilled labors, in addition to its ability to generate savings from providing
goods and services on a large scale in all jurisdictions (economies of scale).32

The Household Standard of Living
Let us now focus on a typical household or individual in a given jurisdiction.
Following Kanbur and Ferroni (1991), we assume that each household is characterized by
a standard of living (W), continuous and twice differentiable (C2), defined over two
attributes—a basic need achievement (B) and a valuation of non-basic needs (I):33

31

This assumption is more relevant in the context of developing countries where mobility is associated with
high cost, both monetary and cultural attachment. This cultural adjustment cost can be justified by the high
degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization observed in most developing countries. In the context of
developed economies, the literature pioneered by Tiebout (1956) provides the theoretical foundation of this
assumption. Although criticized on several grounds, the Tiebout hypothesis has found empirical support
(Hamilton 1975; Borjas 1995).
32
Risk pooling, economies of scale, for example in the production of electrical and water centrals (Faguet
2003).
33
The standard of living is defined by a given consumption that a household derive from the basic needs
achievement and the valuation of his or her consumption of non-basic needs. An individual standard of
living also determines his status on the continuum of poverty schedule.
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W = W (B, I ) ;

(3.1)

Where (WB > 0 and WBB ≤ 0) and

(WI

> 0 and WII ≤ 0) .

The basic needs (B) is a set of physical and physiological requirements that an
individual is required to fulfill in order to have a minimum acceptable standard of living.
It usually includes basic goods and services such as food, water, sanitation shelter, basic
education, health services and public transportation.34 In other words the basic needs
approach mainly favor indicators of achievement and access over indicator of income or
expenses.35 Thus, basic needs (B) are function of pro-poor goods and services (g):

B = B (g ) ;

Where B g > 0 and B gg ≤ 0

(3.2)

On the other hand, the valuation of non-basic needs is essentially the consumption
of all other productive investment or private goods. Thus, non basic needs (I) is a
function of all other goods (x).

I = I (x ) ;

Where

I x > 0 and I xx ≤ 0

(3.3)

Moreover, each jurisdiction (j) is characterized by a need parameter (θj)>0, which
provides information about the optimal mix of pro-poor public good (g*) and productive
investment (x*) needed to lift individuals or household out of poverty.36 Because of its
proximity advantage, local governments are expected to have better information about
this need parameter than a remote central government. In other words, compare to local

34
It can therefore be noticed that basic needs go beyond the notion of minimal needs which in only comprise adequate
nutrition, shelter and clothing (Asselin and Dauphin 2001).
35
For instance, indicator such as infant mortality rate, life expectancy, and illiteracy will be preferred to indicator of
social expenditure which says little about the extent of accomplishment in improving the well-being in literacy and
health deemed important in reducing poverty.
36
The question of what and who is to determine basic needs is subject to debate in the literature. Basic needs can be
interpreted objectively in terms of physiological and physical requirements; but it may be defined subjectively as the
satisfaction of household’s wants. To determine the basic needs, the former rely on physiologists, doctors and other
specialists while the latter refer to individuals themselves who in this case are assumed to have the knowledge and will
to choose what is deemed appropriate, in the society’s perspective, to improve their standard of living.
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governments, central government perceived local needs with a substantial absolute
margin of error ( ε ). The central government is assumed to either overshoot or
underestimate the true need-parameter (θ). Thus, ( − ∞ < ε < ∞ ) measure the mismatch
value in the perception of local needs. We normalize this parameter to ( − 1 < ε < 1 ).
However, given that our ultimate interest is on the absolute mismatch, we further restrict
the mismatch parameter to ( 0 < ε < 1 ). Thus, as ( ε → 0 ), central officials
underestimate the need parameter of local population, wheras when ( ε → 1), they
overestimate.
Combining equations (3.1) to (3.3) and the above information we obtain the true
valuation of the standard of living:

W = W [θ B ( g ), I ( x )] ;

(3.4)

Where W (.) is continuous and twice differentiable (C2) in its
arguments: (WB > 0 and WBB ≤ 0) and

(WI

> 0 and WII ≤ 0) .

That is, an increase in basic needs (B) and productive investment (I) increases the
standard of living, but at a decreasing rate.

The Budget Constraint
The benevolent government chooses the level of (g) and (x) to be provided and
spends on behalf of individuals. In return, individuals are supposed to select by majority
voting, government officials who better satisfy their wants and needs. The governments,
either central or local, are assumed to have a balanced budget such that revenues (T)
equal expenditure (E): T = E; where expenditure (E), in per capita term, is fixed and has
to be allocated between pro-poor public goods and services (g) and productive investment
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(x). In addition, the price of the pro-poor public good (g) in terms of the productive
investment (x) is given by (τ >0). That is, to produce one unit of the pro-poor public
good, it requires (τ) units of productive investment. Thus, the budget constraint is given
by:

E = xk + τ

k

gk

(3.5)

Under type (c) economy, centralized regime, there is one representative
benevolent government which decides on the level of ( g c ) and ( x c ). In addition, the
central government is assumed to have advantage over the production of both pro-poor
public goods and productive investment. As discussed earlier, this benefit is derived from
its ability to access superior technology and skilled labors in addition to its economies of
scale advantage. Thus, central government is assumed to provide goods and services of
better quality and relatively cheaper than decentralized economy, type (d). Hence, the
normalized parameter (0< σ < 1) captures the central government technological
advantage or superior technical capacity.
Putting together the above information, we get the following generic
government’s objective function:

[

]

⎧⎪MaxW k =W θ k B( g k ), I ( x k )
⎨
⎪⎩s.t E = x k + τ k g k

;

⎧d = decentralized economy
where k = ⎨
⎩c = centralized economy

(3.6)

Thus, the problem solved by the policy maker can be rewritten as:

[

( )

g k = arg ⎧⎨ Max
W θ kB gk , I
⎩ gk

k

(E

−τ kgk

)] ,

k = {d , c }⎫⎬
⎭

Assuming interior solution, the first order condition yields:

(3.6)’
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Wg =

θk

∂W
∂W ∂B
∂W ∂ I
=θk
⋅ k −τ k
⋅
=0
k
∂B ∂g
∂ I ∂x
∂g

∂W ∂B
∂W ∂I
⋅ k =τ k
⋅
∂B ∂g
∂I ∂x

τ k ⋅ I x ⋅ WI = θ k ⋅ B g k ⋅ WB ;
where W B =

(3.7)

∂W
∂W
∂I
∂B
k
, WI =
and I x = , B g = k
∂B
∂I
∂x
∂g

Equation (3.7) shows the tradeoff between the provision of basic needs (B) and
productive investment (I). As illustrated in Figure 6 below, any linear combination of (B)
and (I), (point K); will be “living standard superior”, as opposed to solely focusing either
on Basicneeds, (point L), or on productive investment (Point N).

Figure 6: Tradeoff between Basic needs (B) and Productive investment (I)
I

N
K
L

W
B

Solving for g k yields:

g

k

= [B ′ ] ( g ),
−1

k

where

W
τk
B ′( g ) = k ⋅ I x ⋅ I ;
θ
WB
k

(3.8)
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with B′( g k ) = Bg =
k

∂B
⎧ k = d,
and ⎨
k
∂g
⎩ k = c,

⇒ decentralized economy
⇒ centralized economy

Equation (3.8) suggests that the composite pro-poor local public good is a function of the
tradeoff between the marginal benefit derived from basic needs and productive
⎡W ⎤
investment ⎢ I ⎥ as well as the tradeoff between central government’s technological
⎣WB ⎦

advantage ( τ k ) and local government proximity advantage( θ k ).37
To assess the poverty reduction outcome, we consider a poverty line (z) that
delineates the poor from the non-poor households.38 Given the poverty line (z) and the
standard of living (W) defined earlier, consider now a poverty measure characterized by:

P = Φ (z , W

)

Such that:

⎧0,
Φ(.) = ⎨
⎩1

(3.9)

if Wh ≥ z ∀ h ∈{1, 2 ..., m}
otherwise

Where; Ф(.): Index function that aggregates the multidimensional aspects of
poverty and satisfies some desirable axiomatic properties discussed in Appendix B. This
function assumes a positive value when the individual is poor, but is invariant when the
individual is above the poverty line (z).

37

38

Note that by duality approach, ( x k ) can be determined using the budget constraint.

The poverty line (z) is usually calculated based on two methods, the cost of basic needs methods (CBN)
and the food Energy requirements method (FER). As a result, there are two possible ways of defining
poverty line. According to the CBN, poverty line is a minimum level of basic needs that a household is
supposed to have in order to avoid being classified as poor. It usually uses a consumption bundle of $1 or
$2 a day as a threshold. On the hand, the FER defines poverty line in terms of minimum level of caloric
requirement, usually 2100 calories of food a day as a benchmark. There is a growing literature on poverty
line measurement. For more details see (Ravallion 1994; Ravallion 1996; Wodon 1997).
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Clearly, the choice of Ф(.) will ultimately depend on the class of poverty indices
(P)used and the underlying axiomatic property which need to be verified.39 As stated
earlier, our objective is to compare poverty reduction outcomes in a decentralized regime
versus a centralized economic setting. In doing so, we shall be able to derive some policy
implications on the optimal economic and institutional setting in reducing poverty. We
use the following two steps:
First, we determine the impact of pro-poor good ( g k ) on the standard of living of
household ( W k ), in type (k) economy. Then, we evaluate the effect on this outcome on
poverty reduction:

∂P k
∂P k ∂W k
=
⋅
; for k = {d , c}
That is,
∂g k ∂W k ∂g k

(3.10)

The following section turns to the analysis of the potential effect of type (k)
economy on the provision of the optimal mix of pro-poor service and productive
investment, and their ultimate effect on poverty reduction.

Comparison of Poverty Outcomes

Characterization of Type (k) Economy
Recall from (3.8) that ( g k ) is given by:

g

39

k

= [B ′ ] ( g ),
−1

k

where

W
τk
B ′( g ) = k ⋅ I x ⋅ I ;
θ
WB
k

For a comprehensive literature review on different class of poverty measures and their underlying
axiomatic properties, see Ravallion (1994) Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984), Sen (1997) and Shorrock,
(1997).
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k
with B′( g k ) = Bg =

∂B
∂g k

and

⎧ k = d,
⎨
⎩ k = c,

⇒ decentrali zed economy
⇒ centralize d economy

As discussed earlier, the central government incurs an informational cost from the
misperception in the local need parameter, captured by the absolute mismatch parameter
( 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 ). Again, we focus on the absolute mismatch because our interest is solely on
the magnitude of the misperception, but not on the direction. The rationale of this
argument is that the optimal composite of pro-poor goods and services may not be
achieved if central government either underestimate or overestimate the local need
parameter. Moreover, the standardization will help in making comparison between the
central government cost advantage ( 0 < σ ≤ 1 ) and the local government proximity
advantage ( 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 ), central to our discussion. On the other hand, local governments

lack technology and skilled labor to efficiently produce pro-poor goods and services.
These costs differential can be summarize as follows:

⎧⎪ θ k = ε α θ
(θ ,τ ) such that ⎨⎪ k
;
α
⎩τ = σ τ
k

k

(3.11)

Where α ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that measures the degree of decentralization.
Specifically, as α approaches the value zero (0), the higher the degree of
decentralization in the economy. Conversely, a highly centralized economy will be
represented by the case where α get closer to the value one (1). Formally stated,
⎧lim (ε α , σ α ) = (1, 1) ⇒ (θ k , τ k ) = (θ , τ ) ;
thus k = d → more decentralized economy
⎪α →0
⎨
( ε α , σ α ) = ( ε , σ ) ⇒ (θ k , τ k ) = ( ε θ , σ τ ) ; thus k = c → more centralized economy
⎪⎩lim
α →1

With the above specification, we can now explicitly characterize the pro-poor
goods and services for type (k) economy.
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Comparing the Outcome of Pro-poor Public Good Provision by Type (k) Economy

In type (d) economy, decentralized governments have the informational advantage
over centralized government from being closer to their constituents, but do not possess
the required “technical capacity” and technology to efficiently produce the pro-poor
goods and services. This outcome is obtained by solving for type (d) economy in the
optimization problem given in (3.6). Using the above characterization for decentralized
economy (k = d); i.e. good knowledge of local needs ( ε = 1 ) and lack of technical
capacity ( ς = 1 ), we get:40

g d = [B ′ ] ( g d ),
−1

with B ′( g d ) =

W
τ
⋅ Ix ⋅ I > 0;
θ
WB

(3.12)

Clearly, the amount of pro-poor public goods and services provided by
decentralized local governments is an implicit function of the trade-off between
informational advantage and lack of technical capacity, as well as the trade-off between
pro-poor public good and productive investment.41
On the other hand, in type (c) economy, the centralized provision of pro-poor
public goods and services is given by:

g c = [B ′ ] ( g c ),
−1

with B ′( g c ) =

W
στ
⋅ Ix ⋅ I > 0;
εθ
WB

(3.13)

As stated before, the provided level of pro-poor public good in centralized
economy is subject to information bias such that local needs are perceived with a

40

This assumption is an extreme case, since in the real world it is nearly impossible to know or fulfill with
exactitude the needs of a group of individuals. Even in majority voting, just over half, but not all, of the
wishes expressed by individuals are taken into account.
41
Note that the amount of productive investment, given the fixed revenue, could be derived using the
budget constraint in (3.6).
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mismatch factor ( 0 < ε < 1 ), thought the central government has the ability to produce
them relatively cheaper ( 0 < σ < 1 ).
Hence, the provided level of pro-poor public good, in both type of economy, can
be rewritten in compact form as follows:

W
⎡τ ⎤
−1
g d = [B ′] ( g d ), where B ′( g d ) = ⎢ ⎥ ⋅ η > 0 ; with η = I x ⋅ I
WB
⎣θ ⎦
⎡σ τ
−1
g c = [B ′ ] ( g c ), where B ′( g c ) = ⎢
⎣ε θ

WI
⎤
⎥ ⋅ η > 0 ; with η = I x ⋅
WB
⎦

(3.12)’

(3.13)’

Next, we need to identify the type of government which is likely to provide best
the public goods and services of relevance to the poor. To address this issue we compare
equations (3.12)’ and (3.13)’:
gd
⇒
gc

B ′( g c ) σ
=
B ′( g d ) ε

(3.14)

Using the ratio in (3.14) to compare these two outcomes yield:

gd

> c
g ⇒
<

σ

>
ε
<

⇔

σ <
1
ε >

(3.15)

One possible way to address this issue will be to derive the resulting dominant
effect from comparing the ratio of the cost advantage factor to the misperception
parameter. In other words, if central government cost advantage ( σ ) is exactly
counterbalanced by its mismatch of individual needs for public goods ( ε ), then the effect
will be neutralized [ g d = g c ]. Thus, the source of provision of the pro-poor public
service will not be relevant for citizens, route 2 (Figure 7), and there would be no
advantage to either centralization or decentralization. However, if central government
cost and technological advantage ( σ ) is outweighed by its inability to identify accurately
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individual needs ( ε ), then local constituents will be better-off by having the local public
services provided by their respective governments [ g d > g c ], route 1 (Figure 7).
Finally, if central government’s lack of information ( ε ) is dominated by its
ability to better access technology and skilled labor ( σ ) to provide the PPG, then
individual would substantially gain from the centralized provision of the service
[ g c > g d ], route 3 (Figure 7). Analytically, this can be summarized by the following:

Figure 7: Analytical illustration of Pro-poor basic needs provision

[ 0 < σ < 1 , 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1]

Assumption

Outcome

Level of
Provision

σ
>1
ε

σ
=1
ε

gc < gd

gc = gd

Route 1

Route 2

Preferred Local Gov.
provision of propoor basic needs

Indifference
between central and
local Gov. provision

σ
<1
ε

gc > gd

Route 3
Preferred Central
Gov. provision of
pro-poor basic needs

This comparison results in the following proposition:
Proposition: If the central government misperception of local need ( ε ) more than offset

its organizational and technology advantage ( σ ), then the decentralized provision of
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basic needs is “living standard superior”; Otherwise, a centralized delivery will be
preferred.

⇒

⎧⎪if ε > σ then g d > g c ;
⎨
⎪⎩Otherwise
gc > gd

Typically, a given level of ( g k ) is characterized by the pair (ε , σ ) :

g k (ε , σ ) = g ,

where

g ε < 0 and g σ > 0 ;

(3.16)

Let us now consider an indirect standard of living achievement function,
k
continuous and twice differentiable, ψ (.) associated with a given level of PPG,

characterized by the argument ( ε , σ ) and the degree of (de)centralization ( α ) .42 In other
k
words, ψ (.) is a function of the pair ( ε , σ ) as well as ( α ) :

ψ k = ψ [g ( ε , σ );α ] ; Where ψ ′ > 0 and ψ ′′ < 0 ; and g ε < 0 and g σ > 0
ψ k [ ε , σ ; α] =ψ ;

(3.17)

Using the indirect standard of living achievement function, it can easily be shown
graphically that an optimal level of PPG ( g * ) exist and is associated with an
intermediary type of economy. This optimal economic setting is neither highly
centralized, nor fully decentralized. That is, the economic structure that will produce a
better mix of pro-poor public goods and service is likely to be between these two
economic environment.43 This optimal economy could be, as it is usually advocated in

42

We normalize the argument of the standard of living to only pro-poor public good (PPG) to simplify and
make the model more tractable. Thus, we implicitly postulate that the productive investment (x) is also a
function of the pair (ε , σ ) and is inversely related to PPG (g).
43
The magnitude of the optimal level of decentralization is not determined here, but relegate to the
empirical section in chapter 4 and chapter 5.
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developing countries, a system of decentralization with good coordination by central
government officials.
For illustration purpose, let’s consider the case where individuals are indifferent
between central and local government provision, as the resulting outcome from cost
advantage is identical to the outcome from information advantage, ( g c = g d ), Route 2
(Figure 7). As discussed earlier, decentralized provision (g d ) is tailored on household
needs, where the perception parameter closer to unity, ( ε → 1 ); but at a relatively higher
cost with lower discount price or higher value of the cost differential parameter ( σ → 1 ),
point ( g d ), Figure 8. In contrast, central government produces ( g c ) cheaper because of
its cost advantage, higher price discount ( σ → 0 ), though the provision is not well
targeted, lower perception of people wants and need ( ε → 1 ), point ( g c ), Figure 8. Thus,
an optimal economic state ( g * ) could be found, using a convex combination of states
c

( g d ) and ( g ). At this new state of economic setting, local governments’ perception
advantage; that is lower misperception ( ε → 0 ), will be combined with central
government organization and know-how or high discount price ( ς → 0 ) in the delivery
of pro-poor goods and services, point ( g * ), Figure 8. This particular form of
decentralization is the most advocated by practitioners and development institutions,
which recommend stressing on local capacity building and better central coordination in
the implementation of decentralization policies. An example of such an economic system
will be a decentralized provision of PPG with trained local personnel, who deliver goods
and services according to the national strategy of poverty reduction.
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Figure 8: Optimal provision of PPG
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Summary of the Theoretical Analysis

Overall, this chapter has developed a theoretical model to explain the interaction
between decentralization and poverty reduction outcomes. We show that the marginal
effect of fiscal decentralization on pro-poor sectors depends largely on the outcome of the
trade-off between potential benefits derived from better matching of local preference due
to local proximity, and the lack of technical capacity at the local level. In particular, we
proved that if central government cost and technological advantage are outweighed by its
inability to identify accurately individual needs, then local constituents will be better-off
by having the local public services provided by their respective governments.
This finding provides, in a way, a theoretical explanation of the different
outcomes observed in fiscal decentralization programs around the world.

CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to develop an empirical framework to examining
the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes. First, we analyze
the direct effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty using both income-based and nonincome-based poverty measures. Then, we explore possible channels, through pro-poor
services such as basic education, basic health care and agriculture extension, over which
fiscal decentralization may affect poverty reduction outcomes. In addition, given that
Africa is far behind in attaining its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) target, we
also investigate whether the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty are greater in
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to other regions.
This chapter begins with the description of the empirical methodology. First, we
use the standard panel data, fixed effect–random effect, and then employ the Instrumental
Variable (IV) estimator, related to the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM)
framework, to deal with potential endogeneity problem associated with our regressors
and control for unknown form of heteroskedasticity in the errors.
In the second section, we discuss the rationale for the inclusion of the explanatory
variables used in our estimation and provide the source of the data. In the third section,
we develop the empirical model and specify the estimation equations used to test our set
of hypothesis. The last section presents our estimation models used to evaluate the impact
of fiscal decentralization on respective poverty reduction outcomes.
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Empirical Methodology

To examine the influence of decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes, we
adopt the panel data framework and use several estimation procedures in an attempt to
deal with potential econometric issues, given the multidimensionality of both poverty and
decentralization variables. Indeed, panel data analysis allows us to control for unobserved
countries’ heterogeneity in our sample. Moreover, panel data analysis enables us to
decompose components of variance and to study the dynamics of change contained in
both the endogenous and exogenous variables from our sample. Furthermore, the
combination of time series with cross-sections enhances the quality and quantity of our
dataset in ways that would be impossible using only one of these two dimensions. Indeed,
we believe that panel data analysis is appropriate given the complexity of the process that
may arise over time and across countries when studying multidimensional phenomena
such as poverty and decentralization.
The general formulation of panel data model used throughout this study is as
follows:

y it = xit′ β + η i + vit ;

i = 1,..., N

t = 1,..., T ;

(4.1)

Where yit is the dependant variable, x it is the vector of explanatory variables, β is the
vector parameters to be estimated. The error term is decomposed into η i , countries’
heterogeneity or countries’ fixed effect, and vit is the random disturbance.44 For standard

44

For simplicity and for exposition purpose, we consider the one-way error component model:

u it = η i + v it . This analysis could easily by extended to a two-way error component model given by
u it = η i + λ t + v it ; where λt is the time specific effect.
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form of statistical inference, as well as the efficiency properties of our estimates, we
make use of the exogeneity assumption, stated in terms of the idiosyncratic error as:
E (vit x i1 , x i 2, ..., x iT ,η i ) = 0 ,

t = 1, 2, …, T

N is the number of cross-sectional units (countries) and T is the number of time periods
(years).

Random Effects and Fixed Effects Estimators

We note that running the standard Ordinary Least Square (OLS) on the pooled
data, using the above set of assumptions, will generate the following two undesirable
outcomes:
First, the simple OLS estimator will be unbiased but inefficient in the presence of
unobserved countries fixed effects, assuming that E (η i x it ) = 0 . Second, the standard
OLS estimator will be all together biased and inconsistent if the unobserved country
specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables; that is E (η i x it ) ≠ 0 .
Panel data framework provides a solution for these two set of issues. The first problem
can be resolved by using the random effect model, while the second problem can be
addressed by adopting the fixed effect model.
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The random effect model (RE) assumes that both the country specific effect ηi
and the explanatory variables xit are uncorrelated, E (η i x it ) = 0 . As a result, the standard
OLS estimator on the pooled dataset is unbiased, but inefficient. The source of the
inefficiency comes from the fact that the standard errors ignore the resulting correlation
over time of the composite error term ( u it = η i + v it ) within countries. Hence, the
estimated standard errors are inaccurate for statistical inference. To address this
shortcoming, the random effects procedure uses the following within individual variancecovariance matrix that account for the particular error structure at hand:
⎡σ η2 + σ u2
σ η2
K
σ η2 ⎤
⎢
⎥
σ η2
σ η2 + σ u2 O
M ⎥
⎢
Ω = E (u i u'i ) =
⎢ M
O
O
σ η2 ⎥
⎢
⎥
2
L
σ η2 σ η2 + σ u2 ⎥⎦
⎢⎣ σ η
Where u ,i = (ui1 ui 2 ... uiT )
This within variance – covariance is applied in a general Feasible Generalized
Least Square (FGLS) framework to generate the random effect estimator as follows:

βˆ

−1

RE

⎛ N ' ˆ −1 ⎞ ⎛ N ' ˆ −1 ⎞
= ⎜ ∑ X i Ω X i ⎟ ⎜ ∑ X i Ω yi ⎟
⎝ i =1
⎠ ⎝ i =1
⎠

(4.2)

Where X i = ( xi1 xi 2 ... xiT ) and yi = ( yi1 yi 2 ... yiT )
Thus, the random effects estimator is efficient if the countries-specific effects are
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. However, if this is not the case, the random
effects estimates are inconsistent, while the fixed effects estimator is consistent.
The fixed effects (FE) model is less restrictive and allow the country specific
effect to be correlated with the regressors, E (η i x it ) ≠ 0 . Indeed, this assumption is more
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likely and an interesting case to consider since in many empirical works, panel data
analysis is primarily used under the presumption that the country specific effect ηi is
correlated with the explanatory variables x it . Under the fixed effects assumption, the
standard OLS and the random effects estimates are not valid as they are biased and
inconsistent. A natural and straightforward solution would be to include an intercept for
every country before estimating the model by OLS. This is done by expressing.

η i = y i − x i ' β − v i , which is also equivalent to estimating the parameter estimates by
OLS from the transformed within group model below, commonly referred to as the within
transformation. It is derived as follows:
y it − y i = ( x it − x i ) β + (v it − v i )

(4.3)

T

T

T

t =1

t =1

t =1

Where yi = T −1 ∑ yit , xi = T −1 ∑ xit , and v i = T −1 ∑ v it
Clearly, this transformation “wipes out” the unobserved country specific effect
before applying OLS estimation to derive consistent estimates of the parameter vector, β .
Note however that all inferences are based on the original model, equation (4.1). The
model described in equation (4.3) is simply an estimating equation.
However, fixed effects models are not without costs. First, they incur significant
loss of degrees of freedom because they estimate (N-1) additional parameters
corresponding to all but one country dummy. This situation may increase the likelihood
of multicollinearity issue, which usually increases the standard errors and thereby weaken
the model’s statistical power to test parameters. The second disadvantage of the fixed
effects model is its inability to estimate the effect of time invariant explanatory variables
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such as regional dummies and religious or ethnic fractionalization variables that may be
used to capture within countries heterogeneity.
In the next section, we present a formal test for choosing between the random and
the fixed effects models since there have different implications for our parameter
estimates.
Choosing Between Fixed Effects and Random Effects

Statistically, the fixed effects model seems to be the reasonable procedure to
adopt since it always provides consistent estimators. However, as discussed above, they
may not be the most efficient model to estimate. To check for the appropriate model
between the random effects and the fixed effects model to adopt, we perform the
Hausman test (Hausman 1978). The Hausman test compares the fixed effects to the
random effects models by testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by
the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent
fixed effects estimator. In other words, the Hausman test verifies whether the unobserved
countries effects are correlated with the regressors. Formally, the test is specified as
follows:

Ho: No correlation between individual effects and explanatory variables47
Ha: Individual effects are correlated with the regressors.
Under the null hypothesis (Ho) of orthogonality, both random effects and fixed
effects estimators are consistent, but the random effects estimator is more efficient than

47

This is the case of Hausman’s test for two ways model which compare two estimators, one which
assumes assuming that both the α i and λt are fixed and another that assumes.

E (λt / X it ) = E (α i / X it ) = 0 . The test is based upon ( βˆGLS − βˆW ).
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the fixed effects. On the other hand, under the alternative Hypothesis (Ha), fixed effects
estimator is consistent and efficient, while random effects estimator is inconsistent.
The Hausman statistic, H is described as:

)
)
)
2
H = (βˆFE − β RE )′ [ AVˆar(βˆFE ) − AVˆar(β RE )] −1 (βˆFE − β RE ) ~ χ K

(4.4)

Where, βˆ FE is a vector of fixed effects estimates, and βˆ RE is a vector of random

effects estimates. A var(β ) represents the asymptotic variance of the estimates. The
Hausman statistic, H, is asymptotically distributed as χ K ; with (k) denoting the number
2

of explanatory variables in the model estimated. Usually, a large value of the Hausman
statistic is interpreted as evidence for the rejection of the null hypothesis thereby
indicating the presence of fixed effects in the model.
It is worth noting that the consistency of the parameter estimates (random effects and
fixed effects) is conditioned on the exogeneity assumption that the error term is
uncorrelated with any of the regressors in our model. However, in many econometrics
applications, including studies on decentralization and poverty, the problem of
endogenous explanatory variables is present.
In the next sub-section, we discuss an estimation procedure that uses a set of
moment conditions to handle the problem of endogeneity in the right-hand-side variables:
the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimation.

Panel GMM- IV Estimation

A violation of the strict exogeneity assumption mentioned above leads to
inconsistency of the coefficient estimates. A standard way to threat endogenous
explanatory variables is to use instrumental variables (IV) procedures to produce
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consistent estimators. However, as noted by Baum et al. (2003), in the presence of
heteroskedasticity, the IV coefficient estimates are consistent, but their standard errors
are invalid for statistical inference. Currently, the common approach used to deal with
heteroskedasticity of unknown form is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), first
developed by Hansen (1982).48 Although, GMM uses orthogonality conditions to produce
efficient and consistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form,
it may suffer from poor finite sample performance. Note that the standard IV estimators
may be preferable than the GMM estimators if in fact heteroskedasticity is not of a
concern.

Test of Overidentifying Restrictions

Let’s assume a set of instruments Z i [T × L] , where L ≥ K is the number of
instruments satisfying L moment’s conditions E [Z ′i u i ] = 0 . Using the sample

counterpart, this is equivalent to the following sample moments conditions:
1
g ( βˆ ) = E [Z ′i uˆ i ] =
N

N

∑ Z′ (y
i =1

i

i

− X′βˆ ) =0

(4.5)

Where Z i = [ Z i1 L Z iT ] and u i = [u i1 L u iT ]
The panel GMM estimator is then derived by minimizing the corresponding
quadratic form equations given by:49
′
⎡N
⎤
⎡N
⎤
ψ N ( β ) = ⎢∑ Z ′i (y i − X ′i β )⎥ WN ⎢∑ Z ′i (y i − X ′i β ) i ⎥
⎣ i =1
⎦
⎣ i =1
⎦

(4.6a)

48

Note that OLS and IV procedures are special case of GMM since they both use a set of orthogonality
conditions to derive the parameter estimates.
49
We make use of the fact that u = y i − X i β in the expression of the quadratic form equation (4.6). For
more in-depth discussion on Panel GMM estimation, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Wooldridge (2002),
Hansen (2000), Hayashi (2000), Greene (2000) and Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).
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Where WN [ L × L] represents a weighting matrix. The sample analog can be
expressed as:
)
)
J ( βˆ ) = N ⋅ g N ( β )′WN g N ( β )

(4.6b)

Thus, equation (4.6b) is the GMM objective function that is minimized to produce

)
the GMM estimates β . If the number of equations to be estimated (L, the moments
)
conditions) is equal to the number of parameter estimates (K, coefficient in β ), then the
model is exactly identified. In this case, the weighting matrix equals WN = [Z Z] −1 , and
the GMM estimator is equivalent to the standard IV estimator. On the other hand,

)
if L ≥ K , it is not possible to derive the vector β that will set all the L moment condition
to zero; the model is said to be over-identified. In other words, there is more instruments
available than the number of regressors. In this case a more complex weighting matrix is
called for to generate the quadratic form equation (4.6). The panel GMM estimator is
derived by setting the sample average analog of equation (4.6b) to zero. This is done by
)

solving ∂J ()β ) = 0 . After algebraic manipulation, we get:
∂β

−1

βˆ

PGMM

⎡⎛ N
⎞
⎛ N
⎞ ⎤ ⎛ N
⎞
⎛ N
⎞
= ⎢⎜ ∑ X ′i Z i ⎟ WN ⎜ ∑ Z ′i X i ⎟ ⎥ ⎜ ∑ X ′i Z i ⎟ WN ⎜ ∑ Z ′i y i ⎟
⎠
⎝ i =1
⎠ ⎦ ⎝ i =1
⎠
⎝ i =1
⎠
⎣⎝ i =1

(4.7a)

Rewriting the Panel GMM estimator given in equation (4.7a) in matrix form
yields:
)

β PGMM = [ X ′ Z WN Z ′ X] −1 X ′ Z WN Z ′ y

(4.7b)

As noted in Baum et al. (2003), an important issue to address when the model is
overidentified, is to test for the overidentifying restrictions in the model. This is
equivalent to testing the validity of the instruments; i.e., testing whether the instruments
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considered are uncorrelated with the error term. This test is commonly known as the
Sargan (1958) test for standard IV estimation, but referred to as the Hansen (1982) test in
the context of GMM models. The Hansen test is a general case of the Sargan test and is
conducted using the Hansen J ( βˆ ) statistic evaluated at the efficient GMM estimator.
The Hansen J ( βˆ ) statistic is asymptotically distributed as a χ L2− k , under the null
hypothesis that the instruments are valid and suitable for the model being estimated.
Formally, it is expressed as follows:
) )
)
J ( βˆ ) = N ⋅ g N ( β )′ S −1 N g N ( β ) ~ χ L2− K

(4.8)

2
Where χ L−
k is a Chi-Square distribution with (L-K) degree of freedom

corresponding to the number of overidentifying restrictions. This is a joint test of valid
orthogonality conditions and correct model specification. A large J ( βˆ ) statistic casts
doubt on either or both set of assumptions and can be interpreted as a rejection of the null
hypothesis that the orthogonality conditions are satisfied.

Variables Description and Data Sources
This study uses a comprehensive dataset compiled from various sources that
include variables measuring poverty reduction outcomes, fiscal decentralization, political
institutions and several control variables for over 150 countries span over the years 19752000. Specifically, out of 177 countries originally in our sample, only 97 countries have
data on both HDI and fiscal decentralization. Of these, 70 countries are from developing
economies and the remaining 27 are higher income countries. When we use the FGT
class of poverty indicators, the sample is only composed of 44 developing countries out
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of the 66 developing countries that initially have information on FGT poverty measures
in our dataset.50 In terms of coverage period, our original dataset spans from 1975 to
2000, with a five years interval. However, due to missing values, not all countries have
information on all variables for every year. Thus, the resulting dataset used in our study is
a typical unbalanced panel data, for which our empirical estimation is accordingly
adjusted for. The summary statistics and the definition of all variables are presented in
table C1 and table C5 of appendix C, respectively.

Dependant Variable

Our dependant variable is the measure of poverty derived from different sources
in an attempt to capturing the multifaceted aspects of poverty phenomenon. One set of
variables used to capture poverty in our model is the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT)
generic class of additive poverty indicators ( Pα ), measured alternatively by the poverty
headcount (H), the poverty gap (PG) and the square poverty gap (SPG). 51 The general
formulation of this index is given as follows:
α

1 q ⎡ z − yi ⎤
;
Pα = ∑ ⎢
n i =1 ⎣ z ⎥⎦

Where (yi) represents the income of individual (i), ranked in increasing value of
income, (q) is the number of poor in the total population (n), and (α) is the aversion for

50

Note that the FGT class of poverty indicator is not available for higher income countries and therefore do
not exist in our sample. The list of countries classified by income level and by region is reported in the
appendix D.

51

Ideally, we would like to use other poverty measures such as the Watt’s index and the Sen Poverty index
for comparison purpose. However, these indices do not exist for most countries because of their
computational difficulties. Thus, we use the Foster-Greer-Thorbeck class of poverty indicator, accessible
at: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp (accessed March 2004). Moreover, as mentioned
in Section 2, this class of poverty has some desirables axiomatic properties and present several advantages.
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poverty. As α increases, more and more weight is given to the poorest of the poor. In
addition, the FGT poverty index is decomposable or additive.52 Note that when α = 0, Pα
is reduced to the widely used headcount poverty index (H), defined as the proportion of
the population living in household with income or consumption per person below the
poverty line (Ravallion, 1992). When α =1, Pα becomes the poverty gap index (PG),
defined as the mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line
(Ravallion and Chen, 2005). Typically the poverty gap gives an indication of how far
below the poverty line a person is. As such the poverty gap index is more informative
than the Headcount poverty index; as it gives an idea of the depth of poverty, while the
former is merely a crude indicator of the state of poverty in a country or a community.
The third index, the square poverty gap (SPG), is obtained from Pα , when α = 2 and was
first proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) to address the shortcomings of the
previous poverty indices relative to the issue of inequality among the poor. The SPG
index provides information on the severity of poverty in a population as it allows
comparison among the poor. The dataset on all these three indices are drawn from the
World Bank’s PovcalNet.53
The second set of poverty indicator used in this study is the UNDP’s Human

Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a composite index that utilizes an arithmetic
average of three standard human development indicators: life expectancy at birth,
educational attainment and per capita income. Formally, HDI is given by:
52

Additive decomposability, require that aggregate poverty be equal to the population weighted sum of
poverty levels in the various sub-groups of society (Ravallion (1996)).
53
PovCalNet is an interactive computational tool developed by staff of the Bank’s research group to allow
users to replicate the calculations made by the Bank’s researchers in estimating the extent of absolute
poverty in the world. The dataset is available at: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp
(accessed March 2004).
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HDI = 1/3 (life expectancy index) + 1/3 (education index) + 1/3 (GDP index).
Typically, this index is used to assess the multidimensionality aspect of poverty
and may be considered a good proxy of the extent and the quality of pro-poor services
available in a given country. Indeed, the HDI measures the well-being of individuals as
the average overall achievements in three basic dimensions: longevity measured by life
expectancy, knowledge, captured by educational attainment (adult literacy and combined
primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment), and a decent standard of living, represented
by the real GDP per capita (in PPP$). In practice, expenditures on social services may not
necessary translate into poverty reduction outcomes since corruption or local elite capture
has been found to dampen the intended benefit of these services to the poor.54 Thus, the
rationale for using the HDI is to assess the real picture of the quality and the effectiveness
in delivering pro-poor services in those countries.55 Data on the trend in HDI is reported
in the UNDP’s Human Development Report, (2004).56 Nevertheless, the HDI also has
some limitations and has been subject to some criticisms. For example, the normalization
assumption, which gives equal weight to achievement along the three dimensions of the
index, may be challenged. In addition, the HDI views achievement relative to the best
country in the sample. For these reasons, we disaggregate the HDI index into its
individual components and use them alternatively to check the robustness of our results.

54

See Bardhan and Mokerjee (2005), Besley and Coate (2003) for a theoretical discussion.

55

The Human Development Index presents some advantages as mentioned in chapter 2 and is available on
the UNDP website. The HDI has been used to capture poverty in several studies (see among others, Von
Braum and Grote 2002; Lindaman and Thurmaier 2002).
56
A five-years-average trend, from 1975 to 2003, is available in the UNDP’s (2004) “Human Development
Report.”
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Independent Variables

Our main regressor of interest is the fiscal decentralization variable. The Fiscal
decentralization variable is measured by the share of sub-national expenditures
(revenues) in total government expenditures (revenues).57 The data is drawn from the
IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS 2005). It is worth mentioning that the
measure of fiscal decentralization entails some flaws and has been criticized in the
literature on several grounds. First, this measure may not necessarily convey information
on the actual decision-making autonomy over expenditure or revenue of the different tiers
of local governments (Prud’home 1995; Ebel and Yilmaz 2002). For instance, it is not
clear from this measure what levels of activities are under the direct control of
subnational governments, especially when they are funded by central government.
Second, it says nothing about the revenue collection source and the extent and nature of
the grant received by local governments. In fact, these measures only provide information
about the relative level of countries’ fiscal decentralization. Nonetheless, they have been
recognized as “second best” indicators and have been widely used in several empirical
studies on fiscal decentralization (Pryor 1967; Kee 1977; Pommerehne 1977; Oates 1972;
Bahl and Nath 1986; Zhang and Zou 1997; Davoodi and Zou 1998; and MartinezVazquez and McNab 2002, among others). The data are from the IMF’s Government

Finance Statistics (2005) CD-Rom.
57

Theoretically, we would like to construct a measure of fiscal decentralization which clearly isolates local
government decision-making over revenues and expenditure by netting out all activities controlled by the
central government. Such a measure will require a comprehensive knowledge about the structure of the tax
system and information on the type of grant and transfer received by sub-national governments in each
country. Unfortunately, the data set provided by the IMF’s GFS does not permit to do this exercise. Ebel
and Yilmaz (2002) have used a dataset from the OECD countries to construct a more accurate measure of
fiscal decentralization. However, their dataset includes only six OECD countries, from 1997 to 1999.

77

Other variables of interest include key predictor of poverty such as basic
education, basic health and agricultural extension. In order to explore potential channels
through which decentralization may affect poverty reduction outcomes, we conduct
sectoral analyses on three key pro-poor areas, basic education, basic health and
agricultural extension.58 Specifically, we use life expectancy at birth and under-five
infant mortality rate, immunization against diphtheria or measles, as proxies for heath
outcomes. The data for health outcomes are primarily drawn from the World
Development Indicator (World Bank 2005). For basic education outcomes, we use
alternatively, youth literacy rate, repeater rate at primary school, the percentage of
primary school completion in the population, teacher-pupil ratio, the school drop-out
ratio. The primarily source of the education data is from Barro and Lee (1996) and
(2000). Finally, we use agriculture value added per worker, a measure of agricultural
productivity, to proxy for agricultural extension. The data is also compiled from the

World Development Indicators (World Bank 2005).
Other regressors used in this study include pro-poor social expenditure, captured
by spending on social sectors that have been recognized by development practitioners and
by the literature on basic needs, to benefit the poor. It usually includes expenditure on
primary education, basic health care, water and sanitation, agriculture research and
extension, labor intensive jobs and rural roads (Gomanee et al. 2002; Mosley et al.
2004).59 However, due to data availability, we only use public expenditure on education,

58

For evidence on the role of basic education and basic health care in reducing poverty see, World Bank
(1995); Gomanee et al. (2002); Mosley et al. (2004), Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson (2002); For the benefit
of agriculture extension in reducing poverty refer to Binswanger and Von Braun (1991); Ravallion and Datt
(1995); Bourguignon and Morrison (1998), and Hazell et al. (2000).
59
Refer to Gomanee et al. (2003) for the original methodology on the construction of the Pro-Poor
Expenditure index (PPE).
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health and social security and welfare. This indicator is computed using the arithmetic
average of these three variables, expressed as a ratio of GDP adjusted for PPP. The Data
for pro-poor social expenditure come from several sources, the IMF’s Government

Finance Statistics (GFS 2005) for the data on social security and welfare, education
expenditure and health expenditures; the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI 2005) for the agriculture productivity and the GDP data.
We also control for the quality of governance using several variables drawn from
different sources. The data include Political right, civil liberties and freedom; the latter
computed as the arithmetic average of the first two measures. These variables are used to
assess not only how individuals participate in the political process in their countries by
freely electing their representative, but also capture how individuals are free to voice their
opinion and develop personal autonomy without the government interfering. This set of
data is drawn from the Freedom in the World Country Scores of the Freedom House.
These variables range from one to seven, with seven representing lower degree of
freedom and one greater degree of freedom.60 We also use measures of rule of law,

quality of bureaucracy, ethnic tensions, corruption, risk of repudiation of contracts by
government and risk of expropriation of private investment, compiled from International

Country Risk Guide (ICRG).61 Variables on rule of law, corruption and the quality of the
bureaucracy range from 0 to 6, with a 0 representing lower performance and 6 meaning
better performance. The other two indicators, risk of repudiation and the risk of

60

For more information on the methodology used in deriving the score, refer to
http://www.freedomhouse.org/reseach/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm. (accessed May 2005).
61
The ICRG data is a rich dataset that covers 90 countries spanned over the period 1982-1997, and is
compiled by the Political Risk Services (PRS) group, a commercial service that provides financial,
economic and political risk assessment for investors available at http://www.icrgonline.com(accessed May
2005).
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expropriation are scaled from 0 to 10, with a lower number indicating lower performing
government institutions.
Other socio-demographic and economic control variables used in this study are

population density, fertility rate, age dependency ratio, initial GDP per capita PPP, and
openness to trade. These data are compiled from World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI, 2005). In addition, we use as control variables the absolute latitude of a
country, the legal origin of company law and commercial code of a country are from La
Porta et al. (1998). We also used the Gini coefficient of income inequality to assess the
state of the distribution of individual well-being in terms of income.62 The income
inequality data come from the new World Income Inequality Database (WIID2a) of the
United Nation University’s World Institute Development Economic Research’s (UNUWIDER).63

The Hypothesis Framework
As discussed in the previous chapters, the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and poverty is not straightforward and not always well understood. The
traditional literature on local public finance has long viewed poverty reduction policy as
mainly a redistributive issue that needed to be exclusively addressed by central
government on the justification of mobility and externality considerations. On the other
62

There is a variety of inequality measures, but the most widely used is the Gini coefficient. For a
comprehensive review of inequality measures refer to chapter 2.
63

The UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID), collects and stores information on
income inequality for developed, developing, and transition countries. The new Version 2.0a of June 2005,
also referred to as WIID2a consists of a checked and corrected WIID1, a new update of the Deininger &
Squire database from the World Bank, new estimates from the Luxembourg Income Study and
Transmonee, and other new sources as they have became available. This dataset contains in addition to the
Gini coefficient and quintile and decile shares, survey means and medians along with the income shares of
the richest 5% and the poorest 5% have been included in the update. The database and its documentation
are available on the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database website (UNU-WIDER 2005).
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hand, fiscal decentralization was associated with the concept of efficiency and was
largely ignored in poverty reduction strategies (Tiebout 1956; Musgrave 1959; and Oates
1972). However, the recent trend in donor-supported development activities and poverty
reduction programs have now embraced the view that poverty is first a local phenomenon
and that poverty reduction policies require involvement at the local level, including
adopting sound fiscal decentralization program (World Bank 2000). Thus, fiscal
decentralization should be seen as one of the policies with the greatest potential for
improving public service delivery and contributing to the achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) of reducing poverty. In particular, local governments may
play a critical role in a country’s poverty reduction efforts in several ways. Consider the
following:
First, local governments have been found in a number instances to be critical in
providing an enabling environment to ensure local economic growth, by promoting and
providing both physical and human capital development. It is widely agreed that
economic growth is the key to long term poverty reduction at the local level. As such,
extensive local involvement is require to accurately identify pro-poor investment
strategies that remote central government bureaucrats, situated in a distant capital, would
be generally less capable of doing. Second, local governments usually deliver key public
services (access to safe drinking water, basic education, basic health care, and
agricultural extension services) that are important for improving the quality of life of all
residents. As a result, local governments’ entities can constitute a quite helpful element in
the institutional framework for poverty reduction. Indeed, the Millennium Development
Goals recognize that many social services are critical ingredients in a comprehensive
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poverty reduction strategy. Third, decentralization in its entire dimension, including local
empowerment, brings government closer to the people by enhancing their representation
and voice, which ultimately enhanced the accountability of government officials to the
people. In other words, accountability and good governance are important preconditions
for assuring a pro-poor -growth economic environment in which government basic
services can be delivered in an effective manner. While decentralization is likely to
generate the above-mentioned benefits, issues such as inadequacy of locally generated
revenues, inexperience of local officials, an underdeveloped system of public account
ability with elite capture and corruption and poorly educated citizenry can seriously
undermine the benefits of decentralization to translate into poverty reduction outcomes.64
As illustrated in our theoretical model presented in chapter 4, there is an apparent
trade-off between potential benefits derived from a fiscal decentralized system (better
matching of local preference and enhanced accountability due to local proximity) on the
one hand, and possible risks due to lack of capacity building (due to poorly educated
citizenry) and the need for policy coordination at the central level (scale economies and
externality) on the other hand. The magnitude of these two opposing effects may vary
over time and space, so that it is difficult to appropriately assess the net outcome on
poverty without undertaking an empirical investigation.
This dissertation explores the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty in two
ways:

64

See Bardhan and Mokerjee (1998), Prudhomme (1995), Besley and Coate (2003) for theoretical
evidence on this literature.
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First, we investigate whether there is any causal effect of fiscal decentralization
on poverty. Second, we explore a potential transmission channel of these poverty
effects from fiscal decentralization.
As discussed above, fiscal decentralization may affect poverty through many
different channels. These may include channels through increased transparency or
quality of governance (Fisman and Gatti 2002); or through enhancing growth
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003; Akai and Sakata 2002; Davoodi and Zou 1998;
Zhang and Zou 1998, among others). In this dissertation, we explore one other
transmission channel—fiscal decentralization effect on pro-poor sectoral outcomes.
These include outcome in basic education (youth literacy rate and repeater rate at
primary school), basic health care (child mortality rate and immunization against
measles, diphtheria) and agricultural productivity (agricultural value added per worker).
In addition, we also investigate whether the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty
are greater in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to other regions. This later analysis
finds its justification on Africa’s relatively higher level of poverty and the fact that
Africa is far behind in attaining its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) target.
As such, we formulate the following set of testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Holding everything else constant, an increase in local government
spending power, as measured by fiscal decentralization leads to an improvement in the
standard of living of the poor, as proxy either by the Human development index (HDI); or
inversely by income poverty indicators (Poverty Headcount, Poverty Gap or Square
Poverty Gap).
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This postulate stems from the rationale that local self-governing institutions and
greater community involvement can provide good incentive to improve the material
conditions and autonomy of the poor (Von Braum and Grote 2002; Oates 2004).

Hypothesis 2: On average, Sub-Saharan African countries will benefit more from
fiscal decentralization than countries from other regions, ceteris paribus.
This hypothesis finds its justification on the classical fiscal decentralization
theorem proposed by Oates (1972), which advocates a provision of local public goods
and services by local government’s body because of their ability “to tailor outputs to local
circumstances,” given their informational and proximity advantages. This hypothesis may
hold because the Sub-Saharan African countries are highly heterogeneous both within
and across boundaries, with a high level of language, ethnic and religious
fractionalization compared to other regions. Furthermore, Sub-Saharan African (SSA)
region has the highest level of poverty and present the slowest growth toward its
Millennium Development Goals (MGDs), UNDP (2004). Thus, ceteris paribus, if fiscal
decentralization is to help reduce poverty, it is more likely to do so for SSA than any
other region, at least in nominal term.

Hypothesis 3: Fiscal decentralization will have a statistically significant effect on
pro-poor services delivery, which in turn may translate into poverty reduction outcomes.
This hypothesis attempts to link the two isolated empirical evidence that decentralization
increases pro-poor spending (McNab 2001; Arze Del Granado 2003) on the one hand;
and that pro-poor expenditures significantly reduce poverty (Gupta, Davoodi, and
Tiongson 2002; Mosley et al. 2004) on the other hand.
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Model Specifications
To test our first hypothesis relative to the effect of fiscal decentralization on
poverty, we use the following general baseline equation, drawn from the literature on the
determinants of poverty:65

Pov it = f ( Dec it , SSExp it , initgini it , X it ) + u it ;

i = 1,..., N ; t = 1,..., T (4.24)

Where u it = η i + v it is composite error of unobserved country-specific effects (η i ), and a
vector of idiosyncratic disturbances ( v it ). The functional relation between poverty
outcomes and fiscal decentralization is represented by the function (f) such that the
marginal impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty is given by:66
∂Pov
∂Dec

=
Dec = Dec

∂Pov ∂f
⋅
∂f ∂Dec

(4.25)

Pov is poverty measured alternatively by the FGT additive class of poverty
indicator (H, PG, and SPG) or by the HDI; Dec is the fiscal decentralization measure,
captured either by the share of subnational expenditures to total government expenditures
(Subexp), or by the share of subnational revenues to total government revenues (Subrev).
As shown in equation (4.24), poverty is regressed on pro-poor social expenditure
(SSExp), the initial value of the Gini coefficient of income inequality (initgini) and a set
of control variables (X) that includes, indicators of health, education, and agriculture

65

See Ahluwalia et al. (1979); Ravallion and Chen (1997); Collier and Dollar (2001); Deaton (2001);
Dollar and Kraay (2002) among others.
66
This general specification will allow us for example to test for a potential inverted U shape relationship
between poverty and decentralization, as suggested by the graphical analysis discussed in figure 4.1. That
is, an increase in fiscal decentralization is likely to generate a positive poverty reduction outcome up to a
certain level of fiscal decentralization, beyond which, any increase lead to negative impact of poverty. This
non-linear relationship between decentralization and poverty could also be modeled alternatively using a
log-linear specification.
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productivity outcomes, as well as socio-demographic and government institutional
quality variables. All these variables are described above and summarized in appendix C.
Figure 9 below shows the partial correlation between fiscal decentralization
(DecExp) and poverty (HDI) for developing countries (Panel A) and higher income
countries (Panel B). There is an apparent positive relationship between reduced poverty
and fiscal decentralization as hypothesized, but the relationship is non-monotonic.

Figure 9: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty in
developing countries and higher income countries
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While the sample for developing countries seems to support an inverted U-shape
relationship, the trend for higher income countries is steadily increasing. In other words,
there is a non-linear but increasing relationship between poverty and fiscal
decentralization for developing countries. These observations have some important
implications for both our model specification and the interpretation of our results, at least
for developing countries. To ascertain the consistency of this non-linear relationship
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between poverty and fiscal decentralization in developing countries, we employ other
measures of poverty. In Figure 10 below, Panel A illustrates the partial correlation
between fiscal decentralization and poverty in developing countries using the HDI, while
in Panel B through Panel D, this relation is shown using the poverty headcount (H), the
poverty square (PG) and the square poverty gap (SPG) respectively.

Figure 10: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization and different
measures of Poverty in Developing countries.
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In all cases, there is a persistent quadratic pattern between the two variables,
though a somewhat weak quadratic trend is observed when more and more weight is
given to the poorest fraction of the population; that is, when using the poverty gap and
the square poverty gap as indicators of poverty. Moreover, it is worth noting that this
non-linear relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty holds even when we
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use the share of subnational revenue in total revenues as fiscal decentralization measure;
or when we classify the dataset by sub-samples of income level.67 Given the above
discussion, we adopt the following model specifications:

Povit = β 0 + β1 log Decit + β 2 SSExpit + β 3 Initginiit + γ Controli t + u it (4.26)
Povit = β 0 + β 1 Decit + β 2 DecSqit + β 3 SSExpit + β 4 Initginiit + γ Control i t + u it (4.27)
Where Pov is the poverty measures discussed earlier, Dec is fiscal decentralization
measured either by the share of subnational expenditure or by the share of subnational
revenue. To capture the non-linear relationship discussed above, we use a semi-log
specification (log Dec) in equation (4.26) or include the square of fiscal decentralization

(DecSq) in equation (4.27) to capture the quadratic fit suggested in Figure 10. SSExp is
the share of pro-poor social expenditures in total government expenditure. Initgini is the
initial value of the gini coefficient of income inequality and control is a vector of control
variables discussed earlier in the variable description sub-section.
Our coefficient of interest in equation (4.26) is β1 , the marginal effect of decentralization
on poverty. In equation (4.27), this effect is given by the expression
[ β 1 + 2β 2 ⋅ Dec ],where Dec represents the mean value of fiscal decentralization in our
sample.68 Thus, the critical level of fiscal decentralization beyond which the sign of the
marginal effect is reversed, is given by Dec = − β1 .
2β 2

67

Figure D5 through Figure D11 in Appendix D show the other set of scatter plots using revenue
decentralization and the FGT class of poverty measures. The correlation between fiscal decentralization
and poverty is also shown by region and by level of income rank.
68
This expression is obtained by simply taking the partial derivative of equation (2.27) with respect to
fiscal decentralization (Dec): ∂Pov = β + 2 β ⋅ Dec . Note that we could also use other value of fiscal
∂Dec

1

2

decentralization, say the median fiscal decentralization, to evaluate the marginal effect in equation (4.27).
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To test our second hypothesis relative to the impact of fiscal decentralization on
poverty reduction outcomes in Sub-Saharan African region, we introduce an interaction
term between fiscal decentralization and the SSA dummy variable DecSSA. The resulting
specification is as follows:

Povit = β 0 + β1 log Decit + β 2 DecSSAit + β 3 SSExpit + β 4 Initginiit + γ Controli t + u it
(4.28)
The expected sign of these coefficients depends on the poverty measure being
used in the regression. According to our hypothesis, we expect β 2 to be positive since
higher level of fiscal decentralization will be associated with higher quality of human
development in SSA. In contrast, β 2 is expected to be negative if poverty headcount (H),
poverty gap (PG) or square poverty gap (SPG) is used as dependant variable in the
estimation regression. Higher level of fiscal decentralization is hypothesized to decrease
income poverty in SSA.
Finally, we test our third hypothesis regarding the possible channels through
which fiscal decentralization may impact poverty using the following methodology.
However, before developing this methodology, it is worth explaining the rationale behind
the selection of the channels used to investigate the effect of fiscal decentralization on
poverty.
In the previous section, fiscal decentralization is found to be associated with
poverty reduction, as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) and a set of
income poverty indicators such as the Headcount poverty (H), the Poverty Gap (PG) and
the Square Poverty Gap (SPG). However, given that both poverty and fiscal
decentralization are multi-faceted, the resulting relationship between these two
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phenomenons may be indirect. For instance, fiscal decentralization may improve
institutional quality (Fisman and Gatti 2002), and better institution may in turn lead to
economic growth (Mauro 1995; Gyimah-Bempong 2002) and eventually reduce poverty
(Olson 1996; Chong and Calderon 2000; among others).69 Moreover, fiscal
decentralization may affect the functional composition of public expenditures to key
social services that are likely to improve the standard of living of the most vulnerable
layer of the population. These spending are commonly referred to as pro-poor
expenditures, though the issue of which expenditure types should be included in a propoor expenditure index is often subject to debate. Indeed, depending on countries’
characteristics which differ across time and space, poverty reduction strategy may require
different types of spending. Besides, the choice of key variables to capture this
differential effect is sometimes unobservable to practitioners or constrained by data
availability. However, in the literature on basic-needs and among development
practitioners, certain categories of public spending are generally believed to have a
bearing on human development, and, consequently on the poor. These pro-poor social
spending are generally basic health care, primary education, water and sanitation, rural
roads and agricultural extension services (Gomanee et al. 2002 and 2003). In the same
line, Gupta et al. (2002) note that ‘Greater public spending on primary and secondary
education has a positive impact on widely used measures of education attainment, and
increased health care spending reduces child and infant mortality rates. Similarly,
Gomanee et al. (2002) shows that public expenditures on “social services” (sanitation,

69

Note that other studies, mostly theoretical, have shown that fiscal decentralization is less likely to
improve institutional quality because of possible rent extraction at the local level (Shleifer and Vishny
1993; Bardhan and Mookerjee 2000). In this case, the poor quality of local institutions will increase
inequality and relative poverty (Pedersen 1997; and Bourguignon and Verdier 2000).
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education and health), are the most likely to provide benefits to the poor. Although, fiscal
decentralization may positively affect the functional composition of public spending
(Arze Del Granado 2003); its impact on human development indicators may not be
substantial. The empirical literature on the relationship between pro-poor expenditure
and indicators of pro-poor services delivery outcomes has shown a weak linkage
(Hanushek 1995; Gupta et al. 1999, among others). In other words, pro-poor social
expenditures may not necessarily translate into pro-poor outcomes. In light of these
findings, we explore possible channels between fiscal decentralization and poverty
through pro-poor services delivery outcomes such as basic education, basic health care
and agriculture productivity indicators.70 Furthermore, this analysis will allow us to take
into account the traditional criticism about the weighting issue in the computation of the
Human Development Index (HDI).
Figure 11 below illustrates possible channels through which decentralization may
affect poverty. The top left Panel (A) shows a strong positive relationship between
decentralization and poverty reduction, measured by the HDI.
In this dissertation, we propose three possible channels through which this broad
relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty may be decomposed into. The
first proposed channel is through basic education outcomes (youth literacy rate), Panel
(B). The second channel explored is through basic health care outcomes (Child
Mortality), Panel (C). The third transmission mechanism considered is through
agricultural extension captured by agricultural productivity per worker, Panel (D). There
is some evidence of positive correlation between fiscal decentralization and poverty
70

We do not explore the channel through government institutional quality as it has been extensively
investigated by several studies among which Treisman (2000a); Fisman and Gatti (2002); and Enikolopov
and Zhuravskaya (2003). But, we control for the quality of government institutions in our estimations.
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reduction outcomes, measured either by basic education, basic heath care provision or
agriculture productivity indicators.
Again, there appears to be a strong and consistent non-linear pattern between
fiscal decentralization and poverty reduction outcomes. These results are consistent with
our earlier findings when poverty indicators were used. However, these results do not
establish any direction of causality and the significance of the transmission mechanisms
and the exact magnitude can only be determined through a sound empirical analysis. In
this subsection, we empirically investigate these channels in turns and use the following
sectoral specifications to achieve this goal.

Figure 11: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization and different
measures of Poverty in Developing countries.
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Our education outcome specification follows a variant of standard education
models used in several studies by Hanushek (1995); Barro and Lee (1996) and Gupta et
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al. (2002). Specifically, we regress fiscal decentralization Dec, education inputs EduInp
and a set of commonly used control variables X1 on education outcome EduOut,
measured alternatively by youth literacy rate and repeater rate at primary school. The
education specification can be written in general form as:

EduOut it = f1 ( Decit , EduInpit , X1it ) + u1it
Similarly, following Gupta et al. (2002), Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003);
and Mobarak et al. (2004), we adopt the following specification for the health outcome:

HealthOut it = f 2 ( Decit , HelfInpit , X 2it ) + u 2it
Where HealthOut is the health outcome; Dec is the fiscal decentralization
variable, HealthInp is an indicator of health input like birth attended by skilled health
staffs, hospital beds per 1000 people, and X2 is a set of control variables such as the
percentage of primary school complete in the female population and the quality of
government institution captured by the level of corruption and the quality of bureaucracy.
Finally, we evaluate the impact of fiscal decentralization on agricultural output
using a variant of the empirical specification by Fan et al. (2004) in who assess the
impact of various public investments in agriculture on poverty.

AgriOut it = f 3 ( Decit , AgrInpit , X 3it ) + u 3it
AgrOut is the agriculture output measured as agricultural productivity; Dec is the fiscal
decentralization variable; AgrInp capture a set of agriculture inputs such as agriculture
machinery, amount of fertilizer used; and X3 is a set of control variables.
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This chapter reports the empirical results derived from our three main hypotheses
regarding the impact of decentralization and poverty. For each testable hypothesis, we
first estimate the parameters using the standard panel data Fixed Effect (FE) and Random
Effect (RE), and report the result of the Hausman specification test. Next, we use the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) instrumental variable estimator to deal with
potential endogeneity in our regressors. In the first section, we present the results of the
empirical investigation of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty
reduction outcomes. In the second section, we report our findings regarding the potential
transmission channel of fiscal decentralization impact on poverty reduction outcomes,
through pro-poor services. Our hypothesis to investigate whether the effect of fiscal
decentralization on poverty are greater in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to other
regions is examined in each of the sub-section.
Descriptive statistics as well as simple correlation between the variables are
reported in Table C1 through Table C3 of appendix C. The description and the data
source for the variables are shown in Table C5 of appendix C. Finally, Table 1 through
Table 6 present the estimation results.
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Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty Reduction Outcomes
To assess the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty, we use a variant of the
empirical specification discussed in the previous chapter. For illustration purpose, we
report results for the three panel data estimation procedure discussed in the methodology
section. Table 1 presents results for our baseline panel data regression (4.26) using the
HDI as dependant variable. The fist two columns report the fixed effects and random
effects models respectively.

Table 1: Regression estimates for the Standard Panel Data+.
Dependant Variable
Specifications

Human Development Index (HDI)
FE
RE

Fiscal Decentralization
a b
(Expenditure) ,

0.094*
(0.054)

0.114**
(0.049)

b

0.018
(0.027)

0.058**
(0.029)

0.065***
(0.014)

0.011
(0.007)

Immunization Diphtheria

0.001***
(0.000)

0.001***
(0.000)

Fertility rate

-0.009**
(0.004)

-0.012***
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.000)

-0.002**
(0.000)

-0.002***
(0.000)

-0.002***
(0.000)

201

201

Pro-poor Expenditure
Population Density

a

% Population with
Primary school
Initial Value of
Gini Coefficient

Observations
Hausman Test
Chi-sq (11) [Pvalue ]

5.98 [0.8747]

Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a
Note:
Variable in logarithm
b

+

Variable expressed as a ratio of total expenditure
Year dummy included
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Moreover, we conducted the Hausman test for these two specifications, and failed
to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the country unobserved fixed
effects and the regressors. The Hausman statistic (H), which asymptotically follows a chisquare distribution (with 11 degree of freedom) is 5.98. Therefore, the p-value of 0.874
suggests using the random effects model.71 However, we also report the results for the
fixed effects model for completeness. In general, the results support the hypothesis that
fiscal decentralization exerts a positive effect on poverty reduction, irrespective on the
poverty indicator used.
As discussed earlier, in case the fiscal decentralization variable or one of our
regressors is endogenous, the parameter estimates are inconsistent and the instrumental
variable (IV) estimation procedure is called for, using appropriate set of instruments. For
instance, endogeneity in our pro-poor expenditures and fiscal decentralization variables
may occur under the following circumstances: first, it may be argued that shocks such as
unexpected wars, military coups or unexpected change in donor’s policy on aid in
developing countries, are likely to affect the degree of expenditure decentralization and
pro-poor social expenditures as well as the level of poverty in those countries. Indeed, in
the case of unexpected change in donor’s policy on aid, which is theoretically lumped in
our random error terms, the resulting effect of these shocks on the composition of propoor expenditures is a potential source of endogeneity that needs to be deal with. Second,
as discussed in our data section, fiscal decentralization as well as pro-poor public
expenditures indicators may suffer from measurement error, source of biasness in our
coefficient estimates. To correct for these potential issues, we adopt the instrumental

71

The same analysis is done using other measures of poverty (the FGT class of poverty indicator) and the
Hausman test also supports the random effects model specification (See table 1).
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variables procedure. However, in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form,
the standard errors of the IV parameter estimates are inconsistent and therefore invalid
for any statistical inference. To address these problems, we estimate our baseline using
the GMM-IV procedure discussed in our empirical methodology. Furthermore, given that
we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation at 10% level of
significance, using the Wooldridge autocorrelation test for panel data, the lag value of the
independent variables can be used as internal instruments when appropriate.72
Table 1 reports results for the GMM-IV estimation using the HDI as the
dependent variable. In general, these results show that fiscal decentralization has a
positive and strongly significant effect on HDI, suggesting that countries with more
expenditures decentralization are likely to have a better standard of living (captured by
the HDI) and thereby a better poverty reduction outcomes. Moreover, in all our
specification, the Hansen test (generalized Sargan test) of overidentifying restrictions, fail
to reject the null hypothesis of joint validity of the instruments used for our model. Note
2
that the Hansen J ( βˆ ) statistic is asymptotically distributed as a χ L−
k , where [L-K] is the

number of overidentifying restrictions. We report the results of these tests in the last two
rows of each table. With respect to the magnitude of the effect, one standard deviation
increase in fiscal decentralization (about 14.58 % point increase) will lead to an

72

The Wooldridge autocorrelation test for panel data model is discussed in Wooldridge (2002) pp. 282–
283. Drukker et al. (2003) provides simulation results showing that the test has good size and power
properties in reasonably sized samples. David Drukker has also proposed a user-written program, called
xtserial to perform this test in Stata. It is also important to note that other studies have used similar
methodology to address the issue of endogeneity in the regressors.
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improvement in human development (reduction in poverty) by about 7.64 % of a standard
deviation, ceteris paribus.73
Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in pro-poor social expenditures
(around 16% point increase) improves the standard deviation of the HDI by around 12 %,
holding everything else constant. Furthermore, agriculture productivity, measured by the
agriculture value added per worker, seems to be a significant predictor of poverty
reduction. On the other hand, as expected, higher infant mortality rate is associated with
high poverty (Ravallion 2003; 2005) and (Galasso and Ravallion 2005).
In column 2 of Table 2, we control for region specific effects and the results
indicate that the sign and the statistical significance of our findings are not affected,
though the magnitude is slightly modified. More interestingly, we include an interaction
dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to measure the difference in effect of the impact of
fiscal decentralization on poverty. Our results reveal that the impact of fiscal
decentralization on poverty is reinforced in SSA. Specifically, one percentage point
increase in fiscal decentralization, increase the HDI by 0.086 (0.081+0.005) point in
SSA, while for the rest of developing countries, this effect is 0.005 point less. As argued
before, these findings may be explained by the high heterogeneity in individual
preference due to the higher language, ethnic and religious fractionalization observed
both across and within African countries.

73

This figure 7.64% is obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimate (0.054) by the standard deviation of
decentralization (14.58) and dividing it by the standard deviation of HDI (0.103). That is 7.64 % = (0.054 *
14.58) / 0.103. Note that the standard deviation is derived using the descriptive statistics based on the
sample of the underlying regression estimation.
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Table 2: Regression estimates for HDI using GMM–IV Panel Data
Human Development Index (HDI)

Dependant Variable
Specifications

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Fiscal decentralization b

0.054**
(0.024)

0.081***
(0.021)

0.078**
(0.032)
0.028***
(0.004)
-0.003***
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)

0.132***
(0.029)
0.031***
(0.004)
-0.002***
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.001**
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.001)
-0.012
(0.016)
-0.014
(0.011)
-0.036**
(0.014)

0.348***
(0.083)
-0.004**
(0.002)
0.059***
(0.028)
0.020***
(0.006)
-0.003***
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.002**
(0.001)

0.230***
(0.077)
-0.003***
(0.001)
0.077***
(0.028)
0.019***
(0.004)
-0.003***
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.004
(0.012)
-0.015
(0.013)
-0.017***
(0.004)

147
0.232

147
0.477

147
0.319

147
0.398

Fiscal Decentralization ^2 b
Pro-poor expenditures b
a

Agricult value added per worker
Child mortality rate
Fertility rate
Repeater Rate at Primary School

Decentralization b × SSA dummy
Initial Value of Gini Coefficient

a

Dummy for LAC
Dummy for MENA

Observations
Hansen Test : p-value

Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: In column 1 and 2, fiscal decentralization is expressed in logarithm form.
a

b

Variable in logarithm
Variable expressed as a ratio of total expenditure

As illustrated earlier in Figure 9, the relationship between poverty and fiscal
decentralization may not be linear, as we have assumed so far. To account for the
quadratic fit suggested by Figures 9 and 10, we include the square term of fiscal
decentralization (Subexpsq) as shown in equation (4.27). The results in columns 3 and 4
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of Table 2 show a positive and statistical significant coefficient on the linear part while
the sign on the quadratic term is negative and statistical significant at 5% level. These
findings, indeed, confirm the inverted U-shape pattern observed in the graphical
illustration, which suggests that fiscal decentralization is likely to improve human
development (reduce poverty) up to a certain critical level, beyond which any increase in
the share of subnational expenditures in total expenditures may actually lead to increases
in poverty. Specifically, an increase in decentralization of expenditure responsibility
increases the HDI up to a critical fiscal decentralization threshold equal to 40%
approximately.74 Most developing countries are below this threshold.
For completeness and robustness check, we also conducted the same analysis
using three income measures of poverty; namely, the poverty headcount (H), the poverty
gap (PG) and the square poverty gap (SPG) computed using the international poverty line
of one US dollar a day per person. We also test for the presence of non-linearity in the
relationship between decentralization and poverty using the Foster-Greer-Thorbeck
(FGT) class of income poverty. Columns 1 through 3 of Table 3 report the results using
our baseline equation (4.26).The findings are similar to those obtained using the HDI as
the poverty indicator. The results seem to support a quadratic (U-shape) relationship
between the two variables, which is statistically significant at 1% level. This indeed
suggests that fiscal decentralization is likely to reduce poverty up to certain threshold
level of fiscal decentralization equals to 25%, irrespective of the income poverty

74

This critical decentralization level is obtained by setting the partial derivative of equation (2.27) to zero
and solving for fiscal decentralization (Dec) Dec = − β1 . Solving for decentralization in column 3 and 4 in
2β 2

Table 2, yields a decentralization threshold of 43.5% and 38.33% respectively. Countries above this
threshold are mostly higher income countries, except Argentina, Brazil, China and India.
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indicator used.75 Similarly, pro-poor expenditures are important predictor of poverty
reduction outcomes. A one standard deviation increase in pro-poor social expenditures
(around 16 % point increase) reduces the proportion of people living below the
international poverty line of one dollar a day per person (Headcount poverty) by 5% point
approximately, holding everything else constant.

Table 3: Regression estimates for FGT using GMM–IV Panel Data+

Pro-poor expenditures b
Fiscal decentralization b
Fiscal Decentralization ^2
Fertility rate
Repeater Rate at Primary School
Initial Value of Gini Coefficient a
Decentralization b × SSA
LAC dummy
MENA dummy

Observations
Hansen test: p-value

Square Poverty
Gap (SPG)
(1)
-0.041**
(0.016)
-0.241***
(0.076)
0.005***
(0.002)
0.075
(0.144)
0.079**
(0.033)
0.075**
(0.032)
-0.049**
(0.022)
2.995**
(1.261)
0.175
(0.551)

Poverty
Gap (PG)
(2)
-0.097***
(0.027)
-0.466***
(0.154)
0.009***
(0.003)
0.067
(0.302)
0.139**
(0.063)
0.145**
(0.061)
-0.093**
(0.043)
6.410**
(2.503)
0.374
(0.982)

Headcount
Poverty (H)
(3)
-0.306***
(0.080)
-1.058***
(0.393)
0.021***
(0.008)
0.262
(0.827)
0.239
(0.204)
0.297**
(0.147)
-0.189*
(0.111)
8.892***
(2.363)
3.434*
(1.964)

113
0.441

113
0.348

113
0.313

Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a
Note:
Variable in logarithm

75

b

Variable expressed as a percentage of total expenditure

+

Year dummy included

The fiscal decentralization thresholds obtained by using H, PG and SPG poverty indicators are 25.20%,
25.88% and 24.10% respectively. These results are derived from columns 1 through column 3 of table 3. It
is interesting to note that most Sub-Saharan countries except, South Africa are below this threshold;
whereas countries around the threshold are Colombia, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Mexico and South Africa.
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A similar proportion increase in fiscal decentralization leads to a 2% point
reduction in the gap between the average income of the poor and the international poverty
line (poverty gap), while reducing the inequality among the poor people (square poverty
gap) by 1% point, ceteris paribus. Another point to notice is that the initial level of
income inequality, defined as the initial value of Gini coefficient, has a positive and
statistical significant effect on all three measures of poverty.
We also introduce an interaction dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to assess
the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty for Africa. The results are comparable to
our previous findings that use HDI as the poverty indicator. In particular, we find that
decentralization is likely to reduce poverty more in SSA compared to other developing
countries and the difference in effects for SSA using the poverty headcount, poverty gap
and square poverty gap are 0.20%, 0.10% and 0.05% respectively.
Overall, three important observations can be made from these set of estimation
results. First, the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes is
statistically significant, though non-linear. This relationship holds irrespective of the type
of poverty indicators (income or non-income) and specification used in our regression
models. This is an indication that fiscal decentralization, if used adequately, can be an
important policy tool for poverty reduction strategies in developing countries and
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty is more prevalent. Second, the nonlinear (quadratic) relationship between decentralization and poverty suggests that there is
a critical threshold of fiscal decentralization beyond which poverty may be worsened.
This quadratic pattern is statistically significant at 5% level and the critical
threshold varies between 25%, when income poverty measures are used, to 40% when the
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HDI, a much broader measure of poverty, is employed. In other words, the threshold is
sensitive to the type of poverty indicators used. This leads us to the third observation; that
the way one measures poverty seems to matter in the determination of the critical level of
fiscal decentralization that needs to be pursued for a poverty reduction strategy.76
As discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation, poverty is multi-faceted and
encompasses other non-income needs that significantly affect human life. In many
developing countries, people have identified themselves as poor for lack of food, shelter,
job opportunities, or physical asset bases such as livestock and land. For instance, in a
survey conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, Chamber (1995) identifies the
following criteria as lack of well-being in those regions: not having access to safe
drinking water, health facilities when needed or not being able to read and write. Recent
reports by the World Bank (2001 and 2004) and by the United Nation Development
Program (2000, 2003, 2004, and 2005) also introduced being at risk, uncertainty about
the future, vulnerability, powerlessness, lack of voice, representation or freedom as key
components of poverty. Thus, it is not surprising to observe different fiscal
decentralization thresholds when different types of poverty measures are used. However,
what is important to notice is the robust non-linear relationship between fiscal
decentralization and poverty reduction, irrespective of the poverty indicators or the
decentralization measures (expenditure or revenue) employed.77
Another important issue worth investigating is the possible channels through which this
relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty may occur. In the next section,

76

As mentioned before, these critical levels of fiscal decentralization should be interpreted with caution and
should not be taken with very exact meaning, given both the quality of the data and the
77
Figure 17 through Figure 21 in appendix D shows a similar non-linear relationship between poverty and
fiscal decentralization, when the revenue measure is used.
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we explore three potential channels, basic education, basic healthcare and agricultural
extension, which have been found in the literature on basic needs, to have significant
bearing on the standard of living of the poor.

Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty Reduction Outcomes:
Exploring the Channels through Pro-poor Sectors
In the previous section, fiscal decentralization is found to have a significant effect
on different measures of poverty, Human Development Index (HDI), Headcount poverty
(H), the Poverty Gap (PG) and the Square Poverty Gap (SPG). However, as discussed
earlier, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty may be explained
through indirect channels such as basic education, basic healthcare and agricultural
productivity, referred to as pro-poor sectors. In this subsection, we empirically investigate
these channels in turn and address some econometric issues raised in our empirical
methodology.
In Table 4 through Table 6, we present the main findings regarding potential
channels trough which fiscal decentralization may impact poverty reduction outcomes.
Table 4 shows the results for the education outcomes channels; Table 5 presents the
findings for health outcomes channels; while in Table 6, we report the results for the
agriculture productivity channel. In these analyses, we employ the GMM-IV estimation
procedure presented in our previous discussion. We instrument for fiscal decentralization
and pro-poor expenditures using their internal lag values. The results of the Sargan /
Hansen test of joint significance and validity of the instruments are reported in each table.
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In all specifications, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of validity of the instruments, as
attested by the reported pvalue of the Sargan /Hansen test in the tables.
We begin the discussions of our empirical results with the education outcome
channel. Next, we analyze the health outcomes channel, and conclude this section with
the analysis of the agriculture productivity channel.

The Basic Education Channel

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 reports results of the first pro-poor sectoral
channel, the basic education outcomes, captured by youth literacy rate and repetition rate
at the primary school level, respectively. We use the quadratic functional form suggested
by the scatter plots in panel B of Figure 11 and include the square term of fiscal
decentralization in the empirical estimation.
In general, the results from Table 4 indicate a statistical significant relationship
between fiscal decentralization and education outcomes, measured either by literacy rate
among the young population or by repeater rate at primary school. Specifically, fiscal
decentralization is likely to improve youth literacy rate, but at a decreasing rate. This
implies that fiscal decentralization positively impact poverty outcomes up to a certain
critical level beyond which more decentralization will have a negative impact on poverty
outcomes. This is consistent with the belief that full decentralization of education sector
may not always be the most efficient choice. Indeed, certain activities like the design of
school curriculum, setting national standard and teachers’ training may be best
undertaken and executed by sectoral ministries and department agencies at the central
level.
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Table 4: GMM-IV Panel estimates for Education outcomes+

Dependant Variables
Specifications

Pro-poor expenditure b
Fiscal decentralization b
Square of Fiscal Decentralization
Pupil – teacher ratio
Initial GDP per Capita a
Decentralization b × SSA dummy
Decentralization b × bureaucracy
Decentralization b × corruption

Hansen Test [Pvalue]
Number of Observations

Education Outcomes
Youth Literacy
Repeater Rate at
Rate(% age 15-24)
Primary School
(1)
(2)
0.464**
(0.215)
1.906***
(0.576)
-2.600*
(1.418)
-1.248***
(0.424)
-5.186
(6.945)
0.999*
(0.538)
0.243**
(0.100)

-3.524**
(1.392)
-0.493***
(0.112)
0.501**
(0.223)
0.060
(0.067)
1.822
(1.654)
0.142**
(0.072)
0.030
(0.024)

0.183
102

0.101
162

Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a
Note:
Variable in logarithm
b

Variable expressed as a percentage of total expenditure

+

Year dummy included

Similarly, pro-poor expenditures have a positive and statistically significant effect
on youth literacy rate. Holding everything else constant, a 10%increase in pro-poor
expenditures leads to an increase in literacy rate among young people by 4.6%. This
result is consistent with previous studies by Barro (1990), Gupta et al. (2002)and others
who found that public spending on social services (education and health) is likely to
reduce poverty by increasing economic growth and promoting income equality. In the
same line, Psacharopoulos (1994) justified the importance of public spending on basic
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education as a result of the high social rate of return for primary education found in his
study. Further, higher pupil-teacher ratio, a proxy for class size, leads to lower literacy
rates among the young population. This finding is consistent with the general belief that
reducing class size will be associated with high student performance. That is, teachers
with smaller class size are expected to be more responsive to students’ needs and
ultimately increase their school performance.78
Moreover, fiscal decentralization is likely to improve youth literacy rate (% age
15-24) more in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions. The difference in effect
between Africa and other regions is estimated to be approximately one percentage point.
In other words, compared to other regions and holding everything else the same, the
literacy rate among the population aged 15 to 24 years will increase by an additional
percentage point in Sub-Saharan African countries relative to other regions. Our results
also suggest that fiscal decentralization is more effective at reducing poverty when
coupled with relatively better quality of bureaucracy. Specifically, an increase in the
quality of bureaucracy by one point, improves the effect of fiscal decentralization on
youth literacy rate by an additional 0.24% point.79
When repeater rate in primary school is used as measure of basic education
outcome, the result is similar. Public spending in pro-poor sectors is likely to reduce the
primary school repetition rate. This finding is quite intuitive in the sense that we
anticipate more resources available in the primary school system to be in principle
78

Although this line of argument seems appealing, recent empirical evidence have shown that there is little
gain, in terms of students’ school performance, from reducing class size (Hanushek 1992, and Hanushek et
al. 1998). They find the variations in students’ performance to be more explained by the variations in
teachers’ quality. These findings also call for caution in using pupil-teacher ratio as an actual measure for
class size.
79
Recall that the quality of bureaucracy index varies between 0.56 and 6 in our sample, with higher number
corresponding to better quality of bureaucracy practice.
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associated with better qualified teachers, more personal assistance, and thereby better
student performance. In other words, holding other things constant, this increase benefit
will eventually retain the pupils in the primary school system up to completion. Again,
the quadratic pattern observed earlier between fiscal decentralization and education
outcome is persistent and statistically significant, even when we use a different measure
of education outcome, repeater rate at primary schools. Fiscal decentralization is likely to
reduce primary school repetition rate up to a certain critical threshold of fiscal
decentralization beyond which the impact may diminish.
According to our findings, the level of corruption does not seem to influence the
outcome of fiscal decentralization on repeater rate at primary schools. However, there are
regional differences in the outcome of fiscal decentralization on education outcome. In
particular, Sub-Saharan African countries may experience a higher level of repetition rate
at primary schools compared to other regions, as the level of fiscal decentralization
increases. At first glance, this result seems contradictory, as one would expect fiscal
decentralization to improve education outcome. But, this finding may be rationalized by
the fact that repetition rate may not necessary correspond to poor educational outcome in
majority of SSA countries. For instance, in most Eastern and Western African countries,
primary school pupils are not only required to take a qualification exam in order to
proceed to secondary school, but the grading system is often too strict to favor a
reasonable passing rate.80 In addition, this examination is overly competitive and tends to
impede the progress of the majority of primary school pupils into secondary school
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In Anglophone West African countries, this examination is called the West African Examination
Council’s (WEAC) Common Entrance Exam, while in francophone Africa; it is the certificate of primary
school education, called Certificat d’Etude Primaire (CEPE).
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institutions. Thus, the negative coefficient on the interaction term between SSA and fiscal
decentralization is not surprising.
Overall, our findings support our maintained hypothesis that fiscal
decentralization improves education outcomes, though the impact for Sub-Saharan
African countries is lower than other regions. These findings have some implications for
poverty reduction and the two Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) directly related
to education. Indeed, education, especially basic education, has proven to help reduce
poverty. Improvement in the quality of human capital enhances productivity, broadens
employment opportunities, increases growth and income levels of the poor
(Psacharopolous and Woodhall 1985; Ranis et al. 2000). In addition, the two MDGs
related to education (achieving universal primary education and promoting gender
equality) are also found to help promote achievement of several other MDG goals, such
as reducing poverty, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, lowering the
prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and helping to ensure environmental sustainability.

The Basic Health Care Channel

Like basic education, access to basic health care services plays an important role
in poverty reduction strategy. The health status of a country’s work force is a key
determinant of its potential for economic growth and development. Columns (1) and (2)
of Table 5 report results of the second pro-poor channel investigated in this dissertation,
the basic health care outcomes, measured by child mortality and by immunization against
preventive diseases. Again, we adopted a quadratic specification as suggested by the
scatter plots in panel C of Figure 11.
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Table 5: GMM-IV Panel Estimates for Health outcomes+

Dependant Variable
Specifications
Pro-poor expenditure b
Fiscal decentralization b
Square of Fiscal Decentralization
Decentralization b × SSA dummy
Birth attended by skilled staffs /10^6
Female schooling
Decentralization b × corruption

Health Outcomes
Child Mortality
Immunization
Rate
Diphtheria
(1)
(2)
-0.570***
(0.201)
-2.057***
(0.483)
2.570***
(0.797)
2.586***
(0.610)
-0.119
(0.291)
-0.845***
(0.268)

0.285***
(0.081)
0.139*
(0.071)
-1.217**
(0.487)
0.028
(0.123)
0.236**
(0.098)
0.182***
(0.041)

Decentralization b × civil liberty

0.190*
(0.109)

Hansen Test [Pvalue]
Number of Observations

0.388
178

0.742
166

Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a
Note:
Variable in logarithm
b

Variable expressed as a percentage of total expenditure

+

Year dummy included

Overall, there is a strong and statistically significant evidence of non-linear
relationship between fiscal decentralization and basic healthcare outcomes. In particular,
fiscal decentralization is found to reduce child mortality or increase the coverage of
immunization against preventive diseases such as diphtheria, measles and malaria.
However, as shown by the sign on the quadratic term, the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and these health outcomes are non-linear. There is a critical threshold of
fiscal decentralization beyond which these positive outcomes may be reversed. This may
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explain the lack of consistent empirical evidence that exist to date on the study of the
effect of decentralization on health care service delivery. Indeed, empirical investigation
on the impact of decentralization on health outcomes for the poor are mixed. In some
cases, the decentralization of health services performs positively and are pro-poor
(Bossert 199; Hearse 2001), while in other cases there have been no significant impact on
responsiveness to the poor and development orientation (Sekher 2005). Naturally, the
incidence of decentralized health care services depends to a large extent on the design of
the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. When health care services are devolved
in the absence of subsequent intergovernmental transfers, local authorities will be
required to charge user fees and mobilize substantial own local resources to improve
local services (Prudhomme 1995; Lubben et al. 2002). As such, decentralization of health
care services can exert a substantial fiscal burden on poor areas and communities, unless
the central government provides equalizing resources through the transfer mechanism.
Likewise, pro-poor expenditures have a positive and statistically significant effect
on reducing child mortality and increasing immunization coverage. Holding everything
else the same, a 10 percent increase in pro-poor expenditures leads to a 5.7 percentage
point reduction in child mortality rate (column1) and a 2.85 percentage point increase in
immunization coverage against diphtheria (column2). These finding are in line with
previous studies by Gupta et al. (2002) who found that public spending on social services
(education and health) are likely to reduce poverty by increasing economic growth and
promoting income equality. Younger (1999) also found that in Ecuador, health
consultations for children at public facilities are more pro-poor in nature than health
consultations for adults. Our results also suggest that female education (% female
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population who completed primary education) is an important predictor of the reduction
in child mortality. A one percentage increase in the proportion of female population who
completed primary school is associated with a 0.85% point reduction in child mortality.
This supports other empirical findings that have argued that improving literacy and
education, particularly for girls and women, is one the most effective way to improve
many human development indicators such as reduced fertility, better health and nutrition
of children (World Bank 1995). Surprisingly, births attended by skilled staffs do not seem
to matter in reducing child mortality, as evidenced by the statistically insignificant
coefficient, though with the right sign, in column1 of table 5. Moreover, our results
indicate that the effect of fiscal decentralization on immunization rate in Sub-Saharan
African countries is not statistically different from regions of the globe. However, the
results suggest that fiscal decentralization has a weaker effect in reducing child mortality
in Sub-Saharan Africa than other regions. Specifically, the impact of fiscal
decentralization on the reduction of child mortality rate is 2.6% lower in SSA countries
than counties in other regions. This result in Sub-Saharan Africa has to be contrasted with
not only the lack of knowledge for preventing and treating illnesses but also with the
general lack of access to health services by the poor, compounded by a lack of
accountability and performance by the health care sector (World Bank 2004). In addition,
the particularly high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases in most African
countries may explain this result. However, we found that greater civil liberties and lower
level of corruption help improve the outcome of fiscal decentralization on health
outcomes. For instance, in countries where there is high degree of civil liberties (i.e., civil
liberty index =1), an increase in fiscal decentralization by 10 percent leads to a reduction
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in child mortality by 1.9 percentage point, ceteris paribus. In contrast, holding every thing
else the same, a 10% increase in fiscal decentralization will be associated with an
increase in child mortality rate by 13.3 percentage point in countries with extremely low
level of civil liberties (i.e., civil liberty index = 7).81 Similarly, countries with very low
level of corruption (i.e., corruption index = 6) experience higher immunization coverage
of 1.1 percentage point as a result of a 1% increase in decentralization, ceteris paribus.
In conclusion, the results partially substantiate our hypothesis relative to the
impact of fiscal decentralization on basic health care. Fiscal decentralization may
improve basic health care service up to a certain threshold, beyond which any increase in
fiscal decentralization may actually undermine this outcome. In addition, we found the
effect of fiscal decentralization on health outcomes to be weaker in Sub-Saharan Africa
compared to other regions. However, the findings suggest that good quality of
governance (i.e., using corruption index and the degree of civil liberty) has an
unambiguously high impact on basic health care outcomes (i.e., child mortality and
immunization coverage).

The Agriculture Productivity Channel

International trends suggest that the output and yield of staple foods has a large
impact on poverty trends (IFAD 2001). These findings have some important implications
for poverty strategy in the sense that three-quarters of the 1.2 billion people who live in
extreme poverty are found in rural areas where they work (World bank 2005). Of these
poor people residing in rural areas, around 75 percent make a living from agriculture,
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Note that the civil liberty index varies from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating greater civil liberty and 7 lower
degree of civil liberty.
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which typically represent the largest economic sector in most developing countries
(IFAD 2001).
Thus, any decentralization policy that seeks to empower grassroots people
through the empowerment of their local governments seems a natural avenue to promote
poverty reduction in rural sector. In the context of agricultural development, the basic
aim of decentralization should be to improve the delivery of basic local services like
agricultural extension by assuring that the extension services that are provided respond to
local needs. Here, we empirically investigate this premise by regressing fiscal
decentralization and a set of control variables on agriculture productivity (i.e., agriculture
value added per worker).
We adopt a quadratic specification as suggested by the scatter plot in panel D of
figure 11, in order to account for the potential non-linear relationship between fiscal
decentralization and agriculture productivity. Our control variables include the use of
agriculture machine per worker (a proxy for agriculture inputs), pro-poor expenditures,
measure of quality of governance and regional disparity.
The results suggest that fiscal decentralization has a statistically significant effect
on agriculture productivity, though the relationship is non-linear. In particular, fiscal
decentralization will improve the agriculture value added per worker up to a threshold
beyond which more fiscal decentralization may reduce agriculture productivity. Indeed,
fiscal decentralization may facilitate the use of local knowledge, local participation and
ownership by utilizing local resources. Furthermore, decentralization has the potential to
enhance transparency and accountability in the delivery of agricultural services, allowing
local governments and community groups to more closely monitor service providers in
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order to reduce shirking by extension workers and to ensure that extension services are
actually delivered.

Table 6: GMM-IV Panel Estimates Agricultural Productivity outcomes+

Dependant Variables
Specifications
Pro-poor expenditure b
Fiscal decentralization b
Square of Fiscal Decentralization
Decentralization b × SSA dummy
Agriculture machinery
Decentralization b × corruption
Decentralization b × civil liberty

Hansen Test [Pvalue]
Number of Observations

Agriculture Outcomes
Agriculture Value
Added Per Worker
(1)
(2)
0.021***
(0.006)
0.031**
(0.014)
-0.084***
(0.025)
-0.039***
(0.011)
1.400***
(0.235)
0.005*
(0.003)

0.019***
(0.005)
0.065***
(0.014)
-0.078***
(0.022)
-0.034***
(0.010)
1.293***
(0.230)
-0.007***
(0.002)

0.634
169

0.668
178

Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a
Note:
Variable in logarithm
b

Variable expressed as a percentage of total expenditure

+

Year dummy included

However, as suggested by our findings, fiscal decentralization may not always
produce satisfactory agricultural productivity outcomes. Like in any other sector, the
design of fiscal decentralization policy and the sequence of the implementation in the
agricultural sector, have to be done properly in order to ensure a positive agriculture
productivity outcome. Indeed, to the extent that agriculture extension and livestock
development focus on supporting agricultural production by poor subsistence farmers and
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small-holders, the link between agricultural programs and poverty reduction will be often
more direct than in the cases of education and health care.
As expected, the use of agriculture machinery by farmers increases the agriculture
productivity per worker. A one point increase in agriculture machinery leads to an
increase in the agriculture productivity by 0.014 percentage point, ceteris paribus. Indeed,
the dissemination of technical know-how to small farmers may improve the access to
seed and fertilizer, increase the adoption of irrigation schemes, enhance market access, or
improve the assistance of veterinary services for livestock owners, which are key
determinant of good agriculture productivity outcomes. Thus, to the extent that
agricultural extension and support programs are effective in increasing agricultural
production, these programs directly increase the earning potential of poor rural
households.
The quality of governance is an important predictor of the impact of fiscal
decentralization on agriculture productivity. In effect, lower level of corruption or greater
level of civil liberties positively influences the impact of fiscal decentralization on
agriculture productivity, holding everything else the same.82 This may be explained by
the fact that decentralization has the potential to enhance transparency and accountability
in the delivery of agricultural services, allowing local governments and community
groups to be more pro-active in monitoring service providers in order to reduce potential
shirking by extension workers and to ensure that extension services are effectively
delivered.
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Recall that the corruption index ranges between 0 and 6, with 6 indicating high corruption level; whereas
civil liberties index fluctuates between 1 and 7, with 7 representing low level of civil liberty.
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The results also indicate that the impact of fiscal decentralization on agricultural
productivity is lower in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) compared to other regions. In
particular, the difference in effect of the impact of fiscal decentralization on agricultural
productivity is 0.35 percentage point lower in SSA countries compare to countries in
other regions. Indeed, these results should be interpreted with caution, and should not be
understood as evidence against fiscal decentralization; but rather the positive effect of
fiscal decentralization on agricultural value added per worker is smaller in SSA relative
to other regions. In fact, several reasons may explain this finding. Fist, agricultural
extension programs in Africa are still at their infancy stage and farm productions in most
African rural areas are done through traditional rudimentary methods.83 Thus, even
though agriculture extension and agriculture machines are likely to improve agricultural
productivity, their relative use in African countries are often too moderate or at an
experimental stage to produce any substantially higher impact. Second, as shown above,
the quality of government institutions is an important predictor of the increase effect of
fiscal decentralization on agricultural productivity. However, in most African countries,
government institutions are often weak and unstable (Gyimah-Brempong 2002). For
instance, according to the 2005 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index,
six of the ten most corrupt countries in the world are from SSA region, where 33% of the
population is living with hunger or with insufficient food (UN 2006).84
As a result, given the large scale of decentralization programs, including the
agricultural sector, currently undergoing in different countries in SSA, more assessment
83

Recently, the Farmers Field School (FFS) approach, which emerged in Asia (Philippines) in 1970, has
been implemented in some African countries (started with two pilots, Ghana in 1995 and Mali in 1997) in
order to foster agricultural development by reinforcing adult education, agroecology and local
organizational development (Simpson and Owens, 2002).
84
The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals Report 2006.
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work may need to be undertaken with regards to the design and implementation of fiscal
decentralization programs. This will ensure desirable outcomes for agricultural
productivity, which has serious implication for rural poverty reduction. Indeed, a number
of studies have shown that in many developing countries, the largest growth in poverty
reduction has occurred as a result of agricultural growth (Binswanger and Von Braun
1991; Ravallion and Datt 1995; Bourguignon and Morrison 1998, and Hazell et al. 2000).
In the same line, Sarris and Markova (2001) demonstrated that improving farm
production in rural areas helps spur a non-farm activity, which is critical to insulating
rural families from poverty.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation we explored the link between decentralization and poverty
reduction outcomes. We looked at two aspects of this link – the overall impact of
decentralization on levels of poverty and potential channels through various poverty
reduction outcomes. For the first aspect, we empirically estimate the impact of fiscal
decentralization on four measures of income and non-income poverty levels. For the
income measures, we use the three traditional measures – poverty headcount (H), poverty
gap (PG) and the square poverty gap (SPG). However, poverty is a multifaceted concept
and to account for this complexity, we also employ non-income measures of poverty
proposed by the United Nation Development Program (UNDP), the Human Development
Index (HDI).
We implement the empirical estimation using the Generalized Method of Moment
Instrumental Variable (GMM-IV) methodology based on Baum et al.
(2003).Furthermore, given Africa’s relatively poor performance with regards to
attainment of their Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) targets, we investigate
whether there is any potential differences in the impact of fiscal decentralization on
poverty relative to other regions.
Theoretically, we develop a simple framework to assess poverty reduction
outcomes in a decentralized provision of pro-poor public goods and services. Our model
is based on Kanbur and Feroni (1991), Faguet (2004) and Besley and Coate (2003), but
explicitly introduces the poverty dimension. The model provides a generic theoretical
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framework to understand the interaction between decentralization and poverty reduction
outcomes. Our main conclusion from the theoretical model is that the impact of
decentralization on poverty depends on the relative magnitude of the proximity advantage
of subnational government and the superior technical capacity of the central government.
Our empirical results reveal a statistical significant non-linear relationship
between fiscal decentralization and poverty. In all our estimations, fiscal decentralization
improves poverty reduction outcomes. However, as mentioned above, the relationship is
non-linear; that is, after a certain critical threshold, fiscal decentralization may have a
negative impact on poverty reduction. This fiscal decentralization threshold is estimated
to range from 25% to 38%. Further, we find that fiscal decentralization is likely to have a
larger effect on poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) relative to
other regions.
Our empirical analysis also indicates a potential transmission of the effect of
fiscal decentralization on poverty through three pro-poor sectoral outcomes – basic
education, basic health and agricultural productivity. The empirical results on these
outcomes are mixed for the Sub-Saharan Africa sample, but hold for the full sample.
These results may have a number of implications in regard to policy making.
First, it might help to evaluate decentralization policies, especially in developing
countries where substantial public sector reforms are being implemented. Second, it is
also important to realize that very high level of fiscal decentralization may not
necessarily serve the interest of the poor, as evidenced by the non-linear relationship
between fiscal decentralization and poverty. This might have implication on the
structuring of decentralization policy.
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APPENDIX A:
THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT OF POVERTY REDUCTION

Evolution of Thinking about Poverty and Poverty Reduction Policies

Poverty Reduction has become a key challenge facing the world community.
Poverty Reduction policies have evolved over the years according to the evolution of
thinking about poverty. As discussed in section 2.1, the definition and measurement of
poverty has broadened over the past quarter of a century, and as it has broadened, so have
the relevant set of policies expanded. A deeper understanding of poverty has been critical
to the design and implementation of specific programs and projects to help people escape
poverty.
During the 1970s and 1980s, poverty was viewed mainly as a lack of income or
commodities. Consequently, policies turned their attention to the expansion of per capita
income through economic growth as the key strategy to reduce poverty. In other words,
poverty reduction strategies during those two decades focused on an indirect approach:
through growth-led policies the flow of benefits to the poor would be enhanced
(Ahluwalia 1990 and Bhagwati 1988). During this time, governments heavily intervened
in the national economy pursuing macroeconomic stability and growth, encouraging
private sector development, promoting good governance, investing in social
development, accelerating trade liberalization, and strengthening financial sectors with
the hope that all this would indirectly, but significantly, affect poverty.
However, the empirical evidence has shown that economic growth is on average
not pro-poor or distribution neutral, unless it is combined with the right policies to assure
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that the poor can participate fully in the opportunities brought in by that growth
(Ravallion 2004).
During the late 1980s and 1990s, the concept of poverty was broadened, as was
seen in section 2.1, to include, in addition to income, a wide set of non-income basic
needs, such as primary education, basic health and access to social services. The United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) played a leading role in re-defining poverty in
terms of human development, and introducing several new measures including the
Human Development Index and the Human Poverty Index, also reviewed above.
As the new dimensions of poverty were incorporated into these indexes, the range
of policy instruments to reduce poverty also expanded. Economic growth was not viewed
any longer as the sole tool for poverty reduction but rather as a necessary condition.
During this time, the focus turned to policies and programs to improve health, expand
education and other sectoral spending, supplementing other government actions designed
to promote investment and broad-based growth. This strategy of targeted spending
became known as the “direct approach,” which relies on targeted programs aimed
directly at increasing the welfare of identified poverty groups. Besides expenditure
policies on services that directly benefit the poor, other targeted programs include wageemployment and financial assistance programs, better known as safety net programs.
As we have seen in Section 2.1 above, in recent years the concept of poverty has
been broadened even further to include other aspects such as vulnerability,
powerlessness, voice, and participation. This calls for the active participation of different
sections of society, especially the poor, in the design of public policies (for example in
the context of decentralization) for poverty reduction. The new architecture of
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international aid to fight poverty, such as PRSPs, prescribes participation as an integrated
part of the approach.

Current Trends in International Development Strategies and Practice

A number of recent innovations in aid practice spring out of lessons learned from
now a long history of Development Cooperation. Table A1 provides a schematic history
of development strategies and policy practices during the past five decades. The new aid
mechanisms that have emerged in response to past experience focus on three issues:
country ownership, sound policy and institutional environment, and cooperation between
government and donors (Foster 2000).

Table A1: Historical Trends in Development Cooperation
1960s:

With donor support, governments to displace private sector: National
Development Plans, government-led industrialization, nationalization.

1970s:

Donors to displace government: donor driven projects with own
management structures outside government, such as integrated rural
development.

1980s:

Governments, responding to donor/IFI stipulations, return ownership to
private sector: Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and privatization.

1990s:

Donors begin to return ownership to government: Sector wide programs
(SWAPs), direct budget support, HIPC.

2000s:

Emphasis on increasing voice and accountability: governance,
participation, Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and
PRSPs.

Source: compiled from various source, including Foster (2000).

Although significant progress has been made in designing and implementing
poverty reducing policies, there is still an important ongoing debate on what policies may
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be most effective in achieving poverty reduction, and how international financial
institutions, bilateral donors and other actors can best contribute towards this goal. Just as
poverty reducing policies have evolved adapting to the changes in the prevailing concept
of poverty, so have the general approaches to international development strategies and
practices. The 1980s and 1990s were decades of growth in the wealth of many nations, as
the world’s economy grew, benefiting from growth in trade, liberalization, and
technological innovations. However, in this era of globalization the situation of many
poor countries and the poor people within those countries did not improve.
In the early 1980s the IMF introduced “structural adjustment policies” (or SAPs)
as a way to help poorer countries join the global boom. The SAPs were meant to stabilize
national finances and to open the national economies to international trade, both of which
were regarded as the fundamental basis for sustainable economic growth. Yet the SAPs
appeared not to have been successful. Critics of the SAPs argue that they actually
increased poverty, in part because in order to ensure debt repayment and economic
restructuring SAPs required poor countries to reduce spending on items such as health,
education and development, while debt repayment and other economic policies were
made the priority.
By the 1990s, it was clear that a new strategy was needed for reducing poverty
among developing countries. Several policy innovations followed. One of such policies
was the “sector wide approaches” (or SWAPs), which essentially are mechanisms for
coordinating support to public expenditure programs. Another policy innovation during
the 1990s was the “Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative” (or the HIPC) launched by
the World Bank and the IMF with the objective of reducing the poorest countries’ debt to
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multilateral institutions. By the late 1990s, the World Bank launched the Comprehensive
Development Framework (or CDFs) to provide a framework for key stakeholders
(developing countries and donors) to identify national priorities for each sector. CDFs
were to be country-led strategy involving all development actors in the country. Later,
these would become the basis for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) under
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) initiated in 1999. The PRSP
approach results in a comprehensive country-based strategy for poverty reduction aiming
to provide the crucial link between national public actions, donor support, and the
development outcomes needed to meet the United Nations' Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have provided the
operational basis for the IMF and the World Bank concessional lending and for debt
relief under the HIPC Initiative.
In the beginning of the new century, development strategies have become the
center of the policy agenda at the international, national and regional level. The United
Nations, for example, has adopted a number of declarations to reduce poverty, the latest
being in 2000, through the MDGs, in which a global commitment was made to reduce
poverty around the world by 50 percent by the year 2015, and which has become the
overarching objective for both national and international stakeholders.
Currently, poverty reduction policies revolve around the Millennium Goals and
the PRSP approach, as world leaders promised to work together to meet eight specific
and measurable development goals and concrete targets for advancing development and
reducing poverty by 2015 (see Table A2 for the list of goals and targets).
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Table A2: United Nations Millennium Development Goals
In September 2000, the member states of the United Nations unanimously adopted the
Millennium Declaration. Following consultations among international agencies, including
the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the
General Assembly recognized the Millennium Development Goals as part of the road map
for implementing the Millennium Declaration. The Millennium Development goals and
targets to be achieved by 2015 are:
Goal
1 Eradicate extreme poverty
and hunger
Achieve universal primary
2 education
3 Promote gender equality
and empower women
4 Reduce child mortality
5 Improve maternal health
6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria
and other diseases

7 Ensure environmental
sustainability

8 Develop a global
partnership for development

Target
Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a
dollar a day
Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from
hunger
Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of
primary schooling
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary
education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015
Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children
under five
Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio
Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other
major diseases
Integrate the principles of sustainable development into
country policies and programs; reverse loss of
environmental resources
Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable
access to safe drinking water
Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100
million slum dwellers, by 2020
Open trading systems, special needs of least developed
countries, debt, employment, access to medicines, etc.

Source: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (accessed February 2003).

The first seven goals focus on eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving
universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women;
reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and
other diseases; and ensuring environmental sustainability.
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The eighth goal calls for the creation of a global partnership for development,
with targets for aid, trade, and debt relief. People, government, and external actors are
encouraged to embrace the Goals and to own the PRSP process and take action.
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APPENDIX B:
A TYPOLOGY OF POVERTY MEASURES

The multidimensional nature of poverty raises the question of how to measure and
compare it over time and across communities. In this subsection we consider the
strengths and shortcomings of the ways in which different aspects of poverty are
measured and quantified.

Income-poverty Measures
Headcount Ratio

The poverty headcount ratio has been for decades one of the most widely used
poverty indicators because of its computational and interpretation ease. The headcount
ratio (H) is simply the proportion of population that is poor. In a sense, it is the
percentage of the population living below the poverty line (see Table B1).
Though, computationally simple, the headcount ratio suffers from major
limitations. This measure does not reflect the intensity or degree of poverty nor the
distribution of the poor among themselves. For instance, a simple but very relevant
question that the headcount measure fails to address is how far are the poor from the
poverty line?

Poverty Gap Ratio and the FGT Index of Poverty

An alternative measure proposed to account for the issues just mentioned above is
the poverty gap ratio (PG). It accounts for the shortfall of incomes of the poor from the
poverty line (see Table B1 for the explicit expression).
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Table B1: Income-Based Poverty indicators
¾

H=

Headcount ratio index (Incidence of Poverty)

q
; Where (q): Number of poor and (n) the total population.
n
¾

PG =

Poverty Gap (Depth of Poverty)

z − µi
1
; for µ i < z; Where ( µ i ): Income of the ith poor person and (z) poverty line. It
∑
n i =1 z
q

can also be expressed in terms of the headcount ratio as: PG = HI
Where I =

z − µ*
*
is the income gap of the poor; in which ( µ ) is the mean income among the
z

poor.
¾

Square Poverty Gap index, SPG ( Severity of Poverty)
2

1 ⎡ z − yi ⎤
SPG = ∑ ⎢
;
n i =1 ⎣ z ⎥⎦
q

Where, y: income of the ith individual ranked in increasing value of income, (q) number of poor in the
total population (n), and ( α =2) the aversion for poverty.
¾

Foster Greer Thorbecke (FGT) index of poverty
α

1 ⎡ z − yi ⎤
Pα = ∑ ⎢
;
n i =1 ⎣ z ⎥⎦
( α ) is the aversion for poverty. Note that when
• α =0, Pα = H (Head Count Ratio)
q

•
•

α =1, Pα = PG (Poverty Gap Ratio)
α =2, Pα = SPG (Square Poverty Gap ratio)
¾

Sen’s poverty index

P = H [ I + (1 − I ) G*]

Where, H: is the headcount ratio as defined early;
I: is a per-person percentage gap (income-gap ratio) defined above;
G*: is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution of the poor.
¾
Watt’s poverty Index
Watts (1968) has been widely used in the past. It includes in its formulation both the notion of income
and non-income attributes of welfare. It is given by: W =

1
N

⎛ z ⎞
⎟⎟ , where (z) poverty line
⎝ i⎠

∑ log ⎜⎜ y
i

and (y) a composite of human and non-human wealth

This measure can also be expressed in terms of the headcount ratio as follows:
PG = H * I ; Where, (H) is the poverty headcount ratio and I =

z − µ*
is the income gap
z
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of the poor; in which ( µ * ) is the mean income among the poor and (z) is the poverty line.
To answer the question of how the poor are compared to their peers, also below the
poverty line, Foster, Greer and Thorbecke-FGT (1984), propose another index, known as
(Pα), that encompasses the three fundamental elements that should be measured by
poverty indices: (i) the incidence, or the number of persons falling under a predefined
poverty line; (ii) the intensity, which accounts for “depth” of poverty as well as
incidence; and (iii) the severity, which reflects inequality among the poor. The general
expression is given by:
α

Pα =

1 q ⎡ z − yi ⎤
; Where (yi) represents the income of the (i) individual, ranked in
∑
n i =1 ⎢⎣ z ⎥⎦

increasing value of income, (q) is the number of poor in the total population (n), and (α)
is the aversion for poverty. As α increases, more and more weight is given to the poorest
of the poor. In addition, the FGT poverty index is decomposable or additive.85 Note that
when α = 0, Pα yields the headcount poverty measure (H). And when α =1, Pα becomes
the poverty gap (PG). (See Table B1).

Sen’s Poverty Index

Sen (1976) proposed an alternative poverty index that is sensitive to the
distribution of income among the poor, as opposed to the “crude” headcount ratio (H). As
he argued, the headcount ratio is a crude index completely insensitive to income
distribution: a pure transfers of income from the poorest poor to those who are better off

will either keep (H) unchanged or make it go down. Thus he maintained that a poverty
85

Additive decomposability, require that aggregate poverty be equal to the population weighted sum of
poverty levels in the various sub-groups of society (Ravallion 1996).
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index to overcome these problems should simultaneously satisfy the following two
criteria:
i.

Monotonicity: given other things equal, a reduction in income of an

individual below the poverty line must increase the poverty measure and;
ii.

Transfer: given other things equal, a pure transfer from a person below the

poverty line to anyone who is richer must increase the poverty measure.

Acknowledging these axioms, Sen proposed a poverty index that introduces the
distribution of income among the poor (or the Gini coefficient for the poor).86 However,
Sen’s poverty index was later shown to be also problematic with respect to two different
issues. First, it is not replication invariant, meaning that merging two populations with
identical characteristic may change the value of the index. Second, it does not represent a
continuous function of individual incomes.

Watts’ Poverty Index

Another poverty measure that has been widely used since its introduction in 1968
is the Watts poverty index, though it remains less popular than the (Pα) class of poverty
measures. Watts (1968) stipulates that the wealth of the individual or the household
required for the computation of this index should normally be divided into two parts:
“human wealth” and “non-human wealth.” The latter category refers mostly to the usual
income sources, such as income transfers, salaries, and all “real-money sources of

86

It is interesting to note that the poverty gap measure (PG), commonly used by the United States Social
Security Administration, also violates the transfer axiom, though it satisfies the monotonicity axiom.
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income.” The former category pertains to the skills and the social condition of an
individual in general.
A correct implementation of the Watts index should therefore include values that
reflect both of these categories. See Table B1 for the general formulation of this index.
One technical issue with the Watts index is that it does not work with zero values, since
its computation relies on the use of a logarithmic function. Therefore, the inclusion of
“human wealth” in the computation ensures that there will be only positive values
associated with individuals’ wealth. Interestingly, the Watts poverty index has also the
desirable property of decomposability.

Non-income-based Measures of Poverty
The concept of human development is motivated by the process of widening
people’s choices and the level of well-being they can achieve. Such choices are neither
finite nor static. But regardless of the level of development, the three essential choices for
people are to live a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge, and to have access to the
resources needed for a decent standard of living. Human development does not end there,
however. Other choices, highly valued by many people, range from political, economic
and social freedom to opportunities for being creative and productive and enjoying selfrespect and guaranteed human rights. Income clearly is only one option that people would
like to have, and although an important one, it is not, in this view, the sum total of the
lives of individuals. Indeed, income is seen as a means, with human development being
the end. The most commonly used measures of human development in the literature are
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the HDI, the HPI and the GDI discussed below (see Table B2 for a summary of these
non-income measures of poverty).
The Human Development Index (HDI)87

The Human Development Index (HDI) developed by the UNDP measures the
average overall achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human
development:
1. A long and healthy life (longevity), as measured by life expectancy at birth.
2. Knowledge, as captured by educational attainment, the adult literacy rate (with
two-thirds weight) and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross
enrollment ratio (with one-third weight).
3. A decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita (in PPP US$).
Before the HDI itself is calculated, an index needs to be created for each of these
dimensions. Once the dimension indices have been calculated, the HDI is calculated as
the simple average of the three dimension indices:
HDI = 1/3 (life expectancy index) + 1/3 (education index) + 1/3 (GDP index).
The Human Poverty Index (HPI)88

The HPI was first proposed by Anand and Sen (1996), and later implemented in
UNDP’s Human Development Report (1997). This concept aims at capturing deprivation
with respect to the key non-income dimensions of well-being.

87

88

For more detailed information see UNDP Report (1990).
For more details see UNDP Report (1997).
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Table B2: Non-Income-Based Poverty indicators
¾

The Human Development Index (HDI)
The UNDP (1990) defines the HDI as follows:

HDI = 1/3 (life expectancy index) +
1/3 (education index) + 1/3 (GDP index)
The dimension indices, (X1) = Life expectancy
(X2) = Literacy and (X3) = Logarithm of GDP per capita, are computed by looking across a range of
countries and established the maximum and the minimum value for each indicator. Then a deprivation
index for the ith indicator and the jth country is defined as:
Iij = ⎡ max X ij − X ij ⎤ , where I ij lies between 0 and 1.
⎢
⎥
⎣⎢ max X ij − minX ij ⎦⎥

So the deprivation index for country j as the average of the 3 deprivation indexes for the country:

Ij =

1 3
∑ I ij
3 i =1

Such that: (HDI ) = 1 − I j . A country’s human development is high if its HDI is more than 0.5.

The Human Poverty Index (HPI)
The HPI measures deprivation in the three basic dimensions of human development captured in the
HDI:
•
Vulnerability to death at early age, measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age
40 (P1).
•
Exclusion from reading and communications, as measured by the adult illiteracy rate (P2).
•
Lack of access to basic economic provisions (P3), measured by proportion of people without
(i) access to safe drinking water, (ii) percentage of people without access to health services, and (iii)
percentage of children under 5 who are moderately and severely underweight. Formally,
HPI =

[

1

α

3

α

α

( P1 + P2 + P3 )

]

1

α

, where

α =3

o
The gender-related development index (GDI)
Similar to the HDI, the GDI is computed as the unweighted average of three component indices:
– the equally distributed life expectancy index,
– the equally distributed education index and
– the equally distributed income index:
GDI = 1/3 (life expectancy index) +
1/3 (education index) + 1/3 (income index)

o
The Gender Empowerment measure (GEM)
GEM focuses on women’s opportunities and captures gender inequality in three key areas:
 Political participation and decision-making (1);
 Economic participation (2);
 Power over economic resources (3).
For each of these 3 dimensions, an Equally Distributed Equivalent Percentage (EDEP) is computed as
follows:
1
EDEP = [( female index ) 1 − ∈ + ( Male index ) 1 − ∈ ] 1 − ∈ , Where ∈= 2
Finally, the GEM= EDEP1 + EDEP2 + EDEP3
3
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The difference between HDI and HPI lies in the fact that the HDI emphasizes the
average economic and social achievements for the entire population, while the HPI
focuses on the deprived segments of the population of the country. This is consistent with
the standard practice of confining poverty measures exclusively to the deprived segments.
Another difference between the HDI and the HPI is that HPI exclusively concentrates on
education and health, while the HDI also contain the additional component of GDP per
capita (adjusted for the purchasing power parity).
Typically two different types of human poverty index are used to assess
deprivation in human well-being. The first one, HPI-1 is used for developing countries
and the second one, HPI-2, for selected OECD countries (UNDP 1997).
The HPI-1 measures deprivations in the three basic dimensions of human development

captured in the HDI:
1. A long and healthy life—vulnerability to death at a relatively early age, as
measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40.
2. Knowledge—exclusion from the world of reading and communications, as
measured by the adult illiteracy rate.

3. A decent standard of living—lack of access to basic economic provisions,
as measured by (i) percentage of people without access to safe drinking
water, (ii) percentage of people without access to health services, and (iii)
percentage of children under 5 who are moderately and severely
underweight.89

89

Note that due to lack of reliable data on access to health services for recent years, often deprivation in a
decent standard of living is measured by two rather than three indicators – the percentage of the population
not using improved water sources and the percentage of children under five who are underweight. An
unweighted average of the two is used as an input to the HPI-1.
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The computation of HPI-1 is more straightforward than the HDI since there is no
need to generate dimension indices, as the indicators used to measure the deprivations are
already normalized between 0 and 100.
The HPI-2 measures deprivations in the same dimensions as the HPI-1 and also

captures social exclusion. Thus it reflects deprivations in four dimensions:
1. A long and healthy life—vulnerability to death at a relatively early age, as
measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 60.
2. Knowledge—exclusion from the world of reading and communications, as
measured by the percentage of adults (aged 16 - 65) lacking functional literacy
skills.
3. Adecent standard of living—as measured by the percentage of people living
below the income poverty line (50% of the median disposable household income).
4. Social exclusion—as measured by the rate of long-term unemployment (12
months or more).

The Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

While the HDI measures average achievement, the GDI adjusts the average
achievement to reflect the inequalities between men and women in the following
dimensions:
1. A long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth.
2. Knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined primary,
secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio.
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3. A decent standard of living, as measured by estimated earned income (PPP
US$).
The GDI is computed as the unweighted average of three component indices—the
equally distributed life expectancy index, the equally distributed education index and the
equally distributed income index (see Table B2 for more detail on the computation
process):90
GDI = 1/3 [life expectancy index + education index + income index].

The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

The GEM focuses on women’s opportunities in a given society by looking at
gender inequality in three key dimensions:
1. Political participation and decision-making power, as captured by the percentage
of parliamentary seats occupied by men and women.
2. Economic participation and decision-making power, as captured by two
indicators, the percentage shares of positions as legislators, senior officials and
managers occupied by men and women; and the percentage share of professional
and technical positions occupied by men and women.
3. Power over economic resources, as measures by men and women estimated
income (PPP US$).

90

For a more detailed analysis of the GDI’s mathematical formulation see Anand and Sen’s (1996)
“Gender Inequality in Human Development: Theories and Measurement,” Bardhan and Klasen’s (1999)
“UNDP’s Gender-Related Indices: A Critical Review” and the technical notes in Human Development
Report (1995) and Human Development Report (1999).
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For each of these three areas, an Equally Distributed Equivalent Percentage
(EDEP) is computed and the GEM is then calculated as the simple average of the three
EDEPs:
GEM = 1/3 [parliamentary representation + economic participation + income index].

Linking Poverty and Income Inequality

Whereas poverty emphasizes different forms of deprivation expressed as income
or human capabilities, inequality is concerned with distribution within a population.
Thus, unlike poverty which is defined only for the population below a certain threshold,
inequality is defined over the entire population and does not necessary depend on the
mean of the distribution. One way to assess inequality is to arrange individuals or
households in ascending order of income or expenditures. The common method is to
divide the population into successive deciles (tenths) or quintiles (fifths) from poorest to
richest, and then associate the corresponding proportion of income or expenditures to
each stratum. The most used measures of inequality are the Dalton-Atkinson indices,
Theil’s entropy measure and the Gini coefficient, all of which are briefly reviewed in the
following sections, but before we do that we take a look at general relationship between
poverty and inequality.
Poverty and inequality are closely linked: for any given mean income, the more
unequal the income distribution, the larger the percentage of the population, living in
income-poverty. Inequality can be conceptualized as the dispersion of a distribution,
whether that is income, consumption or some other welfare indicator or attribute of a
population. Inequality is often studied as part of broader analyses covering poverty and
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welfare, although these three concepts are distinct. As mentioned earlier, inequality is a
broader concept than poverty in that it is defined over the whole distribution, not only the
censored distribution of individuals or households below a certain poverty line. Indeed
some measures of inequality can be driven largely by incomes in the upper tail as well as
in the lower tail of the distribution. Inequality is also a much narrower concept than
welfare. Although both of these capture the whole distribution of a given indicator,
inequality is independent of the mean of the distribution (a desirable property of an
inequality measure), and instead solely concerned with the second moment, the
dispersion, of the distribution.
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Figure B1: Correlation between Poverty (HDI) and Inequality (Gini)
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To illustrate these points, Figure B1 above shows the relationship between
poverty (measured by the HDI) and inequality outcomes (measured by Gini coefficient)
for a sample of countries over the period 1975-2000. As noted earlier, there seems to be
a tradeoff between inequality and human development, so that for a given mean of
income, the more unequal the income distribution (higher Gini coefficient), the higher the
poverty rate (alternatively, the lower the human development index, HDI).This
relationship is captured by the downward sloping fitted line on the left panel of Figure B1
above.

The Gini Coefficient

This is a measure of inequality developed in 1912 by the Italian statistician
Corrado Gini. It is one of the most widely used indicators of income inequality, though it
can be used to measure any other type of unequal distribution. The Gini coefficient (Gini
1912) is mainly derived from the Lorenz curve, a graphic device used to display the
relative inequality in a distribution of income scale (Figure B2). Typically, the Lorenz
curve is derived by plotting the cumulative share of total income (expenditure) earned by
households ranked from bottom to top. The closer the Lorenz curve gets to the 45°
diagonal (the egalitarian line), the more equal the distribution of incomes in the society.
As the degree of inequality increases, the wider the curvature of the Lorenz curve
becomes, and thus the area between the curve and the 45° line becomes larger.
The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the Lorenz curve departs from
the egalitarian line (the 45° diagonal). It is calculated as the ratio of the area between the
Lorenz curve and the 45° line, to the whole area below the 45° line. Formally, if A is the
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area between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve, and B, is the area
underneath the Lorenz curve, then the Gini coefficient is the ratio G = A/(A+B) (see
Figure B2). This ratio is expressed as a percentage or as the numerical equivalent of that
percentage, which is always a number between 0 and 1, where, 0 corresponds with
perfect equality (everyone has the same income) and 1 corresponds with perfect
inequality (where one person has all the income and everyone else has zero income). (See
Table B3 for the algebraic formulation).

Figure B2: Gini Coefficient (G)

The Gini coefficient presents several advantages. First, it is a measure of
inequality, not a measure of average income or some other variable which is
unrepresentative of most of the population such as GDP. Indeed, GDP statistics are often
criticized as they do not represent changes for the whole population, the Gini coefficient
demonstrates how income has changed for poor and rich. If the Gini coefficient is rising
as well as GDP, poverty may not be improving for the vast majority of the population.
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Second, the Gini coefficient is sufficiently simple that it can be compared across
countries and over time, and be easily interpreted. It can also be used to compare income
distributions across different population sectors, for example the Gini coefficient for
urban areas differs to that of rural areas. The Gini coefficient can be used to indicate how
the distribution of income has changed within a country over a period of time, thus it is
possible to see if inequality is increasing or decreasing.
Third, the Gini coefficient satisfies four important principles: Anonymity, it
doesn’t matter who the high and low earners are; Scale interdependence, the Gini
coefficient does not consider the size of the economy, the way it is measured, or whether
it is a rich or poor country on average; Population interdependence, it does not matter
how large the population of the country is; Transfer principle, meaning that if we
transfer income from a rich person to a poor person, the resulting distribution is more
equal.
However, the Gini coefficient is far from a perfect measure as it presents some
important limitations. The first disadvantage is that it ignores the fact that comparing
income distributions among countries may be difficult because redistribution and benefits
systems may be different across countries. For example, some countries provide benefits
in the form of money and others do it in kind (for example, food stamps). The latter are
not counted as income in the Lorenz curve and therefore not taken into account in the
Gini coefficient. In this same vein, the Lorenz curve may understate the actual amount of
inequality if it is the situation is that richer households are able to use income more
wisely than lower income households.
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Table B3: Selected Inequality measures
¾ The Gini coefficient
The Gini coefficient is calculated algebraically by:

G =

1
2n 2µ

∑ ∑
i

j

yi − y

It is often calculated using the more practical Brown Formula G = 1 −

j

∑ (x
i

i +1

− xi )( yi +1 + y i ) ;

Where G: Gini coefficient; X: cumulated proportion of the population variable; Y: cumulated
proportion of the income variable;
The Gini coefficient takes on values between 0 and 1, with (0) interpreted as no inequality and (1)
perfect inequality.
¾ The Atkinson class of inequality measure
Atkinson (1970)proposed an inequality measure defined as: A = 1 − y E ; where ( yE ) is the equally
µ
distributed equivalent level of income and (µ) is the actual mean income.
The more equal the income distributions, the lower the value of the Atkinson Index, since yE becomes
identical to µ.The index A lies between 0 and 1, for any given income distribution. Using a weighting
parameter ε (measure of aversion to inequality), the Atkinson class of inequality measure can be express
as:
⎡
⎢1
A (ε ) = 1 − ⎢
n
⎢
⎣

⎛ y ⎞
∑ ⎜⎜ i ⎟⎟
⎝ µ ⎠

1− ε

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

i

1

(1 − ε )

¾ The general entropy measure
The general entropy measure is formally given by:
T (α ) =

⎡1
⎢
α (α − 1) ⎢⎣ n

1

∑

⎛ yi ⎞
⎜
⎟⎟
i⎜
⎝ µ ⎠

α

⎤ ; Where
− 1⎥
⎥⎦

n is the number of individuals in the sample, yi is the income of individual i, and

µ is mean income.

T (α ) ranges from 0 to ∞ , with (0) representing an equal income distribution and higher values
representing higher levels of income inequality.
• T(0) gives more weight to distances between incomes in the lower tail, it is also refers to as mean
log deviation measure. It is given by:
1
1
µ
T (0) = ∑i log = log µ − ∑i log y i
n

yi

n

Typically, T(0) represent the inequality that would prevail if the mean income is substituted by the
observed income within a group sharing the same characteristic.
• T(1) is the Theil’s inequality measure (Theil (1967)). It applies equal weights across the
distribution of income and is given by :
T (1) =

y
⎛y ⎞ 1
1
∑ i log⎜⎜ µi ⎟⎟ = nµ ∑i yi log yi − log µ
n iµ
⎝ ⎠
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A second limitation of this measure comes from the fact that when collecting the
income data initially, there will always be systematic and random errors. If the data are
less accurate, then the Gini coefficient has less meaning. Also, countries may measure the
statistics differently, thus it is not always possible to compare statistics between
countries. Economies with similar incomes and Gini coefficients can still have very
different income distributions. This is because the Lorenz curves can have different
shapes and yet still yield the same Gini coefficient. As an extreme example, an economy
where half the households have no income and the other half share income equally has a
Gini coefficient of ½; but an economy with complete income equality, except for one
wealthy household that has half the total income, also has a Gini coefficient of ½. This
limitation exists whenever economies whose Lorenz curves intersect are compared.
Thirdly, the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to the income of the middle classes
than to that of the extremes. That is, the Gini is more sensitive to income transfers
between households if they lie near the middle of the income distribution compared to the
tails.91

91

A more technical point is that the small sample variance properties of G are not known, and large sample
approximations to the variance of G are poor. In order for G to be an unbiased estimate of the true
population value, it should be multiplied by n/(n-1).
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APPENDIX C
VARIABLES APPENDIX

Table C1: Descriptive Statistic: All Sample
Variables

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Agriculture machinery
Agriculture value added per worker
Births attended by skilled staffs
Child Mortality rate
Civil Liberty
English Legal origin
Ethnic Fractionalization
Fertility rate
Fiscal decentralization (expenditure)
Fiscal decentralization (revenue)
French Legal Origin
GDP per capita (PPP)
German Legal Origin
Hospital beds
Human Development Indicator (HDI)
Immunization against diphtheria
Immunization against measles
Index of Corruption
Index of quality of bureaucracy
Initial value of GDP per capita
Initial value of Gini coefficient of Income
Language Fractionalization
latitude to the equator
Life expectancy at birth
Literacy of youth
political right
Population density
Poverty Gap (PG)
Poverty Headcount (H)
Pro-poor social expenditures
Female schooling
Schooling
Religious Fractionalization
Repeater rate at primary school (%)

464
434
491
484
417
491
487
446
491
487
491
474
491
447
491
433
427
364
366
421
417
482
467
461
343
415
450
240
240
307
404
404
487
383

0.231
5.9E+03
44700000
54.744
3.065
0.342
0.387
4.081
19.458
15.090
0.456
9.2E+03
0.024
5.641
0.729
73.627
69.337
3.831
3.732
9060.408
39.529
0.336
0.284
63.959
87.582
2.902
173.231
5.038
14.214
45.486
16.413
16.847
0.415
6.908

0.366
8763.5
1.E+08
58.9
1.708
0.475
0.245
1.923
15.358
13.700
0.499
7886.0
0.155
4.6
0.160
24.1
25.5
1.485
1.696
7657.8
11.197
0.270
0.205
11.094
17.3
1.912
620.0
8.157
17.871
15.607
10.738
9.780
0.226
6.486

Min
0.000
77.197
212000
4.000
1.000
0.000
0.002
0.948
0.823
0.235
0.000
5.1E+02
0.000
0.185
0.210
1.200
1.000
0.000
0.010
238.2
16.630
0.002
0.011
37.544
19.546
1.000
1.060
0.010
0.018
8.202
0.200
0.500
0.005
0.000

Max
1.759
49127.7
1.E+09
319
7.000
1.000
0.930
9.274
58.822
53.150
1.000
45582.6
1.000
23.275
0.960
99.938
99.994
6.000
6.000
37081
70.254
0.923
0.722
83.555
99.807
7.000
6502.9
56.083
92.827
85.300
63.100
64.700
8602599
35.000
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Variables

Obs

Risk of expropriation
Risk of repudiation
Scandinavian Legal Origin
Socialism legal origin
Square Poverty Gap (SPG)
Teacher - pupil ratio (in %)

366
366
491
491
240
475

Mean
7.291
6.949
0.022
0.155
2.690
26.126

Std. Dev.

Min

2.318
2.199
0.148
0.362
5.165
11.321

1.400
1.560
0.000
0.000
0.010
6.100

Max
10.000
10.000
1.000
1.000
40.067
64.600

Table C2: Descriptive Statistic: Developing Countries Sample
Variables
Agriculture machinery
Agriculture value added per worker
Births attended by skilled staffs
Child Mortality rate
Civil Liberty
English Legal origin
Ethnic Fractionalization
Fertility rate
Fiscal decentralization (expenditure)
Fiscal decentralization (revenue)
French Legal Origin
GDP per capita (PPP)
German Legal Origin
Hospital beds
Human Development Indicator (HDI)
Immunization against diphtheria
Immunization against measles
Index of Corruption
Index of quality of bureaucracy
Initial value of GDP per capita
Initial value of Gini coefficient of Income
Language Fractionalization
latitude to the equator
Life expectancy at birth
Literacy of youth
political right
Population density
Poverty Gap (PG)
Poverty Headcount (H)
Pro-poor social expenditures
Female schooling
Schooling
Religious Fractionalization
Repeater rate at primary school (%)
Risk of expropriation
Risk of repudiation
Scandinavian Legal Origin

Obs
314
312
329
323
255
329
325
298
329
325
329
316
329
292
329
293
290
215
217
279
279
320
311
305
300
254
299
240
240
164
248
248
325
256
217
217
329

Mean
0.039534
1776.681
5.31E+07
75.35769
3.92549
0.325228
0.463229
3.979792
15.87664
13.07383
0.486322
4591.243
0.018237
3.84996
0.656238
68.99413
67.76694
2.990735
2.671091
4514.298
42.97411
0.378201
0.282876
64.59439
86.08581
3.77769
206.6742
5.038245
14.214
40.677
12.59194
13.99153
0.406004
8.552344
6.21479
5.789019
0.015198

Std. Dev.
0.070812
2041.499
1.70E+08
62.3502
1.397621
0.469174
0.228387
1.888294
13.89102
12.83752
0.500574
2997.521
0.134012
3.591957
0.145927
24.89848
26.086
1.054239
1.180696
2964.032
11.48712
0.288643
0.209008
10.57952
17.96615
1.738728
751.1381
8.156947
17.87137
15.62336
9.443744
8.352098
0.220627
6.819528
2.140794
1.859708
0.122524

Min
3.39E-05
77.1972
439000
5
1
0
0.0394
0.948333
0.822527
0.235019
0
513.7574
0
0.18545
0.209667
1.2
1
0
0.01
539.8337
18.6
0.012422
0.0111
37.54415
19.54575
1
1.060229
0.01
0.018333
8.201923
0.2
0.5
0.004861
0
1.4
1.56
0

Max
0.569364
21821.88
1.24E+09
319
7
1
0.930175
9.274
55.14581
52.25053
1
15270.89
1
14.3086
0.884
99
99.99445
6
6
14549.77
70.25407
0.92268
0.7222
83.55512
99.80708
7
6502.879
56.08333
92.82667
76.81545
61.5
57
0.86026
35
10
9.493
1
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Socialism legal origin
Square Poverty Gap (SPG)
Teacher - pupil ratio (in %)

329
240
317

0.155015
2.689617
29.90076

0.362471
5.164733
11.21175

0
0.01
10.4

1
40.06667
64.6

Table C3: Descriptive Statistic: Higher Income OECD and Non-OECD Countries
Variables
Agriculture machinery
Agriculture value added per worker
Births attended by skilled staffs
Child Mortality rate
Civil Liberty
English Legal origin
Ethnic Fractionalization
Fertility rate
Fiscal decentralization (expenditure)
Fiscal decentralization (revenue)
French Legal Origin
GDP per capita (PPP)
German Legal Origin
Hospital beds
Human Development Indicator (HDI)
Immunization against diphtheria
Immunization against measles
Index of Corruption
Index of quality of bureaucracy
Initial value of GDP per capita
Initial value of Gini coefficient of Income
Language Fractionalization
latitude to the equator
Life expectancy at birth
Literacy of youth
political right
Population density
Poverty Gap (PG)
Poverty Headcount (H)
Pro-poor social expenditures
Female schooling
Schooling
Religious Fractionalization
Repeater rate at primary school (%)
Risk of expropriation
Risk of repudiation
Scandinavian Legal Origin
Socialism legal origin
Square Poverty Gap (SPG)
Teacher - pupil ratio (in %)

Obs
150
122
162
161
162
162
162
148
162
162
162
158
162
155
162
140
137
149
149
142
138
162
156
156
43
161
151
N/A
N/A
143
156
156
162
127
149
149
162
162
N/A
158

Mean
0.63321
16391.32
2.77E+07
13.38872
1.709959
0.376543
0.233342
4.286258
26.72987
19.1357
0.395062
18551.29
0.037037
9.015557
0.875409
83.3223
72.6594
5.042849
5.277372
17992.55
32.56495
0.25134
0.286126
62.71756
98.0175
1.520973
107.0074
N/A
N/A
51.00115
22.48718
21.38718
0.434472
3.594488
8.859201
8.639272
0.037037
0.154321
N/A
18.55295

Std. Dev.
0.408229
10454.69
4.79E+07
8.475993
1.196837
0.486021
0.203208
1.981967
15.66391
14.50029
0.49038
6211.615
0.189438
4.425847
0.046251
18.88381
23.86579
1.140653
1.004342
6009.283
6.318001
0.204813
0.197966
11.97581
3.1518
1.243168
151.8584
N/A
N/A
13.6879
9.85924
10.18594
0.236745
4.107857
1.546642
1.42285
0.189438
0.362376
N/A
6.889371

Min
0.000057
2316.474
212000
4
1
0
0.001998
1.218
1.049501
0.616333
0
3498.313
0
0.712
0.707
11
4
1
2.124
238.1537
16.63
0.002113
0.0111
40.5122
83.52361
1
1.921202
N/A
N/A
18.83826
3.6
3.7
0.091095
0
1.5115
3.282
0
0
N/A
6.1

Max
1.759393
49127.73
2.75E+08
54
6.4
1
0.71242
7.3
58.82211
53.15038
1
45582.56
1
23.275
0.96
99.93777
98.8
6
6
37081.04
53.2
0.643954
0.6889
79.75935
99.8
7
972.6802
N/A
N/A
85.2998
63.1
64.7
0.824078
19
10
10
1
1
N/A
51.8
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Table C4: Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
(o)
(r)
(s)
(t)
(u)
(v)

(a)
1.00
-0.53
-0.45
-0.49
0.70
-0.15
-0.89
0.68
0.74
0.12
0.25
0.72
0.16
-0.10
0.56
0.33
-0.44
0.32

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(j)

1.00
0.95
0.87
-0.58
0.21
0.43
-0.39
-0.55
-0.07
-0.08
-0.33
0.19
0.09
-0.37
-0.20
0.06
-0.32

1.00
0.96
-0.61
0.24
0.34
-0.34
-0.42
-0.15
-0.13
-0.19
0.27
-0.02
-0.30
-0.18
-0.02
-0.42

1.00
-0.62
0.24
0.37
-0.34
-0.37
-0.18
-0.18
-0.18
0.26
-0.07
-0.26
-0.21
-0.02
-0.47

1.00
-0.33
-0.64
0.54
0.43
0.15
0.19
0.43
-0.18
0.08
0.34
0.08
-0.17
0.28

1.00
0.29
-0.39
-0.14
0.11
0.04
-0.02
0.24
-0.07
0.04
-0.09
-0.09
-0.03

1.00
-0.77
-0.64
0.03
-0.08
-0.61
-0.10
0.10
-0.39
-0.39
0.33
-0.34

1.00
0.46
0.01
0.04
0.51
0.04
0.05
0.35
0.37
-0.23
0.33

1.00
0.08
0.21
0.68
0.05
-0.27
0.81
0.21
-0.40
0.14

1.00
0.93
-0.06
0.27
0.50
0.21
0.04
0.07
0.35

(k)

1.00
0.13
0.25
0.51
0.33
0.03
0.04
0.27

(l)

(m)

(n)

(o)

(p)

(q)

1.00
0.22
-0.21
0.53
0.24
-0.49
0.01

1.00
-0.24
-0.07
0.26
-0.32
0.25

1.00
-0.12
-0.18
0.39
0.08

1.00
0.08
-0.26
0.06

1.00
-0.42
0.63

1.00
-0.09

(m)
(n)
(o)
(p)
(q)
(r)

Initial value of Gini coefficient
Births attended by skilled staffs
agriculture machinery
Index of Corruption
Index of Civil liberty
Index of quality of bureaucracy

Variables Definitions
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Human Development Indicator (HDI)
Poverty Headcount (H)
Poverty Gap (PG)
Square Poverty Gap (SPG)
Literacy of Youth
Repeater rate at primary school

(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)

Child Mortality rate
Immunization diphtheria
Agriculture value added per worker
Fiscal decentralization (expenditure)
Fiscal decentralization (revenue)
Pro-poor social Expenditures

(r)

1.00
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Table C5: Description of Variables and Data Source

Variables
Human
Development
Index (HDI)

Poverty
Headcount (H)

Poverty Gap
(PG)

Square Poverty
Gap (SPG)

Expenditure
decentralization

Revenue
Decentralization

Pro-poor Public
Expenditure

Life expectancy

Description and Data Source
Human Development Index (HDI) measures the average overall achievements in
three basic dimensions: longevity measured by life expectancy, knowledge,
captured by educational attainment (adult literacy and combined primary,
secondary and tertiary enrolment), and a decent standard of living, by adjusted
income, real GDP per capita (in PPP$).
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report (2004)
The poverty headcount ratio (%), set at the international $1 (1993 PPP US$) per
person per day, measures the percentage of the population living beneath that
poverty line. It is also referred to as the “incidence” of poverty
Source: World Bank’s PovCalNet:
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp (accessed March 2004).
The poverty gap ratio (%), measures in percentage terms how far the average
expenditure (income) of the poor falls short of the international poverty line of $1
(1993 PPP US$) per person a day. The average is taken over the entire population,
counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gap. The measure reflects the
“depth” of poverty.
Source: World Bank’s PovCalNet:
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp (accessed March 2004).
The square poverty gap ratio (%) of James Foster, J. Greer, and Eric Thorbecke
(FGT), measures the average of the squared proportionate poverty gap, where the
average is taken over the entire population with zero value of poverty gap to the
non-poor. By squaring the poverty gap, more weight is given to larger gaps, thus
capturing the inequality among the poor. The square poverty is also referred to as
the “severity” of poverty.
Source: World Bank’s PovCalNet:
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp (accessed March 2004).
Share of expenditures of all subnational governments (net of transfers to other
levels of government) in total expenditures of consolidated central budget
measured in percents. Scale from 0 to 100. Source: Database on Fiscal Indicators,
by the World Bank, based on IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (2005).
Share of revenues of all subnational governments in total revenues of consolidated
central budget measured in percents. Scale from 0 to 100. Source: Database on
Fiscal Indicators, by the World Bank, based on IMF’s Government Finance
Statistics (2005).
Index that measure categories of public spending on ‘social services’ that are more
likely to benefit the poor and contribute to welfare indicators. They generally
include public expenditures on basic health, primary education, sanitation, housing
and welfare programs.
Source: IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (2005) and World Development
Indicator (2005).
Life expectancy is the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing
patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its
life.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank
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Variable

Immunization
against
Diphtheria
Latitude

Population
density
Immunization
against Measles

Child Mortality
Rate
Literacy Rate,
Youth
Openness

Pupil-teacher
ratio (Primary
school)

Fertility

Legal origin

Index of
Corruption

Description and Data Source
Immunization, DPT (% of children under 12 months). Child immunization
measures the rate of vaccination coverage of children under one year of age. A
child is considered adequately immunized against diphtheria, pertussis (or
whooping cough), and tetanus (DPT) after receiving three doses of vaccine. Scale
from 0 to 100.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank
The absolute latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1.
Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
Population density is midyear population divided by land area in square
kilometers.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank
Immunization, Measles (% of children under 12 months). Child immunization
measures the rate of vaccination coverage of children under one year of age. A
child is considered adequately immunized against measles after receiving three
doses of vaccine. Scale from 0 to 100.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank
Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching the age of five,
per 1000 live births in a given year.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank
Literacy rate, is the literacy rate among people ages 15–24
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank
Error term from the linear regression of the share of export and import in GDP
(measured in percent) on the area and population of the country.
Source: Based on data from World Development Indicators (2005), by the World
Bank
Primary school pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in primary
school divided by the number of primary school teachers (regardless of their
teaching assignment), expressed in percentage.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank
Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a
woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in
accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank
Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of the country.
There are five possible origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial
Code; (3) German Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; (5)
Socialist/Communist laws.
Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indexes for years 2000 and
2001 respectively. Scale from 0 to 10, with higher values corresponding to better
governance outcomes.
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group
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Variable

Political Rights

Civil Liberties

Index of
Corruption
Index of
Bureaucratic
Quality
Risk of
Repudiation

Risk of
Expropriation

Description and Data source
A country rating on a scale of 1 to 7 that indicates the degree of political rights in
regard to existence of free and fair elections, competitive parties or other political
groupings, an opposition that plays a significant role in political decision-making,
and the rights of minority groups to self-government. A rating of 1 indicates
highest level of political rights (closest to the ideals) suggested in the survey.
Source: Freedom in the World 2003; Freedom House
A country rating on a scale of 1 to 7 that indicates the degree of civil liberties in
regard to aspects such as the degree of freedom of expression, assembly,
association, education, religion, and an equitable system of rule of law. A rating of
1 indicates the highest level of civil liberties.
Source: Freedom in the World 2003; Freedom House
An index on a scale of 0 to 6 that measures perceptions of corruption. Corruption
in this context is defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. A higher
score indicates lower expectations of corruption.
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group
An index on a scale of 0 to 6 that measures bureaucratic delays and the general
effectiveness of the government bureaucracy. A higher score indicates a more
effective bureaucracy.
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group
An index on a scale of 0 to 10 that measures the risk that government will renege
on their contracts by modifying the terms due to budget cuts resulting from
revenue drops or any political reasons.
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group
This is an index on a scale of 0 to 10 that measures the risk of expropriation of
private property by government through confiscation or nationalization.
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group

Developing
countries
dummy

Dummy equal to 1 if country does belongs to developing countries. Equal to 0 if
country belongs to high Income OECD or Non-OECD.
Source: Based on World Bank’s countries classification

Agriculture
Value Added
per worker

Agriculture value added per worker is a measure of agricultural productivity.
Value added in agriculture measures the output of the agricultural sector less the
value of intermediate inputs. Agriculture comprises value added from forestry,
hunting, and fishing as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Data
are in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. Source: World Development Indicators (2005),
by the World Bank

Agricultural
machinery,
(tractors per 100
hectares of
arable land)

Agricultural machinery refers to the number of wheel and crawler tractors
(excluding garden tractors) in use in agriculture at the end of the calendar year
specified or during the first quarter of the following year. Arable land includes
land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are
counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market
or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of
shifting cultivation is excluded.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank
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Variable

Description and Data source

Births attended
by skilled staffs

The proportion of births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) is the
percentage of deliveries attended by personnel trained to give the necessary
supervision, care and advice to women during pregnancy, labor and the postpartum period; and to care for newborns.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank

Repeaters rate in
primary school

Repeaters in primary school refer to the total number of pupils who are enrolled in
the same grade as in a previous year, expressed as a percentage of the total
enrollment. It is calculated by taking the total number of students in the last grade
of primary school, minus the number of repeaters in that grade, divided by the total
number of children of official graduation age.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank

Female
schooling
Schooling
Ethnic
Fractionalization
Religion
Fractionalization
Language
Fractionalization
Hospital Beds
(per 1000
people)

GDP per Capita

Gini Coefficient

The Percentage of "primary school complete" in the female population.
The percentage of primary school complete" in the total population.
Ethnic fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected
people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnic group.
Source: Alesina et al. (2003).
Religion fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected
people from a given country will not belong to the same religion.
Source: Alesina et al. (2003).
Language fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected
people from a given country will not speak the same language.
Source: Alesina et al. (2003).
Hospital beds include inpatient beds available in public, private, general, and
specialized hospitals and rehabilitation centers. In most cases beds for both acute
and chronic care are included.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant U.S. dollars
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank
Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some
cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the
cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of
recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index
measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute
equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a
Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect
inequality.
Source: the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID), UNUWIDER, (2005). This new Version 2.0a of June 2005, also referred to as WIID2a
consists of a checked and corrected WIID1, a new update of the Deininger &
Squire database from the World Bank, new estimates from the Luxembourg Income
Study and Transmonee, and other new sources as they have became available.
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APPENDIX D
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

Optimal Weighting Matrix

A key feature of the GMM procedure is the use of optimal weighting matrix to
generate efficient estimator when there is an excess of instruments or when there is
presence of an arbitrary form of heteroskedasticity. Thus, a natural question that comes to
mind is how to derive an optimal weighting matrix?
The efficient GMM estimator is obtained by choosing the optimal weighting
matrix that minimizes the asymptotic variance of the estimator. This is equivalent to
setting the weighting matrix W in equation (4.6b) equal to the inverse of the covariance
matrix of the orthogonality conditions. Let’s denote S [ L × L] this covariance matrix.
SN =

1
N

N

∑ Z ′i u i u ′i Z i =
i =1

1
N

N

∑ Z′ Ω
i =1

i

i

Z,

(1D)

Where Ω i is the covariance matrix of the disturbance term u i . The efficient
GMM estimator is then derived substituting W = S −1 in the equation (4.6b).
)

β EPGMM = [ X′ Z S N −1 Z ′ X] −1 X′ Z S N −1 Z ′ y

(2D)

The associated asymptotic variance of the efficient GMM estimator is given by:
)
AVar ( β EPGMM ) = [ X ′ Z ( N S N ) −1 Z ′ X] −1

(3D)

Baum et al. (2003) note that to get the feasible efficient panel GMM estimator,
one need to make some assumption about the covariance matrix of the disturbance term
)
Ω i in order to be able to estimate the matrix S . The consistent estimator of S is S

expressed as:
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) 1
)
S = [Z ′ Ω Z]
N

(4D)

A feasible efficient two-step Panel GMM can be obtained using the following 3
stages:
First, estimate a standard IV model and save the residual. Next, construct an
optimal weighting matrix using the estimated residual such that
) ) −1 ⎛ 1
) ⎞ −1
W = S = ⎜ [Z ′ Ω Z] ⎟ . Finally, use the estimated optimal weighting matrix to derive
⎠
⎝N
)
the efficient panel GMM estimator β EPGMM and its corresponding asymptotic variance
)
AVar ( β EPGMM ) . This yield
)

)

)

β EPGMM = [ X ′ Z (Z ′ Ω Z) −1 Z ′ X] −1 X ′ Z (Z ′ Ω Z) −1 Z ′ y

(5D)

)
)
AVar ( β EPGMM ) = [ X ′ Z (Z ′ Ω Z) −1 Z ′ X] −1

(6D)

)
)
Different results for β EPGMM and AVar ( β EPGMM ) could be obtained depending on

)
the restrictions imposed on Ω i , may it be conditional homoskedasticity,
heteroskedasticity-consistent or allowing for intra-cluster correlation.

Test of Exogeneity / Endogeneity of Subset of Instruments

Another statistic used to test a subset of the original overidentifying restrictions or
orthogonality conditions is called the “C test” or the “difference-in-sargan” test. This is
equivalent to testing exogeneity or endogeneity of a set of regressors in a model. In the
context of efficient GMM estimator, this test is calculated as a difference in two Jstatistics, whereas in standard IV models, it uses the difference between two Sargan test
statistics. The basic idea of this test is to compare two J statistics from two separate
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)
GMM estimators of the same coefficient vector β , one using only the instruments
included in the unrestricted model (inefficient but consistent, in which a specified set of
suspected instruments are excluded) and the other using the restricted and fully efficient
model (containing the entire set of overidentifying restrictions, including the specified set
of instruments). If the inclusion of the suspected instruments increases the J-statistic
substantially, it is interpreted as evidence against these specified instruments to satisfy
the orthogonality conditions (Hayashi 2000; Baum et al. 2003). Under the null hypothesis
that the specified variables are proper instruments (orthogonal), the C-statistic has
a χ 2 distribution with the degree of freedom equals the number of suspected instrument
being tested. Formally, the C-statistic can be expressed as

C = J ( β ) − J 1 ( β 1 ) ~ χ K2 − K1 ,

(7D)

Where J − J1 is the difference between restricted, fully efficient Hansen J statistics
and the unrestricted inefficient but consistent Hansen J-statistic. K − K1 is the number
of suspected instruments to be tested. It is worth noting that in the context of efficient
GMM or IV with heteroskedasticity-robust standard deviation, using the traditional
Hausman (1978) test to examine the endogeneity of the regressors may produce negative
test statistic with an incorrect degree of freedom.92 However, these shortcomings can
easily be overcome using the C-test, which test for endogeneity by estimating the
restricted and fully efficient model, while indicating the set of suspected regressors to be
examined.

92

In the case of conditional homoskedasticity, the standard Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and the C-test are
numerically the same in the IV context since they are all tests for the validity of set of orthogonality
conditions. These tests differ when the number of orthogonality conditions being tested is greater than the
number of endogenous regressors in the unrestricted regression (Baum et al. 2003).
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Table D1: Random versus Fixed effect model+
Model
Dependant Var.

H

Fixed Effects Model
PG
SPG

Decentralization
(Expenditure)

-0.187*
(0.104)

-0.090
(0.056)

-0.069
(0.046)

-0.160**
(0.075)

-0.086**
(0.039)

-0.060**
(0.029)

Repetition rate

0.124
(0.152)

-0.010
(0.074)

-0.017
(0.066)

0.156
(0.118)

0.018
(0.065)

0.006
(0.058)

Population
Density a

-1.355
(3.933)

-1.935
(1.791)

-2.533*
(1.313)

0.175
(0.911)

-0.108
(0.489)

-0.178
(0.285)

Immunization
Diphtheria

-0.008
(0.027)

-0.012
(0.012)

-0.019
(0.013)

-0.004
(0.025)

-0.013
(0.013)

-0.023*
(0.012)

Agriculture Value
Added per Worker a

-4.499
(3.150)

-0.545
(1.332)

0.760
(0.937)

-8.210***
(1.732)

-2.703***
(0.852)

-1.432**
(0.659)

Initial Value of
Gini Coefficient

0.133
(0.105)

0.014
(0.050)

-0.005
(0.047)

0.124
(0.084)

0.016
(0.041)

-0.007
(0.034)

H

Random Effects Model
PG
SPG

Observations
163
163
163
163
163
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a
Note
Variable in Logarithm
b
Variable expressed as a percentage of total expenditure
+
Year dummy included

163

Table D2: GMM-IV First Stage Estimates

Dependant Variables
First lag Fiscal decentralization
Second lag Fiscal Decentralization
French Legal Origin

Fiscal
decentralization
(1)
0.877***
(0.059)
0.099*
(0.058)
0.362
(0.411)

First lag square of Fisc. Decent.

0.802***
(0.057)
0.137**
(0.055)

Second lag square Fisc. Decent.
Number of Observations
R-Square

Square of Fiscal
decentralization
(2)

306
0.86

Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

306
0.85
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Figure D1: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Expenditure) and Human
Development Indicators (HDI) by Income Level
B) Lower Income Countries

.2

.2

.4

.4

.6

.6

.8

.8

A) All Developing Countries

1

11

21

31
subexp

41

hdi
Fitted values

51

1.5

11.5

95% CI

21.5
31.5
subexp

41.5

hdi
Fitted values

95% CI

D) Higher Middle Income

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

C) Lower Middle Income

51.5

1

11

21

31
subexp

41

hdi

51

1

11

95% CI

21
31
subexp

41

hdi

Fitted values

51
95% CI

Fitted values

Figure D2: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Expenditure) and Poverty
Headcount (H) by Income Level
B) Lower Income Countries
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Figure D3: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Expenditure) and
Poverty Gap (PG) by Income Level
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Figure D4: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Expenditure) and
Square Poverty Gap (SPG) by Income Level
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Figure D5: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Revenue) and
Human Development Indicators (HDI) by Income Level
B) Lower Income Countries
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Figure D6: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Revenue) and
Poverty Headcount (H) by Income Level
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Figure D7: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Revenue) and
Poverty Gap (PG) by Income Level
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Figure D8: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Revenue) and
Square Poverty Gap (SPG) by Income Level
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Table D3: List of Countries in the Sample by Region
Economy
Developing Countries

Code

China
Fiji
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mongolia
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Thailand

CHN
FJI
IDN
MYS
MNG
PNG
PHL
THA

Argentina
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russian Federation
Slovak Republic
Tajikistan
Turkey

ARG
BLR
BGR
HRV
CZE
EST
HUN
KAZ
KGZ
LVA
LTU
MDA
POL
ROM
RUS
SVK
TJK
TUR

Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Ethiopia
Gambia, The
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Senegal
South Africa
Swaziland
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

BEN
BWA
BFA
CMR
ZAR
ETH
GMB
KEN
MDG
MWI
MUS
SEN
ZAF
SWZ
UGA
ZMB
ZWE

Region
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa

Freq.

1
2
2
2
2
5
5
6
5
6
6
6
6
6
4
2
6

Percent

Cum.

5
6
6
6
4
5
5
6

1.02
1.22
1.22
1.22
0.81
1.02
1.02
1.22

1.02
2.24
3.46
4.68
5.49
6.51
7.53
8.75

5
4
4
5
4
5
5
2
2
4
4
4
5
6
5
2
3
2

1.02
0.81
0.81
1.02
0.81
1.02
1.02
0.42
0.42
0.81
0.81
0.81
1.02
1.22
1.02
0.42
0.61
0.43

9.77
10.58
11.39
12.41
13.22
14.24
15.26
15.68
16.1
16.91
17.72
18.53
19.55
20.77
21.79
22.21
22.82
23.25

0.2
0.42
0.42
0.42
0.42
1.02
1.02
1.22
1.02
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.22
0.81
0.42
1.22

51.53
51.95
52.37
52.79
53.21
54.23
55.25
56.47
57.49
58.71
59.93
61.15
62.37
63.59
64.4
64.82
66.04

161
Developing Countries (Continued)

Freq.
South Asia
South Asia
South Asia
South Asia
South Asia

Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka

BGD
IND
PAK
LKA

Iran, Islamic Rep.
Jordan
Tunisia

IRN
JOR
TUN

Middle East & North Africa
Middle East & North Africa
Middle East & North Africa
Middle East & North Africa

Albania
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela, RB

ALB
BOL
BRA
CHL
COL
CRI
DOM
ECU
SLV
GTM
HND
MEX
NIC
PAN
PRY
PER
TTO
URY
VEN

Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean

Percent

Cum.

3
6
5
6

0.61
1.22
1.02
1.22

47.87
49.09
50.11
51.33

5
1
6

1.02
0.2
1.22

45.84
46.04
47.26

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.22
0.81
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.22
1.02
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.42

24.27
25.29
26.31
27.53
28.75
29.97
31.19
32
33.02
34.04
35.06
36.28
37.3
38.52
39.74
40.96
42.18
43.4
44.82

5
5
5
6
6
6
6
4
5
5
5
6
5
6
6
6
6
6
7

162

Developed Countries

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

High income: OECD
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea, Rep.
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
ISL
IRL
ITA
JPN
KOR
LUX
NLD
NZL
NOR
PRT
ESP
SWE
CHE
GBR
USA

High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD

6
6
5
7
6
7
7
6
6
6
7
6
1
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
6
6
7
6

1.22
1.22
1.02
1.42
1.22
1.43
1.42
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.42
1.22
0.2
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.42
1.22
1.22
1.43
1.22

67.26
68.48
69.5
70.92
72.14
73.57
74.99
76.21
77.43
78.65
80.07
81.29
81.49
82.71
83.93
85.15
86.37
87.59
88.81
90.23
91.45
92.67
94.1
95.32

Bahrain
Cyprus
Israel
Slovenia

BHR
CYP
ISR
SVN

High income: nonOECD
High income: nonOECD
High income: nonOECD
High income: nonOECD
High income: nonOECD

6
6
6
5

1.22
1.22
1.22
1.02

96.54
97.76
98.98
100
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